The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freewill: The Discussion of Classic Solutions Based on Zagzebski’s Opinions

The question of the divine foreknowledge and the human freewill (volition) is among the most important and complex philosophical issues within the Abrahamic religions tradition, which has come to be called theological fatalism. In the article at hand, we present the new reading of this issue by Zagzebski and discuss the three traditional solutions by Boethius, William of Ockham, and Molina. According to Boethian solution, God is atemporal. William of Ockham deems God’s knowledge of our freewill as a soft fact rather than a hard one, while Molina denies the premise of the transfer of past necessity. This article shows that the question and its solutions have wrongly deemed the eternity of God within time. That viewpoint is against Anselm’s theology that takes God as atemporal. Finally, we show that atemporality solution agrees with Anselm’s theology and God’s actual knowledge. The human’s agency is in line with God’s agency. That is to say, on the one hand, God’s knowledge is at the top of the causal chain that leads to the realization of an act and is considered as one of the conditions for the realization of the voluntary act. On the other hand, the human knowledge and power is part of the causal chain of that action. Therefore, the consideration of the finite human knowledge as relying on the infinite and atemporal knowledge of God does not contradict the human freewill.