نشریه فلسفه
سال پنجاهم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1401)

We know that Muslim philosophers regard the acquired knowledge (al–‘ilm al–ḥuṣūlī) as some kind of mental existence and response to the various objections refuting the mental existence. But some objections to the mental existence proposed by the western philosophers, such as Hussell’s complicated mathematical formulae objection, are still unknown to Muslim philosophers and therefore have not received any response yet. Hussell’s objection says that no man can imagine such possibilities as polygons with several billion sides. So, they cannot be in our minds. We will try to find a resolution to the complicated mathematical formulae objection mostly based on the principles of Muslim Philosophy – in particular of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy: sometimes we will reconstruct and generalize Ibn Sīnā’s descriptive definition (rasm definition) resolution and sometimes too we ourselves will add some new points and counter-arguments. Such is the counter-argument: such an objection also makes problematic the opposite views – i.e.  intuition of the platonic forms and intuition of the numbers in the enumerated in the very physical world. Reconstructing and generalizing the descriptive definition resolution too, shortly speaking, is: instead of imagining the complicated essences, we here offer relatively simple descriptive definition and imagine this definition. Finally, we will response to the objections of the descriptive definition resolution.

One of the most important reasons for Peter Singer, Defender of animal rights, is that many human behaviors with animals are based on speciesism. He considers the rights of animals and humans equally and calls the human special attention to their own kind "speciesism" and considers any use of animals as an instrumental and incorrect use . In his view, speciesism is the same as racism and just as racism is morally wrong speciesism is also wrong and. In this article article, while examining and criticizing Singer's argument, it is clear that what is condemned is the unreasonable preference of one species over another , which in comparison of human with the animal is eliminated due to the special advantages of the human species because of the specific superiority of human kind is and considering the human specific position in existence the difference between behavior in the face of  humans and animal is different from racism and as a result, purposeful and responsible human use of animals is allowed And human superiority not only does not prescribe his superior view of the animal, but must lead to greater respect for animal rights. Without claiming the anti-racist logic, not paying attention to the difference between the dignity of man and animal and not paying attention to the place of man in the universe are among the criticisms that can be leveled at singer

Husserl, corresponding to three levels of temporality, introduces three levels of time-consciousness in his works. These three levels of time-consciousness are the consciousness of the temporality of transcendent objects (objective time), the consciousness of the temporality of intentional acts and experiences (subjective time), and finally, the deepest level is what he calls consciousness of inner time or absolute consciousness. This third level is the continuous stream or flow of consciousness which in its streaming constitutes itself and other levels of temporality. Although this constituting flow is the deepest foundation of temporality, it is not temporal in the ordinary meaning of the term. That means despite being self-constituting and self-temporalizing it is not given in a higher level of time. Understanding the true meaning of this level of temporality, for long, has been a challenge for scholars. One of the attempts to interpret and demystify this layer of temporality is based on making a connection between this absolute flow of consciousness and a kind of implicit and minimal self-consciousness usually called pre-reflective self-consciousness. In this article besides explaining the three levels of temporality and time-consciousness, I have analyzed this view about the relationship between the third level of time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-consciousness and compared the ideas of scholars on the matter.

The article considers Heidegger's reflections on Holderlin's poetic thought from the perspective of fundamental intention to the other. After the departure of Western philosophies from their original application, these issues came to the forefront of Western thinkers. If it is no longer possible to defend the application of Western philosophy and civilization, how can one see the other? Western thinkers, including Heidegger, took the question so seriously that after asking it, they began to take new ways of thinking in order to seek more original beginnings. In this article, we follow Heidegger's efforts to follow this path in the light of what he himself called “Holderlin's poetic thinking”. Undoubtedly, from Heidegger's point of view, poetry, contrary to the notion of metaphysical thought, which places it at a lower level than philosophical conceptualization, is the original position in which the genuine revelation of the world is possible. In this original revelation, Heidegger seeks the possibility of transcending the dominant criterion of Western tradition, the subject-object criterion. As long as the other is presented as inanimate object devoid of any kind of distinction, what remains of the encounter with the other is merely a pale specter of otherness that hardly signifies the other's truth. So the guiding questions of this article are how to reside beside the other in the light of Holderlin's poetic thinking? What possibilities does poetic thinking provide for the original intention to the other?

