فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 26 (پاییز 1399)

The subject matter dealt with by the author is to explain emotion in the views of Islamic psychology and Philosophy; the method adopted is the qualitative analysis of the contents through rational method and Critical method. The literal meaning of emotion, in Persian Language, is jush and khurush denoting rather strong and negative feelings which come from the faculties of wrath and lust against wisdom. In the terminology of psychology, however, emotion may carry both negative and positive meanings.     According to the findings of this research, emotions exhibit characteristics such as: that they concern sentimental aspect of man, that they are different from motivation, and that they express themselves in bodily behavioral and cognitive aspects of all negative or positive and primary or secondary feelings, the cognitive assessment of which reflects high influence on them.      In the course of explanation of emotions, there are philosophical theories such as “social constructivism”, “biological phenomena”, “issues as cognitions”, “bodily assessments”, and “natural species”. The examination of those theories proves that the exclusive look in each of those views is not acceptable. In the Islamic philosophy -considering the views of Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Miskawah and Allamah Tabatabaii- we can say: emotions come into being in the impulsive faculty which is one of the animal faculties of the soul. As the psychic quality, they inhere in tempers and fall under the two faculties of lust and wrath. Emotions such as wonder shyness fear and hope are peculiar to mankind.

In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, the intelligibles (universal concepts) fall under three categories: primary or essential intelligibles, philosophical secondary concepts, and logical secondary concepts. In this study, the term intelligible is the characteristic of mental concepts. A glance at the philosophical references proves that in the past, the term intelligible was sometimes used to describe the very real entities, rather than the concepts, and were merely divided into two primary and secondary ones. Suffering from the primacy of quiddity and some other doubts, the illuminationist philosophers made existence and its attributes fall under secondary intelligibles and thus be regarded as merely mental concepts. Having made the illuminationist's errors correct, later philosophers divided secondary intelligibles into two categories of logic and philosophy and thus they put attributes of existence under philosophical secondary intelligibles. They have also proposed criteria to distinguish those three categories one from another. In his present study of the historical development of the issue, the author has come to the conclusion that putting the concepts as the subject of description, classification of the intelligibles into three categories, and bringing philosophical entities under "secondary intelligibles" are not recommended, and in some cases are incorrect. Like previous references, we ought to consider the very entities as the intelligibles and to classify them into two categories of primary and secondary intelligibles. In this classification, the philosophical entities go under primary intelligibles and they are divided into three: those of quiddity, philosophical ones, and those mentally-constructed.

In "network realism", the world of what there is is stratified. The worlds of matter, mind, Imagination, Intellect, and Divinity are in in conformity with one another. Beings in the material world have a higher existence in those worlds. Knowing them is always "window-like". Mental knowledge of things with quiddity is realistic, but of those with no quiddity is unrealistic, illusory, untrue, and apparition. Sensible perceptions, intuitions, self-evident conceptual knowledge, and the speculative knowledge we can directly trace back to the self-evident one are all true and realistic. Nonetheless, the speculative knowledge that we cannot directly traced back to the self-evident one is untrue and illusory; it expresses a mere "apparition" of reality. Accordingly, compiled sciences, being speculative knowledge that we cannot directly traced back to the self-evident one, depend on language, are aligned with conceptual and mentally-constructed knowledge and only show an apparition of reality; in general, they are semi-realistic, "similar to reality" or "closer to reality".  The errors of "networked realism" are rooted in: the confusion between knowing the worlds and knowing the stratified different realties of the material world, the belief that induction does not produce knowledge for they missed to spot the induction based on essential characteristics of things, the belief that the knowledge of things with quiddity is realistic and that of those without quiddity is unrealistic, and that they assume perceptions that depend on language and lingual and conceptual considerations illusory and untrue.

The intellectuals on justice research have proposed various definitions of justice though irreconcilable. How may one get the true meaning of justice from among those many definitions? Some of them are formal merely developing a framework for different fields without any criterion for its application on realities. On the contrary, content-based definitions highlight determined criterion or criteria for the realization of justice.  The author is first of the view that formal definitions take precedence over those of content in term of the explanation of conceptual principles of justice. Content-based definitions concern issues of justice, rather than the boundaries of its "conceptual principles". Secondly, from among those conceptual definitions, "giving the right to the rightful" is the most complete one. We can get closer to the true meaning of justice if we make use of Allamah Tabatabaii's theory of mental considerations adding two terms of "wisely and mental construct" to it. According to this definition, a justice researcher seeks for the rights and advantages that the system of creation has not given to the people, nonetheless, it is necessary to construct them -they are rooted in concrete realities outside- in the mind in order to create a desired social life. As to those rights, we cannot say that they are true or false. If their consideration is rooted in concrete realities, then it is wise to act upon, or else they are null and void. This definition proves the significance of philosophical discussions for gaining the wisely constructed rights, and also shows the secret of discrepancies of the researchers in their explanation of the criteria of justice.

