Transcendental Freedom and Kant's Philosophy of History

The concept of freedom is one of the most central concepts in Kant’s Philosophy which has a critical role in both theoretical and practical reason. Some interpreters believe that agency and spontaneity of reason in theoretical knowledge is another expression of autonomy and freedom. In another hand, freedom plays a central part in practical reason too. In fact, practical reason as a will that determines itself abstracted from the casual system of nature is nothing but freedom. But there is a challenge that this fundamental concept in Kant’s philosophy encounter. This challenge in Hegelian terms is that this freedom is just “Transcendental”; it means this freedom is abstracted and cut of reality and Kant never succeed in proving this fundamental concept of his philosophy and just supposed it Transcendentally, as something needed for establishing his philosophy. In this article, we first try to explain the challenge and then critique the possibility of solving it by focusing on Kant’s writings on History. So, in the introduction part, we explain the critique of Transcendentalism in the concept of freedom. Then, we try to show how Kant in the philosophy of history tried to find a way out of the Transcendental grasp of freedom and shows that freedom is an actuality that appears in history. In conclusion, we critique the sufficiency of our reading and this suggested solution.