Philosophy of industry is one of the important dimensions in philosophical discussions and the nodes of economic sciences with theological and philosophical discussions. Hakim Kashfi is also one of the philosophers whose reflection on his works can lead to the explanation of a philosophy, or better to say, the wisdom of the new industry. His definition of industry encompasses all type of creativity and, therefore, considers God the supreme manufacturer and the whole universe his factory. Kashfi's picture of the world and the role of industry in it is based on the metaphor of guest house. He sees the world as a guest home owned by God. Therefore, there must be some people who, through their work and service, give guests the opportunity to enter the realm of divine love. The meaning of work and industry / The ideal manufacturer from the perspective of Kashfi is the main question of the present article, the answer to which leads to the explanation of the theological aspects of industry and industry theory as theology. In this regard, working as a substitute for God, giving to oneself, and expecting the income from God are the three wise ways to discover a monotheistic industry and craftsman. The findings of the article indicate that the ethical view of Kashfi has much in common with some of the concerns of philosophers critical of capitalism; But he goes beyond them and looks at industry as a kind of practical theology.

Justice is known to be the virtue of social structures and institutions in modern social thought. In classical thought, justice was the sum of all virtues or the highest of them, and at the same time it was a virtue for society and a virtue for man. Evaluating the conceptual and functional evolution of justice can be a criterion for measuring the impact of various factors such as religion, culture, politics and economics in comparison with justice. The aim of the present study is to examine the concept of justice in the social thought of medieval Christian philosophers and seeks to restore the concept and function of justice in medieval philosophy in relation to social institutions. Accordingly, by emphasizing the social thought of five famous philosophers of this period, aspects of the importance of the concept of justice have been explored. Among Christian philosophers, Augustine was regarded as the initiator of Neoplatonic philosophy and Thomas Aquinas as the culmination of Aristotelian Peripatetic school. In addition, Anselm of Canterbury was regarded as a prominent Christian theologian, Meister Eckhart as a leading figure in Christian mysticism, and finally Marsilius of Padua as a revisionist political philosopher of ecclesiastical world domination. In this study, using descriptive-analytical method, it is concluded that the thinkers influenced by Neoplatonic thought, namely Augustine, Anselm and Eckhart, mainly considered justice from an individual perspective and Aristotelian thinkers, namely Aquinas and Marcellus, considered justice from a social perspective. In order to achieve that, they have considered the formation of the government and the centrality of the law necessary.

Imagination plays a main role in history by its narrative formulation. But this presence gives rise to a conflict through which, one the one hand, this narrative aspect has been discussed in aesthetics and as such affects the audience’s reading and lead him to a better understanding of historical events; On the other hand, many theorists hold that this imaginative aspect is an ornamental, and hence additional, insertion and try to eliminate it from historical content.  But what is important here is that neither of them maintains a cognitive role for imagination. Paul Ricoeur emphasizes the function of imagination, however, and seeks to demonstrate that how the constitution of imagination works here. He argues that history can reconstitute only by imagination and what imagination adds to history not only does not reduce history to literature but also improves it as a discourse and gives it more functional aspects. By exploring in Ricoeurˊs different texts, this paper aims to find a meaningful relation between history and imagination to show that how imagination modifies the reference of a historical narrative to the past reality through its creative activity. In this way, imagination provides a road through which our image of history is reconstructed.

It is widely known that Kant refers all the three basic problems of philosophy to the single ultimate question “what is man?”, the task of finding a solution for which is assigned to the philosophical anthropology. One considers Critique of Pure Reason in this regard, however, one surprisingly finds that this question is entirely absent from Kant’s own magnum opus. By its very nature indeed, transcendental philosophy is incapable of arising this question thus formulated, since it eventually leads to a subject, not to a human being. Heidegger’s exegetical reading of Kant notwithstanding, one should not simply conclude, however, that the question of the essence of man eventuates by Kant in the formation of a metaphysics of subjectivity. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception is not so much a subject-centered metaphysical theory, of the sort that Heidegger assumes, as it denotes a transcendental formulation of Kant’s general anthropological conception. What lies at the core of this anthropological view is the twofoldness of human place in cosmos, in terms of which the tension between the marginality and, simultaneously, centrality of man in relation to the world can be articulated. We refer to this anthropological conception as “anthropological tension”, due to the irreducible duality that lies at its core.

