On Carnap's Endeavor for By-Passing the Barriers ofMeaningful Speech

In this paper, I try to give a clear reading of Carnap's conventionalismagainst the prevalent philosophical back ground of the day. Thebackground had been painted in Wittgensetinian colors, which weredeemed by Carnap to be rusty, dogmatic and unacceptable. It beginswith the primary satisfaction of logical empiricists with Wittgensteinianapproach to truth and the status of logical sentences (a satisfactionwhich ended to a deep dissatisfaction soon enough). Then I attend toCarnap's remarkable criticisms of Wittgenstein's absolutist point ofview, which is devoid of necessary conventional elements. At the end,we will see that Carnap's attempt at suggesting an alternative schemefor explaining the status of logical and mathematical sentences, as it isput forward in Logical Syntax of Language (1934), suffers from similarshortcomings. This does not need to debase the brilliant points whichemerged out of Carnap's critical reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy,though.