Cultural Relativism in Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Cultural and Religious Rituals

According to the current interpretation, Wittgenstein in "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" takes an expressive approach to religious rituals and cultural practices. Relying on this approach, he criticizes Frazer's view. Moyal-Sharrock, relying on this interpretation, considers Wittgenstein as a proponent of a kind of cultural relativism. But cultural relativism is subject to objections from the perspective of naturalism and the theory of evolution. In this article, we will review Brian Clack's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Clack considers Wittgenstein's view of ritual practices to be compatible with naturalism and an evolutionary account of the social and cultural life of humans. We will then examine Emily Heckel's account of cultural relativism in Wittgenstein's reflections on religious rituals and cultural practices. We will show: (1) how Heckel defends that Wittgenstein is a cultural relativist in these reflections, and (2) how Heckel rejects objections of some naturalists and evolutionists to Wittgenstein's cultural relativism. Finally, we defend the position that, (a) Wittgenstein is not an epistemological cultural relativist, (b) from Wittgenstein's point of view, cultural and religious rituals are not alternatives to science, but they are present in all cultures—including modern culture—beside science, (c) Wittgenstein is a semantic relativist about cultural rituals, and (d) Wittgenstein's defense of the significance of rituals in the social life of human does not conflict with naturalistic study about human, language, and culture, and one can defend Wittgenstein's position about cultural rituals from some naturalistic point of view.