One of the main questions that philosophy has sought to answer is Personal Identity. Philosophical, sociological, and psychological thinkers have, throughout the history, always shown great interest in the history of Personal  identity question. Various human sciences have considered various aspects of this question. Since these aspects share some similarities, thinkers have been suggested that the nature of this question is philosophical. In other words, their responses that originate from various sciences show their agreement. This study presents the question of Personal  identity and aims to show that this question has a hermeneutic nature. It seeks to explain the question of Personal identity, the responses that some philosophers such as John Lock have come up with, and criticisms of late philosophers of mind. From a hermeneutic perspective, the personal identity is also approached yet in brief. Ricoeur who was a thinker with hermeneutic concerns analyzes the question of identity through hermeneutic. He seeks to come up with a suitable response to this question. The present study analyzes his ideas. This aims to suggest narrative identity as a suitable background. It is done through identifying an appropriate relationship between Personal  identity and narrative and through re-reading the criticisms to abstract responses to the question of Personal identity.

The existence of pre-worldly worlds and the presence of man and his quality of life there is a point of contention among philosophers. In this article, by examining Mulla Sadra, who believes in the presence of man in such worlds, the existence and abstraction of the human soul in the previous life and the effects of this presence on his worldly life are explained. Sadra, citing the principle of correspondence between the arc of descent and ascension, states two types of existence and abstraction for man in the arc of descent, one is collectively perfect rational in the world of intellect and divine knowledge, and the other is an particular and Contingent abstraction. Presence in the previous worlds has effects on the worldly life of man, including the fact that the monotheistic nature that has emerged in the world of intellect through perfect rational abstraction  and the superior presence of the disabled in the actual cause is a capital for achieving happiness. Also, the covenant taken in the underworld for the people on the one hand and for the properties on the other hand, has accessories that if adhered to the covenant, will be the bedrock of divine guidance. The difference between human beings in the previous life, which is caused by the difference between the tints and their status, can be effective as one of the factors determining the behavior and goals of individuals along with other environmental and voluntary factors.

In this paper, we intend to examine the controversy between Frege and Hilbert over geometry about abstract algebra; whether Frege's thinking about abstract algebra works out or Hilbert's? To this end, we first study the times when Frege and Hilbert were engaged in philosophy, to have an idea of the dominant intellectual atmosphere of that time and its influence on these two mathematicians. With this in mind, then we have pointed out some differences between Frege and Hilbert's approaches. We have concluded that their most important differences are the role of the subject in mathematics and the discussion about compatibility. After presenting the normative definition of algebra, we have investigated the points made by Hilbert and Frege, using the later Wittgenstein theories expressed in the books On Certainty and Philosophical Investigation. Finally, by considering all the aspects, we have concluded that what seems to be more useful in the philosophical study of algebra is a third approach, which is Wittgenstein's approach with some modifications, since it guarantees some important features. These features are meaningfulness, intersubjectivity, and rule-orientation, all of which are important features for mathematicians.

The ethical and political thinking of Axel Honneth—German philosopher and leading scholar in the third generation of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists—is considered an inclusive theory that accepts the other. Honneth attempts to present a theory that is neither too abstract so that no conception of "good life" can endure, nor is too thick and substantive, and thus exclusionary. He attempts to demonstrate a theory in the middle.  However, his theory has also been subject to the criticism that it rests on an ideological and exclusionary basis. Nevertheless, most such criticisms have their root in the entanglement of the second and third spheres of recognition and thus accept Honneth’s distinction between private and public life, according to which the former contains an immanent and pre-political logic. As a result, except for a few feminist philosophers, criticisms of ideological recognition are confined to the second and third spheres, respectively the realm of human rights and societal solidarity. By contrast, this article explores the ideological predicaments of the first sphere of recognition—familial love—by rejecting the private-public distinction and advocating for broader love-based recognition. Eliminating this distinction will help Honneth's account of the first sphere of recognition to consider the asymmetrical power plays and ideological predicaments between family members.