فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و هشتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 110، تابستان 1402)

In order to attribute moral responsibility to an agent for a particular action, several conditions must be present. These conditions include knowledge, awareness, intention, ability, and ultimately, the presence of free will. Nevertheless, there are instances where even if an agent initially appears to lack certain conditions, we still attribute responsibility to them for the resulting action. This is because we can trace the conditions of moral responsibility back in time to verify their fulfillment in the past. By employing an analytical approach, This article aims to explore moral responsibility in the context of different forms of moral self-deception. I contend that in cases of moral self-deception, when an agent deliberately chooses to ignore their prior inclinations and allows their motivational bias to influence their desired beliefs, the element of intention can be discerned in their self-deceptive actions. As a result, the agent can be held morally responsible.

According to the Qur'an, Jesus Christ considers himself a servant of God and does not consider himself GodAnd this is while Trinitarian Christians claim that Jesus Christ claimed his divinity in the New Testament.And this issue is considered a contradiction between the Qur'an and the New Testament according to the interpretation of Trinitarian Christians.The question raised in this research is "Do the texts of the New Testament claim the divinity of Christ?" Or do they deny this issue? »The purpose of this research is to show the alignment of the Holy Quran with the New Testament in denying the divinity of Jesus Christ.In the interpretations of the Qur'an, the reference to the verses of the New Testament in the negation of the Christian divinity is clearly evident in the interpretation of the related verses of the Qur'an.The results of this research show that Jesus denied his divinity dozens of times in the Bible in different ways.and removes any doubts about this;The research method in this research is based on textual analysis and interpretation of the holy text to the holy text.

Orientalists have long been engaged in the study of the Quran, translating and interpreting it alongside other activities. Their objectives include identifying similarities or differences between the Quran and other scriptures, highlighting potential flaws within the Quran, and employing scientific criteria to uncover factual information. Theodore Khoury, a German Christian priest, dedicated a significant part of his scholarly career to translating and interpreting the Quran, gaining support from members of the Christian community. The primary objective of this research is to address the following question: How can we assess the exegetical methodology employed by Theodore Khoury in his interpretation of the Quran, considering its principles, rules, and sources? Through a descriptive-analytical study of this issue, examining the principles concerning miracles, rules regarding evidence, and the extent of utilizing different exegetical sources, it becomes evident that Theodore Khoury's interpretation is characterized by predominantly superficial interpretations of Quranic verses and occasional negligence, despite his acknowledgment of the Quran's divine and miraculous nature. These shortcomings arise from his heavy reliance on specific Sunni sources of Quranic exegesis. As a result, not only does he overlook the distinctions between the Quran and the Bible, but he also lacks a neutral and impartial perspective when it comes to various aspects of Islam and the Quran.

The consensus gentium argument is a commonly cited argument in favor of the existence of God. It draws upon the widespread belief in God as evidence supporting His existence. Although the argument has not received the same level of attention from philosophers as other arguments, it has nevertheless been a subject of ongoing debate, modification, and revision. In recent decades, as new debates in epistemology emerged, Linda Zagzebski, a prominent contemporary epistemologist and philosopher of religion, presented a fresh formulation of the consensus gentium argument. She finds the traditional formulation of the argument, based on inference to the best explanation, to be problematic, as there are viable alternative explanations, such as psychological and sociological factors, that can account for the widespread belief in God. Zagzebski develops her version of the consensus gentium argument for the existence of God by incorporating her insights from the epistemology of trust. Challenging the notion of epistemic authority, she asserts that placing trust in our own cognitive faculties necessitates trusting the cognitive faculties of others as well. Consequently, the presence of widespread belief in God among others serves as prima facie evidence supporting the existence of God. By employing an analytical approach, this article asserts that Zagzebski's formulation overcomes the challenges encountered by previous versions of the argument. While acknowledging its own limitations, it contends that Zagzebski's formulation proves to be more successful than traditional formulations.

The present study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach to offer a definition of "knowledge by presence" (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) based on the perspectives of Mullā Ṣadrā, as well as the interpretations provided by two Quranic exegeses, namely al-Ṣāfī and al-Mīzān. The objective of this article is to evaluate the compatibility between Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical definition of knowledge by presence and the interpretations offered by his commentators. Additionally, it aims to examine the extent to which this perspective was utilized in Quranic exegesis by his commentators and followers. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that Quranic exegeses adopt a three-layered approach in defining knowledge by presence. These layers encompass the foundational principles, the specific terminologies employed in the definitions, and the associated conditions attributed to these terms. However, it is observed that, regarding the first two layers, Quranic exegeses often focus on a unilateral perspective that emphasizes only one essential element of knowledge, namely the knower. Regarding the third layer, they also place emphasis on delineating the characteristics of the knower. Furthermore, Quranic exegeses provide limited elaboration on the intricate relationship between knowledge and objects, the dynamic between the knower and the known, and the properties and connections that exist between the known and the knower, which all of these are emphasized by Mullā Ṣadrā. Consequently, consulting these Quranic exegeses alone proves inadequate in attaining a comprehensive definition of knowledge by presence. Moreover, although they address philosophical matters to some extent, these exegeses do not consistently apply philosophical principles to every aspect of their exegetical discussions.

The notion of naturalism's self-defeat has a long historical lineage. In more recent times, two prominent formulations of the self-defeat objection against naturalism have emerged: the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument. These arguments aim to address two fundamental tenets of naturalism. The argument from reason challenges the idea that mental states are solely causally related, while the evolutionary argument questions the inherent reliability and trustworthiness of cognitive faculties. Both the evolutionary argument and the argument from reason account for the self-defeating aspects of naturalism, accurately pinpointing its inherent flaws: (1) A simplistic justification of mental phenomena within a materialistic context is not the most comprehensive or exclusive rational justification available; (2) according to the theory of natural selection, naturalism prioritizes survival and reproduction over the pursuit of true beliefs; (3) the assertion that cognitive faculties are products of chance undermines the reliability and trustworthiness of these faculties; (4) rather than pursuing epistemic persuasion through its explanatory power, methodological naturalism has transformed into an epistemic presupposition. While these arguments possess strengths in challenging naturalism, it is important to acknowledge their inherent limitations as well. We argue that these flaws are specific to the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument, and therefore, they do not absolve naturalism from other self-defeating objections. Utilizing the analytical-critical methodology, this article aims to accomplish two objectives firstly, to conduct a comparative study of the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument in elucidating the self-defeating nature of naturalism, and secondly, to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of these two arguments through supplementation and criticism.