Allah had called Himself Samad in the Qur'an. In Arabic language, Samad means the All-Rich, the Eternal, the Everlasting, the Constant, the Impenetrable, and the Besought of all, altogether so that He leaves no room for any other. The contingent beings, however, are in terms of their multitude seen by the sense perception and the intellect. That how we can relate the Samadi existence of Allah to the multitude contingent beings is an issue dealt with by the theologians.     Different theories have been suggested such as, the personal unity of existence, the graded unity of existence, and the dichotomy of God and creatures. Having rationally demonstrated the mystics' theory of personal unity of existence, Mulla Sadra claims that he has accomplished theosophy and completed metaphysics. His explanation associates issues such as the compatibility and incompatibility of personal unity with the foundations of his transcendent philosophy, that whether his graded unity theory is identical with his personal unity or which the mystics claim, and that how far the rational arguments for personal unity are authentic. The examination of the above issues demonstrates that no room is left for Mulla Sadra but to embrace personal unity through the mystics' explanation.

From among divine attributes, Allah's knowledge is a problematic one dealt with by the philosophers. According to his special system of Illumination, Suhrawardi has analyzed divine knowledge explaining that it is an intuition. His analysis is to be studied in two phases: one in Allah's knowledge of His Holy Essence and the other in His knowledge of things.    In the station of act, Suhrawardi argues, Allah knows things intuitively and in full details through an illuminative attribution. This idea is his philosophical innovation. However, he has not claimed that His knowledge of things in His Essence is detailed, rather -as Mulla Sadra supposed- he denied it. Mulla Sadra and his followers including Allamah Tabatabaii have dealt with divine knowledge in three areas: Allah's knowledge of His Holy Essence, His knowledge of things in the station of His Essence, His knowledge of things in the station of act.     In all above three areas, Allamah Tabatabaii holds, divine knowledge is an intuition. Suhrawardi shares the first and third areas with the people of transcendent theosophy, but differs from them in his failure of considering divine knowledge of things in the station of Holy Essence. In transcendent theosophy, divine knowledge of things in the station of Holy Essence is synoptic and at the same time detailed. What is certain is that Suhrawardi has not dealt with it.     In his essay here, the author has studied Suhrawardi's viewpoint and compared it rationally to Mulla Sadra's as per Allamah Tabatabaii 's account.

According to transcendent theosophy, men have imaginal bodies in the Imaginal world. These bodies, from one side, have some features of material body such as form and size, and from another side, lack features such as potentia and aptitude. That is why they are called purgatorial body mentioned in religious texts. In the celebrated view, the imaginal body in philosophy is the same as the purgatory body in religion. Due to some similarities, this conformation is correct somehow; nonetheless, they have some dissimilarities, too. One difference is that as per the celebrated principles of philosophy, imaginal bodies lack potentia and aptitude and their entailments as the incorporeal beings do. On the contrary, there are some signs in religious scriptures suggesting features of the purgatory world (as the abode of purgatory bodies) implying potentia and aptitude in those bodies.     In this essay, the possibility of potentia and aptitude in the purgatory world and their religious documents are examined

In what presented here, the author has dealt with whether current words such as water, the sky, the earth, hand, coming … used in religious texts for immaterial and none-sensible entities and events have first been coined for some material things. As it were, have they been coined for material things in a way that their literal applications include immaterial entities, too; or they have mainly and originally been coined for material signified in a way that their application for immaterial entities is metaphorical.     Having made use of descriptive-analytic method, the author has first proved that at least some people of knowledge have defended the theory of coining words for the spirit of meanings through samples cited from them. They have also regarded the application of those words for immaterial and incorporeal instances literal rather than metaphorical. He then goes on to confirm the very theory carrying out a methedological  and linguistic analysis about it