The Criterion of Truth from the Point of View of Charles Peirce and William James and its Criticism Based on the Point of View of Mulla Sadra and Morteza Motahari

The main question of the present study is concerned with the quiddity of “truth” from the point of view of two prominent figures of pragmatic philosophy: Charles Peirce and William James. Therefore, in this study first a description and analysis of the issue of truth from the point of view of these two pragmatist philosophers are provided and then its principles and basics are criticized based on the views of two Islamic philosophers: Mulla Sadra and Morteza Motahari. In a nutshell, the main claims of Peirce and James in the field of epistemology are: the pursuit of the pragmatic consequences in the stage of knowledge and authenticating the practical utility instead of adapting the mental concepts to reality (external reality or fact-itself) and determining its truth criterion. They believe that the differences and similarities between the ideas and mental concepts are not determined by the mind, but they are determined by means of tangible and practical experiences. Mulla Sadra and Morteza Motahari criticized and rejected this view and believed that this approach leads to the following problems: 1. The meaninglessness of theoretical concepts. 2. Relativity in knowing and gaining of truth. 3. The elimination of rational good and badness. 4. The necessity of pluralism in doctrinal issues and radical thoughts.