A Study on the Universal with Special Reference to Some of Ibn Sìnå's Works

This article is a study and analysis of some of Ibn Sìnå’s technical terms as referred to in the first chapter of the fourth namaĥ of his al-Ishåråt wal-tanbìhåt, wherein he tries to prove the existence of the natural universal (al-kullì al-ĥabi'ì) as a single intelligible fact in the outside world in order to counter those who equate being with sense-perceptible being. In this regard he refers to certain features of the proved fact, such that it seems that what has been proved is somewhat compatible with the Platonic universal rather than the Aristotelian one; however, as far as the issue of the universal is concerned, Ibn Sìnå is a realist in the Aristotelian sense, and denies the realistic universal in the Platonic sense. To support her discussion, the author also reviews briefly some of the different views on universals and the common basis of philosophers in the tradition of Islamic philosophy. She studies some of Ibn Sìnå’s views in the Ilåhiyyåt ('Metaphysics') of al-Shifå' and then deals with the first chapter of the fourth namaĥ of al-Ishåråt wal-tanbìhåt. In addition, during the discussion the author also addresses the question: Will the denial of Platonic realism lead us practically to pure conceptualism, and finally to nominalism?At the end of the article the author throws some light on certain points and problems, each of which can be in turn a topic for further research, some of the most important of which are as follows: 1) On the basis of Aristotelian realism, according to which the universal is acquired from sensible things - whether from only one individual or from several individuals - can ‘induction’, as such, support universal concepts? If the reply is in ffirmative, is not then universal knowledge a posteriori? And if so, how does the universality of the universal attain its validity? 2) If in a philosophical system, like that of Mullå Ģadrå, it is thought that ‘form’ is the existential status of a thing and ‘being’ is the criterion of individuation, can we ever assume a common point, named the nature of the thing? In other words, will not the transformation of ‘form’ as an essential constituent to an existential mode of thing - in a doctrine that stresses the difference between ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’- lead practically to a kind of individualism? And finally, what is the basic difference between the results of this position and conceptualism?