فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 1 (تابستان 1393)

To find a foundation for knowledge is among the important discussions in epistemology, a foundation that is self-warranted, not acquired from anything else. Referring knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by presence is a foundationalist theory that is underlined and explained by Allama Tabatabaei. This theory which has been furthered explained by Martyr Mutahhari, his disciple, has many epistemic implications.One of such references is the reference of philosophical concepts such as the concepts of cause and effect to knowledge by presence. These concepts were considered as mental constructions by Hume and mental frameworks by Kant, leading thus epistemology to skepticism.By referring these concepts to knowledge by presence, they were able to deem the statements made out of these concepts as self-warranted and objective. The principle of causality and self-evident truths are however defendable, as mentioned by Farabi, without relying on such references. This is of course an independent research work. Another instance of reference is the reference of outwardly sensible things to knowledge by presence. It includes two things: 1) error is not in sense perception but in application (of sense perception) 2) to attain correspondence sensible things are in need of explanation, implying that one cannot definitely say that something exists in the external world and has certain qualities as soon as one senses it.

This study deals with the issue of psychology of religious experience with the aim of explaining the nature of psychological analysis put forth by psychologists about religious experience. Our methodology consists of giving a descriptive, analytic and critical account [of the subject under discussion] and analyzing its content on the basis of library research. The main questions addressed include biological foundations of religious experience, prerequisites and psychological conditions for religious experience, impact of psychotropic drugs on religious experience and psychological criteria for distinguishing true experience from false one.Based on empirical evidence and the theories presented by Muslim philosophers the author concludes that religious experience cannot be altogether reduced to biological factors. Psychological conditions such self-purity, vigilance and theoretical and practical asceticism are influential in the emergence and deepening of religious experience. The theories of William James and Sunden that attribute [religious experience] to the activities of the left side of brain are among the psychological explanations of religious experience. Psychotropic drugs do not bring about religious experiences. If there is any clinical disorder symptom of hallucinating [with a person] it can only show a psychological disease.

There are phrases and poems among the words and poems of mystics, which if not explained properly, tend to be against religious commandments. Among such words that have caused religious scholars to accuse true mystics of remissness and carelessness, is the famous sentence according to which when truths are revealed religious laws are abrogated. According to this article, such phrases never deny the existence of obligations in this world. Instead they mean the same thing as some verses and traditions mean, that is one needs to act in accordance with religious laws and thus attain proximity to truth, as long as one has not died. However when one dies and there is no longer any curtain that prevents one from seeing the truths, [one can no longer act in accordance with religious laws for] such laws are no longer valid for him. He remains with whatever he has done. Relying on the words of mystics and analyzing them, the author intends to prove the afore-mentioned theory.

No doubt, one of the privileges of Muslim philosophers (from Farabi onward) over other Muslim thinkers in demonstrating the necessary being is their argument of truthful ones. What is the characteristic of this argument and what is its distinctive criterion? The question this research addresses is: what is the criterion for truthful ones? Mulla Sadra does not regard Avicenna's argument as the argument of truthful ones whereas Avicenna himself gives this name to his argument. Does Farabi, who is the founder this argument, agree with Mulla Sadra on the criterion of truthful ones or does he have his own separate criterion? Which criterion did Allama choose? This study shows that Farabi, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabatabaei have introduced a single criterion for the argument of truthful ones. As to whether or not the arguments presented by Avicenna and Mulla Sadra have the criterion for truthful ones it is something that however needs to be assessed. This study shows that Avicenna's argument and three other arguments presented by Mulla Sadra do not enjoy having the criterion of the truthful ones. However the arguments presented by Mulla Sadra in his Mafatih and Allama Tabatabaei in his Commentary on Asfar are the [only] ones that have the criterion of truthful ones.

In the first chapter of the fourth section of his al-Isharat, Avicenna, relying on the common nature of material things, presents an argument against materialism, which has been focused on by later thinkers. In this argument, the negatively conditioned nature is confused with the unconditioned nature. What is available with material examples is the unconditioned nature that is plural and material and what is immaterial is the negatively conditioned nature which is not available along with the instances of nature. Relying on Avicenna's words, this article tries to explain this argument in a manner that may not be prone to this objection. According to the author, Avicenna wants to falsify the epistemic and methodological foundations of materialism through showing the inefficiency of senses in perceiving sensible natures. Material things include an immaterial nature. When Avicenna says that nature is not sensible he does not intend to say that it is not sensible ontologically. Instead he intends to say that it is not sensible methodologically and epistemologically.

The main question addressed by this study is: What is Aristotle's formulation of the principle of non-contradiction and what are its epistemic roles? Using an analytic methodology and based on Aristotle's works this study assesses the nature and epistemic roles of the principle of non-contradiction. Based on this study, Aristotle has, on the whole, given seventeen formulations of the principle of non-contradiction. One can arrange these formulations into two groups: ontological formulations and logical formulations. The former focuses on 'existence' as the axis of the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction whereas the latter concentrates on the concepts of statement, negation and affirmation. According to this study, the ontological formulation of the principle of non-contradiction can be reduced to the opposition of words. Thus the limitations considered by Aristotle in his logical formulation of the principle of non-contradiction explain the unity of two concepts under all circumstance and the only difference they have is that one is negative in comparison to the other. Based on the findings of this research, Aristotle is of the view that in attaining knowledge the principle of non-contradiction is prior to any other type of knowledge whether notion or assertion. In other words, in Aristotle's philosophy the principle of non-contradiction is a principle (arche) for obtaining any other type of knowledge. The 'absolute priority' indicates that the principle of non-contradiction plays four epistemic roles which consist of justificatory base, indicatory base, signification base and practical base.

The concepts mind makes after encountering external objects are of these types: accidental essential concepts, substantial essential concepts and finally philosophical concepts. You can have your distinctive characteristics when you are existent. The origin for the emergence of 'existence' is knowledge by presence (immediate knowledge). These concepts emerge from a single 'realization' and this single realization is indicated by all of them. However the object of one of these indications is the trunk whereas others are the branches. Philosophically speaking, the real is a prerequisite for the unreal. Essential concepts enter into one's mind before existential concepts and that is why mind considers them as real. Careful analysis shows that the object indicated by 'existence' is the same of the objective realization and the object indicated by essence is the limit of that realization in a specific domain. Conditional modes are of three types; nafadi, shani and indimaji. Since the realization of accidents is the extension of the realization of substance and is thus united with it the fact that accident is nafadi (terminable) can be attributed to substance. Thus the object indicated by essential concept turns into nafadi characteristic for existence. Here the relative meaning of nafad is taken into account rather than its absolute meaning. This is because possible identity owing to its limitation does not include anything beyond its essence. [In other words] it is not available beyond its essence, though there are other beings over there, for it is not empty over there.