نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 109 (پاییز 1401)

“Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some philosophers deny their evidence and certainty and consider them as generally accepted propositions that bear no truth except for conforming to thinkers’ views. Certainty in relation to these two propositions means believing in the correctness of their use in arguments and production of scientific results, and indemonstrability refers to their dialectical application. Some believe that the indemonstrability in the interpretation of such propositions would undermine the basis of moral propositions. The question here is why there is so much controversy about these two apparently evident propositions. The findings of this descriptive-analytic study reveal that the solution must be found in distinguishing between “intellectual goodness” and “rational goodness”. When these two propositions are considered as individual intellectual propositions, they are hypothetical and genetic judgments; however, at a rational social level, they are evident and, of course, mentally posited and, unlike the general view of logicians, they must be viewed as certain propositions (not as generally accepted ones). In addition, some statements such as “They have no basis but popularity”, which are used by some philosophers and logicians about the two propositions, are not used to deny their reality. Rather, they are intended to deny the evidence and necessity of these two propositions in intellectual analyses. Thus, no damage is done to their support for moral propositions.

Faṣṣ ḥikmat ‘iṣmatīyyah fī kalimat fāṭimmīyyah is the title of a book by Hassanzadeh Amuli, which has been written following the method of Ibn ‘Arabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and as a supplementary to this book. In this book, the writer has dealt with the mysterious and all-inclusive character of Lady Fāṭimah (‘a) as a perfect and infallible human being. Such a discussion is an innovative move in theoretical gnosis from certain aspects; however, it suffers from some defects: 1) the related ḥadīths and their narrative proofs have not been quoted with sufficient accuracy; some of the mentioned ḥadīths cannot be found in narrative sources, and some others have been quoted from invalid ones; 2) the attribute of the queen of virtue is not solely applied to Lady Fāṭimah (‘a); therefore, it seems wrong to limit such a chapter to her; 3) Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam begins with the chapter of humanity and ends with the chapter of Muhammedan. Since the true heirs of the Holy Prophet (ṣ) depend on him in their nominal manifestations, the gnostic principles and problems regarding Lady Fāṭimah (‘a) can be sub-categorized under the chapter of Muhammedan and do not need an independent section.

The soul goes through elemental, natural, mineral, vegetative, animal (Ideal immateriality), and rational (intellectual immateriality) stages in the cradle of its fluid existence. Therefore, the soul’s belonging to the body is a part of its identity and, thus, it can be said that the soul is a material-immaterial substance. Given the existential fluidity of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā has reinterpreted its various characteristics. Accordingly, the soul’s faculties are levels of its continuous truth that flourish one after each other. Moreover, natural death is the result of the soul’s ontological gradedness and losing interest in elemental body. At some stages of this ontological becoming, the soul attains immateriality and, hence, its survival after death become necessary. Because gradedness and, as a result, attaining immateriality are essential to the soul, its incarnation and return to elemental body is unjustifiable. Therefore, after death, the soul begins its purgatorial life in an Ideal body that is created based on its moral habits, and the natural form that is created in the matter of elemental body opens the path towards purgatorial perfection before it. One of the most important consequences of the soul’s trans-substantial motion is its entrance into divine worlds and annihilation in active, attributive, and essential oneness. Interestingly enough, based on the trans-substantial motion, this significant achievement is possible at the moment of the soul’s belonging to elemental body and is not necessarily limited to the moment of occurrence of natural death.

