The Role of Non-Empirical Assumptions in Science and Its Consequences on the Idea of Local- Religious Science

The movements of philosophy of science after the sixties, in particular, have abandoned the principle of verificationism and the belief in an explicit and absolute method for evaluating various scientific claims. On the other hand, such criticisms have played a special role in shaping, or validating claims related to, possibilities of other kinds of science, in particular, local / religious science programs. The central role of these developments is the role of non-empirical assumptions in scientific activities. This article tries to express the two main critiques of Kuhn and Quine on positivist views and then, by providing a four-level framework for scientific activity, we analyze the scope and consequences of these critiques to find out its effect on the discussion of "the interaction and participation of non-empirical assumptions in scientific activity". In this article, we state that by abandoning the principle of "verificationism", the criterion of the experimental test, including the whole transferred theory (confirmation holism) and by abandoning the idea of the explicit algorithmic scientific method, we are faced with "methodological pluralism". Attempts have been made to show that, assuming the validity of conventional critiques, although positivist austerity is incorrect, there are still important constraints on the interplay of non-empirical propositions arising from metaphysical, religious, and indigenous beliefs in scientific theories and the incorporation of non-cognitive values into scientific judgments.