Theory of Truth in Husserl's Phenomenology

By abandoning the natural attitude and ruling out the presupposition of external world, phenomenology results in a wide reconsidering of classical concepts, problems and methods, among the most important of which is the “truth”. As we shallsee, in spite of Husserl’s insistence on “correspondence” and contrary to commentators such as Bell, phenomenology results in an adjustment of the concept of “object”, which practically rejects correspondence. With engaging this concept in processesof coherentism, Husserl turns to “coherence”, so that we cannot yet make a distinction between “coherence as the method of arriving at truth” and “coherence as an essential element in definition of truth”. We’ll follow this by introducing object, synthesis and horizon, and finally with analyzing two kinds of errors (immanent and transcendent), we’ll arrive at the dialectic, inherent in the endless play of truth and falsehood.