The Paradox of the Truth of Singular Cogent Hypotheticals with any Antecedents and Consequents
Hypothetical logic has a special place in the tradition of Avicennan logic. In this tradition, various opinions have been presented about the conditions of the truth of hypothetical sentences and the conditions of syllogisms with hypothetical premises. One of the most prominent Avicennan logicians who discussed it is Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī. The truth of singular cogent hypotheticals is a special topic of Samarqandī about hypotheticals. His analysis of this type of hypotheticals finally led to limiting the number of hypothetical syllogisms. In this article, I compare the opinions of Samarqandī about the conditions for the truth of singular cogent hypotheticals with the opinions of Fakhruddīn Rāzī and Abdullah Jīlanī. I show that the origin of the differences between these logicians is the difference in their interpretations of Avicenna's texts about quantifiers of hypotheticals.
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