A Critique of Plantinga's Anti-Evidentialist Approach from the Perspective of Applied Philosophy of Religion
The current study examines Plantinga's anti-evidentialist position through the perspective of applied philosophy of religion, illustrating how epistemological positions can have detrimental practical effects. The article's main claim is that entering the postmodern era and distancing thinkers like Plantinga from general rationality and lowering its standards, including the duty to ground claims on sufficient evidence, has eventually caused reason to be excluded from religious dialogue or to talk about a kind of regional rationality. The consequence of this transformation is the obstruction of dialogue between followers of various religions on the one hand, and believers and non-believers on the other, and lastly, the deprivation of human beings of common and agreed-upon criteria for criticizing each other's beliefs. When the issue of obstruction of dialogue and critique is combined with the fact that there is a close link between beliefs and actions, the problem becomes even worse; because without general criteria for criticizing beliefs, it will be impossible to criticize the actions resulting from them, and all groups, including extremist groups, will be able to absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions and justify their possible crimes in practice.
- حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران میشود.
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