PhD Student in Private Law. University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services

Applying general bankruptcy rules to banks might cause many legal problems. Distinct characteristics of banks and their important role in the financial system makes many countries use the recovery institution in order to prevent the banks’ bankruptcy. The assessment of Iran regulations shows that any comprehensive laws of recovery have not ever legislated, hence it seems necessary to enact efficient laws in this regard. Due to the distinct social, economic, political, and legal characteristics of countries, it is not possible to provide a consistent model for recovery regulation in all countries. Moreover, translating and copying from other countries should not be utilized to formulate recovery regulations. Therefore, adoption of recovery institutions requires it to be completely analyzed and investigated.

Theoretical frame work:

This study on the one hand explains the concept of recovery and introduce the most common methods of recovery. On the other hand, it analyses the Iranian regulations in the field of bank recovery and reviews the practical recovery examples in Iran and evaluates their efficiency. Finally, by understanding the legal nature of each recovery method, the one with correct legal basis according to Iranian law (i.e. appropriate to be adopted in Iran) is determined. A legal model that is consistent with the legal principles of Iran is consequently proposed

This study attempts to answer the main questions of this research based on the analysis of the legal nature of the recovery. It investigates the possibility of adopting the recovery models in Iran by criticizing and comparing various statutes, regulations, and legal doctrines of different countries.

Bankruptcy is a judicial process that only considers the rights of creditors neglecting public benefit. Recovery, on the other hand, is an administrative process with the aim of allowing bank depositors to continue to meet their liquidity needs by accessing banking services. In addition, in this process, the bank's assets are managed in such a way that the value of the insolvent bank is maintained. In this paper, three widely used methods of bank recovery, which are mergers, purchase and assumption, and payments through the Deposit Guarantee are examined. Regarding the difference between the merger method and the purchase and assumption method, it should be noted that the latter involves the purchase of the insolvent bank’s assets and the acceptance of its liabilities, while in the former, the insolvent bank shares are sold and solvent Bank becomes the deputy director of the insolvent bank.  In addition, in the purchase and assumption method the legal personality of the insolvent bank does not disappear, but in the merger model, the legal personality of the insolvent bank disappears by merging with the solvent bank. On the other hand, the difference between the payments through the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the merger model is that the assignment of the bank commitment to the fund does not remove the contractual liability from the bank. This fact is in contrast to the merger method, which is based on the transfer of the contract. In the Deposit Guarantee Fund, the insolvent bank is still recognized as a party to the contract with depositors. However, in the merger method, the legal personality of the insolvent bank is completely reserved and the solvent Bank becomes its deputy. 

Conclusions & Suggestions:

In this paper a recovery model consistent with the legal principles of Iran is proposed. It is shown that the preparation of the Bank Recovery Law should not be merely an imitation and requires an analysis of the legal nature of recovery methods. The proposed model for Iran, through the mergers as well as purchase and assumption methods, is a bilateral legal act (contract). Similar to the legal systems of some other countries, namely, US, Switzerland and Canada, the permission of debtors and creditors of the bank is not part of the basic structure of the proposed recovery model. However, the imposition of this plan on creditors can only take place if the proposed recovery plan is perfectly appropriate and in the interests of the creditors. The proposed legal model, if payment is made through the Deposit Guarantee Fund, is inherently a contract that is made solely by the will of the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Thus, there is no need for the permission of the depositors and the insolvent bank, because the bank's permission is not a condition for its validity and only deprives the fund of referring to it. In the model, the central bank or deposit guarantee fund is considered as a supervisory authority over the banking system. This authority, based on the estimated costs and conditions of the insolvent bank, takes into account the order of priority i.e. mergers, purchase and assumption, and payments through the Deposit Guarantee Fund. It then applies the proposed model to prevent the bank from going bankrupt. The adoption of an inconsistent law of recovery from other countries, in addition to its social, economic and political effects, could confuse and frustrate the legal system. Therefore, the development of efficient regulations in accordance with the nature of the recovery methods based on the proposed approach is of great importance in the Iranian legal system.