نشریه حکمت اسرا
سال دوم شماره 3 (پیاپی 5، پاییز 1389)

The epistle at hand treats of the qualities and characteristics of philosophy and its relation to the other sciences, holding firstly that philosophy is the leader of all other sciences, and secondly that divine philosophy is a particular world view that transforms possible propositions into necessary propositions and necessary propositions into eternally [necessary] propositions. The latter are the most fundamental bases for knowledge and without them we can have no recourse to the truth. The article further illustrates that philosophy, on account of its subsistent, universal, and absolute nature, is the criterion for the validity and invalidity, or the truth and falsehood of other sciences. Accordingly the sacred or profane nature of other sciences is dependent upon this [supra-scientific] philosophy that they are all attached to. Hence if pure philosophy becomes a divine philosophy, all other sciences in their turn become sacred and properly religious. The fundamental reason for this is the fact that all existents, whether material or immaterial, real or mentally posited, are the creations of God; and as the realm of existence is nothing but the created order, creation is the object of human knowledge—the latter then becoming nothing but the exposition of creation. The study concludes by elucidating on some points pertaining to Islamic philosophy in its role as a divine and religious science, as opposed to a profane and secular enterprise.

Saint Anselm’s eleventh century argument for the existence of God was revisited by modern Western philosophers from the 17th century onwards, leading to such figures as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hume, and Kant, each in his turn, giving their rendition and either defending or critiquing it. The present article surveys the discussions that took place regarding Anselm’s argument in Western philosophical circles from the 17th century up until the present from the viewpoint of Islamic philosophy.

Resorting to the noble QurÞÁn in resolving and answering the challenges presented by the humanities, in particular philosophy and epistemology, opens up new vistas in these sciences. This article endeavours to discover some of the responses to one of the most important topics of epistemology, namely, the possibility of knowledge. During the course of treating one of the meanings of ‘knowledge’ in the QurÞÁn and its correspondence with acquired propositional knowledge, the paper applies itself to covering the diverse views of philosophers with regards to actuality and the possibility of its cognition, before moving on to the QurÞÁnic viewpoints. The study concludes by highlighting the emphasis that the QurÞÁn lays on the principle of actuality, the possibility of human knowledge of that actuality, and the negation of both scepticism and relativism in its general sense.

Mysticism (or gnosis, ÝirfÁn) is multi-dimensional. Its primary and most important dimensions are cognitive (vis-à-vis theoria) and conative (vis-à-vis praxis). A study of the various dimensions of mysticism has led to the formation of a number of branches of science, which can be called “mystical sciences.” The most important branches of science of mysticism in the Islamic tradition are: theoretical mysticism and practical mysticism. With the advent and currency of second-order philosophies in the West—those supra-speculative philosophies that survey matters from the outside—the phenomena of mysticism was also considered and intellectually examined from the outside, leading to the appearance of a branch of knowledge called the ‘philosophy of mysticism.’ This new science applies itself to the nature and methodology of mystical experience and its principles. Alongside this branch, another independent branch of science can be envisioned that studies the quiddity and manner of theoretical mysticism, asking the relevant questions as regards it subject matter, bases, issues, methodology and structure. We call this branch of knowledge the ‘philosophy of theoretical mysticism.’ While this type of discussion has traditionally and generally been treated of in the introductions of some relevant books in the field, the expansion of this branch of knowledge and the tabling of fundamental questions and doubts with regards to its nature, bases, and premises calls for independent treatment. The article at hand is a general survey of some of the most important lines of inquiry in the philosophy of theoretical mysticism.

The cognitive basis of theoretical mysticism (or gnosis, ÝirfÁn)—as a school of thought that aims to understand reality—is mystical disclosure, vision, and intuition. The divergent, and sometimes even opposing, visions of the mystics is one of the most important issues that challenges the validity of mystical disclosure and intuition as a basis and source of cognitive knowledge. The article acknowledges the diversity in the levels and types of mystical visions, but goes on to present the most important criteria found in the works of the mystics that distinguishes true from false visions.

One of the issues discussed in theology is the ‘beatific vision,’ or seeing God. The Mushibbahah and Mujassimah sects, taking their lead from some Jewish groups, hold that God has a body and hence He can be seen. The AshÝarÐ sect, while they do not believe God to have a material body, surmise that He is visible to the believers during the Resurrection and have gone one to support their claim by putting forward rational and traditional proofs. The MuÝtazili and the Imamiyyah however see the claim of the AshÝarÐ’s to be in conflict with their bases and premises. Imam KhumaynÐ (r) holds that the beatific vision is a possibility, but with the heart and based upon the reality of faith. He was of the belief that true faith in the station of divine unicity (tawÎÐd) and sanctity (or grace, walÁyah) removes the veil impeding the vision, and went on to stress that any knowledge that is not tantamount to faith in and fear of God is the greatest of veils. In line with this, the Imam saw faith to be a divine light that makes the heart to be the locus of divine manifestations and effusions. He also held that there was a link between faith, the practice of good deeds, and the meeting with God, such that if a man were to have faith and do good deeds, he would, by the grace of God and in accordance with his level of faith and measure of deeds, be able to work wonders.

The principle of imamate, as the continuity of prophethood, is the preeminent principle of the Shias. The latter envisage imamate to be properly theological, and thereby as prefiguring politics. The philosophy of imamate delineates the Islamic social order, and the fact that it includes man’s existential dimension not only guarantees his worldly and otherworldly felicity, but explains the wisdom behind the universality of Islam. Imamate directly pertains to the nature of governments, their legitimacy, as well as their politico-religious status—alluding to the reality that politics arises from theology and can, on that account, be called political theology. Imamate is the continuity of the bond engendered between religion and politics and is the realization of God’s kingdom on earth as well as the legitimacy of man’s vicegerency of God. Religious rule is contingent upon the Imam, while obedience to the Imam becomes necessary so as to bring about the realization of his political leadership of society. The acceptance of this leadership by the people does not in any way affect the nature of imamate and the religious authority of the Imam—something which is a divine appointment. This is because the legitimacy of the Imam is contingent upon him being appointed by God and is conditional upon him being infallible; the latter is so that the goal for such appointment, which is complete obedience and following, can be achieved. Hence it becomes evident that imamate is one of the most pertinent topics of theology, and that it gives rise in every age to different consequences. Determining the place of imamate in the realm of theology has a decisive role to play in delineating these consequences and results.