Reception of Modern Science in Iran: Rethinking the Role of the Shi'ite Clergy

ore than two centuries have passed since the introduction of modern sciences, especially the Newtonian astronomy, into the Islamic world and Iran. The historiography covering the period of opposition until widespread acceptance of modern astronomy by the Shi’ite clergy, should be persued with utmost care and meticulous examination of written evidence and material culture. This period includes the transition from the belief in the centrality and fixity of the earth, assumed not only in the Ptolemaic system but also in other cosmographies of the Islamic era, to modern cosmology. In the last few decades, historians of science have made various comments about this period. Seyyed Hossein Nasr talks about wholesale surrender of  Islamic scholars when facing Western science without launching any criticism. On the other hand, Gamini, a historian of science, maintains, by separating the mainstream Shi’ites from the Shaykhiya and the Sufis, that there were different reactions by these groups towards modern science. Unlike the Shaykhiya and Sufis, the opposition of the mainstream scholars towards modern astronomy was not due to religious dogmas, but it took place only on philosophical grounds. One of the Shi’ite ulama, who had a completely critical view of modern science, was Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn al-Kāshif al-Ghitāʾ. In his writings from the time of Constitutionalism and the following decades, he especially opposes modern astronomy and Darwin's theory of evolution. Gamini has advanced a different reading of the writings of Kashif al-Ghita. In the present article, the contentions that Gamini has expressed in recent years, especially in his new writings, regarding the confrontation of the Shi’ite ulama with modern astronomy, are challenged here. It is argued that they are either anachronistic or rely on the false assumption that the opposition of the mainstream Shi’ite scholars to modern astronomy was solely or mainly related to their philosophical considerations rather than religious objections. In addition, the incorrectness of Gamini’s assertion that Kāshif al-Ghitāʾ only objected to the evolution of humankind and was generally sympathetic towards Darwin’s theory of evolution will be shown