POLITICAL CONSENSUS THROUGH SETTING INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS; CASE OF IAS 22

The study aims to reveal that a valid and effective standard, which formerly issued, may reflect the needs and expectation of few interested powerful bodies due to the neutral comments and dearth of lobbyists in the process of setting the standard. The research investigates the working of the IASB, by exploring the standard setting process specifically in relation to the standard on business combinations which has been on the agenda over an extended period of time. The written submissions in response to 14 issues, proposed in Exposure Draft 61 (1997), to revise IAS 22 “Business Combination” are analysed to understand whether various comments from different interested parties deliberately affect IASB’s decision. The situations in which any of the lobbyists (e.g. Anglo-American bodies) may exert influence are discussed. The results confirm an overall support to the proposed issues by the participants. So there was a satisfactory degree of consensus between the lobbyists involved in IAS 22 in favour of what the IASB was attempting to do. It may raise our concerns about the effectiveness of the deliberation method in the process of setting IASs. This provides us evidence that the IASB acted independently and made its decisions rationally. However a managed type of consensus was seen, which is consistent with the covert view of excreting power and mimetic isomorphism, as a result of insufficiency of respondents and large numbers of neutral comments on the outcome of the consultation process. It then justifies the needs for a revision of the standard once more as happened in IFRS 3.