نشریه مطالعات اصول فقه امامیه
پیاپی 1 (بهار و تابستان 1393)

The non-authoritativeness or unreliability of a tradition transmitted by a single transmitter is one of Ibn Idri's most famous principles in Ilm al-Usul (science oflegal theories). Based on his beliefs, a solitary report (khabar al-wahid) is of no use in establishing certainty. Unless a report reaches the degree of tawatur or it is not devoid of context, one cannot rely on it. Not only does he subscribe to this opinion but he also ascribes the same to Imamiyah (Shiism) saying that it is one of the conspicuous beliefs of the followers of the Twelver Shiites. That is why we see that Ibn Idris's opinions and methodology are different from those of other jurisprudence and at times he has issued such verdicts that are considered to be shādh (rare) in essence. This jurisprudential principle has caused some jurists to ascribe not acting upon narrations from the Ahlulbayt (AS) to him. However, in order to establish to such a degree of certainty that he has rejected all kinds of solitary reports, we need to investigate his opinions in various episodes of jurisprudence and its principles so that in the course of this study, the causes as well as Ibn Idris's motivation to adopt such a stance can be determined. Also, the impacts of this theory on Ibn Idris's method of issuing a fatwa and the effects of the invalidity and unreliability of a solitary report on his thought should be measured and assessed.

The present study within the principles of jurisprudence is of paramount and exclusive importance because it seeks to study one of the relationships governing the significations of the rules of Shariah. It endeavors to discover a new relationship among these significations which are different from the four types of relationships e.g. takhaṣṣuṣ, wurūd, takhṣiṣ, taqyid and finally ḥukūmah. This new relationship has been named "the relationship of default application" (nisbat tatbiq iftiradi). This proposed relationship refers to a special surrogacy through considering a special object which is not currently and practically existent and then applying the rule to the same object in order to obtain the rule of the intended subject. The present research includes an introduction and explanation concerning the new relationship. In line with the same objective, the writer has, then, explained the differences between this new relationship and similar relationships or those close to it elaborating finally on the jurisprudential impacts emanating from this new theory.

It is difficult or perhaps even impossible to speak of reason or human intellect and its authoritativeness as a means for discovering rules of Shariah but it can be understood through research in the views and perceptions of Muslim scholars that they are unanimous about the value and credibility of "reason". That is to say, all Muslim scholars believe in the credibility of reason, its instrumentality and function in knowing the truth and in distinguishing the right from wrong in various ideological, devotional, individual and collective spheres. The discrepancy revolves around whether the human intellect is considered to be a reliable tool alongside the Shariah or the Prophet (S) or it has a status inferior to them. In fact, the discussion is about the range or extent of the credibility of reason about which Muslim scholars are not unanimous. Different scholars from various sects have different opinions. In the cognitive geometry of Muslim scholars, there are three main views: an extremist view, minimalist view and a moderate view. In this study, the above three views have been analyzed and critically assessed and finally one of them has been favored.

In this study, it has been proved that an exception sentence has a purport and an indirect meaning. The indirect signification called 'mafhum' emanates from the exception which has been proved for it irrespective of whether the generality from which a thing is excluded is in the affirmative or in the negative e.g. "You should respect jurisprudents except the corrupt ones" or "Prayer is not repeated except when one of the five elementals are violated." These sentences do have an indirect signification but certain exception sentences in which a thin g is excluded from the subject do not have an indirect signification e.g. "Respect the jurisprudent except the corrupt one". Further relevant issues concerning exception and exclusion have been studied in a bid to clarify this jurisprudential rule and its applications.

Tabadur (quick mental occurrence of meaning of a word without any general or particular contexts) is one of the ways through which one can distinguish the true and real meaning of the word from its figurative meaning. Also, other functions of tabadur are discussed in the principles of jurisprudence. For instance, tabardur enables a reader to tell the difference between the figurative meaning and the outward meaning of a speech. Tabadur, which is a sign of immediate meaning in the mindm, has not remained immune to spurious arguments. There are people who say that the immediate meaning in the mind might emanate from a context or presupposition or it may be due to something not being inclusive and exclusive. Such arguments are put forth to deny the functions of tabadur. Sometimes, scholars have been heedless and negligent towards the functions which is why a precise study of these functions are required to deal with the spurious arguments.

The present research titled "What is the philosophy of jurisprudence" aims to address the following questions: Do we have a scientific discipline or field of education named "philosophy of jurisprudence"? If there is one such science, what are its epistemic features? In fact, speaking of the nature of the philosophy of jurisprudence requires us to investigate the existence of a science which may be incorporated in the epistemic domain of the philosophy of science which gives rise to this question: Do we have a science by the name "philosophy of jurisprudence"? If the answer is in the affirmative and we have such a science among the added philosophies, this will give rise to another question. Can we have such a science alongside jurisprudence? What are its distinguishing features? What are its scope, realm and components? How does it relate to jurisprudence? The conclusion drawn out is that:
1. The philosophy of jurisprudence is a new branch of science considered to be among the added philosophies within humanities.
2. The philosophy of jurisprudence is a second rate science that aims to explain the history, imaginative and decisive knowledge and methodology of jurisprudence. All the presuppositions of jurisprudence are considered to be issues underlying the philosophy of jurisprudence.
3. The philosophy of jurisprudence has some elements in common with other sciences such as the principles of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy of religion etc.