Comparing the Views of Akhund Khurāsānī and the Philosophers on “the Predicate Extracted from the Subject itself” and “the Predicate by Way of Adherence” Emphasizing Ibn Sina’s Viewpoint

There is a connection and give-and-take between different sciences in different ways. In the same way, there is a close and wide-ranging relationship between the principles of jurisprudence on one side and logic and philosophy on the other. The knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence has been influenced by various logical and philosophical issues. In this article, the judgment of some commentators of Kifāya on the compatibility or non-compatibility of the view of Akhund Khurāsānī with the view of logicians and philosophers on the issue of “the predicate extracted from the subject itself” and “the predicate by way of adherence” has been specifically discussed. The authors maintain that Akhund’s view bears two interpretations, one is compatible with the view of philosophers and the other, which has a more subtle meaning, distances from philosophical view. For this purpose, we have tried to find the roots of the debate in logical texts, especially Ibn Sīnā, as the most prominent pioneer of the debate. Scrutiny and analysis of the concepts of “extracted” (khārij), “with the way of adherence” (bi al-ḍamīma) and “from its very essence” (min Ṣamīmih) has led to the point that if we are satisfied with his expressions in Kifāya, Akhund is in agreement with logicians and philosophers, and if the term “the predicate extracted from the subject self” in his words can concomitantly denote the concept of “from its very essence”, then it will be different from philosophers’ view.