Several problems have been produced in the process of philosophy’s interaction with religious theorems. One of the new discussions that has attracted great attention during the last decades pertains to purgatorial and otherworldly perfection of the souls. On the one hand, based on the principles and explicit theories of most philosophers and Mullā Ṣadrā’s words, the perfection of the soul after its separation from the elemental body is impossible. On the other hand, some sentences in Qur’anic verses and Islamic traditions refer to the perfection of the soul in metaphysical worlds. Such differences have persuaded researchers and thinkers to find some solutions. Following an analytic-inferential method, this paper seeks to provide an answer to the question of whether the soul is subject to any change and motion after its separation from the body based on both common philosophical principles and Mullā Ṣadrā’s gnostic approach. The findings of this study indicate that, based on philosophers’ principles, changes in the states of souls after death is an acceptable view of the type of sequence of forms and manifestation of developed habits and forms in the world of nature. Moreover, according to a gnostic reading of the Transcendent Philosophy, changes in metaphysical worlds are certain and of the same type of change in the material world. However, in this approach change and motion are not used in their common philosophical senses and are, rather, used in the sense of departure from undifferentiation to differentiation and manifestation. In this way, the authors provide a rational explanation of change and motion in this paper relying on philosophical principles and through presenting a new definition of motion.

The philosophical analysis of the changes in natural bodies led Peripatetic philosophers to the notion of hyle, which is a substance that essentially lacks actuality and remains fixed in the process of change. Peripatetic philosophers have employed this notion in many philosophical debates, including the famous division of existents into material and immaterial groups. Nevertheless, despite their emphasis upon this notion, Suhrawardī denied the existence of the Peripatetic hyle. Mullā Ṣadrā has not explicitly explained his views of hyle in any of his works; however, a careful study of his works and, particularly, philosophical principles indicates that the peripatetic hyle is not acceptable in the Transcendent Philosophy. In fact, some contemporary philosophers have even found the idea of the Peripatetic hyle to be self-contradictory within the framework of the Transcendent Philosophy. At the same time, the words hyle and matter are frequently used in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works because, apart from cases in which he explains the views of earlier philosophers, he also believes in a kind of hyle that should be called the “analytic hyle”. This kind of hyle is a secondary philosophical intelligible that is abstracted from the analysis of the trans-substantial motion. It bears a unity with from and can be used as a basis for the division of existence into fixed and fluid categories.

Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, one of the prominent Ash‘arī mutikallimun, has raised 18 objections against the law of causality in his al-Maṭālib al-‘alīyah min al-‘ilm al-ilāhī. He has quoted these objections from others; however, it seems that he has raised them himself. Muḥaqiq Lāḥijī has responded to some of these objections in his Shawāriq al-ilhām. Nevertheless, most of them have remained unanswered. In the present paper, the author has referred to 15 of the most important questions and provided others’ responses to them. Most of these objections have not been answered while they can be based on the Transcendent Philosophy. Therefore, the author has provided a summary of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s words and then tried to answer them relying on the principles of Sadrian Transcendent Philosophy. Some of these objections cannot be answered based on any of the principles of Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendent Philosophies and should be answered based on gnostic principles.

Both Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their difference is their philosophical principles and, particularly, the discussions of “identical restoration of the non-existent” and “immateriality of faculties”. The rational demonstration of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s corporeal resurrection was based on his belief in identity with the identical restoration of the non-existent, which has led to some incorrect conclusions such as the materiality of the immaterial dimensions of the soul in the process of resurrection. On the other hand, in contrast to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim as to philosophers’ lack of belief in corporeal resurrection, Mullā Ṣadrā tried to prove it philosophically for the first time. Although his philosophical approach gave rise to some criticisms against him, the same approach was the secret behind his immunity against repeating the same mistakes committed by mutikallimun, including Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the theory of the restoration of the non-existent and believed in other worldly and not elemental corporeal resurrection. Therefore, to demonstrate the restoration of individuals’ acts, he did not have to resort to mutikallimun’s theory of the “return of dispersed components” of human beings. One of the other differences between the views of these two philosophers concerns the problem of the multiplicity and immateriality of faculties. Both thinkers believed in the immateriality of the soul, but Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī maintained that soulish faculties lack multiplicity and tried to bring it in line with the idea of the identical restoration of the non-existent. However, Mullā Ṣadrā believed that the solution to the problem of corporeal resurrection, similar to many other problems, must be sought in the specific method of the soul’s knowledge, particularly, the immateriality of imagination. This paper aims to explain and evaluate the fundamental differences between the views of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the problem of corporeal resurrection.