نشریه حکومت اسلامی
سال پانزدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 57، پاییز 1389)

In this article a discussion is raised as to the general conditions of guardianship, which is a complementary discussion in relation to the previously mentioned five conditions presented in part one in the last issue of the quarterly. The rest of the conditions can be recounted as follows: inward purification, intellectual perfection, courage – that is, the consultants of a Muslim ruler should not be timid and weak in character –, expansion of mind – which is deemed essential and emphasized on by a great number of verses of the Qur’an and traditions for the establishment of a government and heading a society, masculinity – which is denoted by both the intellect and transmitted traditions as a necessary condition – lack of criminal-record and ill-repute, character stability – which prevents instability in running the social affairs – and, last but not least, compassion or chivalry – which is taken to be a complementary or constituent element to the conditions of guardianship in taking responsibility as the ruler for Islamic society.

Studying various views of the concept of social justice which have found their implicit or explicit expression throughout the Shi‘i political thought, this article seeks to present a context in which there exists the concept and principles of social justice and the need to use it in organizing the communal life. To Imām Ali (may peace be upon him), to organize our human communal life we necessarily need the concept and principles ofsocial justice which he himself have stated them in an exhaustive manner. Khāwajah Nasir al-Din of Tus has elaborated on the Shi’i idea of social justice taken from Imām Ali’s assertions about this concept. Al-Fārābi states that only resorting to the whole set of legal injunctions (ahkame shari‘ah) as social values is essential. Mulla Sadrā, too, though he thinks that his view on this in the realm of civic philosophy is philosophical, startshis discussion with an explicit emphasis on and a positive attitude towards the concept and principles of social justice; however, he goes on to present the whole set of legal injunctions for the organization of communal life as much the same as most Muslim jurists(faqihs) do rather than to formulate principles of social justice.

To obtain “a principle for Islamic government in its foreign relations”, this article bases its arguments on two sets of the Qur’anic verses. The first set is concerned with peace and the second with Holy War (Jihad). From the verses denoting peace, it follows that “the establishment of peaceful relations with the non-opposing pagan states is not only legalbut also meritorious and the prohibition against establishing good relations is restricted only to “opposing states.” Thus, to live in peace with pacifist nations is obligatory and, in disputes between the Islamic nation and opposing nations, acts of aggression against neutral and allied nations is forbidden.From the verses concerning the Holy War or Jihad, one concludes that starting a war or holy war requires legal permission from a religious authority. Legal permission to start a war is given in case an opposing nation launches an attack on Muslim territories, persecutes Muslims, organizes conspiracies against Moslems’ religious creeds, persecutes the monotheists and makes people weak and powerless through exploitation and oppression and makes mischief on the earth. Therefore, the main principle in international relations is peace and peaceful coexistence and entering into war is permitted only when a nation commits one of the above-mentioned acts.

According to the monotheistic view of Islam, there is a special theory on the Islamic rule and the guardianship of Islamic community which is of a basis in the theory of the legitimacy of political system distinguished from the legitimacy bases in non-religious thoughts and which is devoid of ambiguities and defects lie in the theories talked about in the political thought in the west. This essay, which is contrastive in nature, has madesome critical remarks on rival theories. In addition, the criticisms levelled at the Islamic view such as “the question of theory of rights and the individuals” role in it, “the question of the contradiction between general supervision and the God-given legitimacy” and a “misgiving on the impossibility of individual people’s participation in administrative andspecialized structures of society under a government in which the ruler’s permission for control and intervention is granted by God with respect to the preference and priority in order of those who show more commitment to religious injunctions and regulations and who are more competent in running the affairs, have been scrutinized with this aim in mind to provide logical and rational answers for the questions and doubts mentioned above and to highlight the fact that the Islamic view is transcendent taking priority over the others.

In the first part of the article, Mulla Sadrā’s view of the soul and its philosophical and political consequences were explained. There it was mentioned that, for Mullā Sadrā, the soul is in continual and constant course of development and becoming while moving from the state of potentiality to that of actuality and total incorporeality, and the attainment of final human perfection is made possible through “being in society” The theory of the fundamentality of existence, substantial motion of the soul and the possibility of the sublimity of the soul have provided a metaphysical basis for intelligible and spiritual communal life in terms of various realms of the soul. In this issue of the quarterly, the bases for the sublimity of the soul in Mullā Sadrā’s view and its philosophical and political consequences have been scrutinized.

At the time of Amir al-Mu’menin ‘Ali’s rule, the influential elites gradually deviated from the right path and committed some evil deeds which, in turn, paved the ground for them to resist against Imam ‘Ali’s reforms. One of their misconduct was that they developed a sense of envy of and enmity towards Amir al-Mu’menin, which had its root in such worldly affairs as ethnic dogmatism, their serious defeats and failures in battles in which they were put to Imam Ali’s sword, and personal grudges.The second corruption they were involved in, which led them to rise in rebellion against Amir al-Mu’menin, was their material interests. Their aristocratic life prevented them to follow Amir al-Mu’menin’s system of government based on justice. Hence they put up struggle against his policy of fair distribution of the treasury of the Islamic state.Interpretation of the Qur’an by the free play of (arbitrary) personal opinion and developing innovation (bid‘a) in religion was another deviation which occurred among the elites and the heads of the companions of the Prophet who exercised their influence at the time of Imam Ali’s rule. These and some other contributing factors caused theelites to distance themselves from Amir al-Mu’menin by establishing innovation, refraining from taking part in battles, waging wars against Imam Ali and assisting his enemies.

Studying the ontological and anthropological bases of pacifism, the present article seeks to deal with some principles governing Islamic ontology and anthropology which organize the foundation of pacifism. After examining the differing views on human nature, the article tries to provide an answer to the question whether human nature has a tendency towards viciousness and quarrel or whether human beings intrinsically seek pacifism and wars and struggles are actually caused by certain external factors.The present article, while discussing the various views of the subject in question, makes an attempt first to explore the ontological, legislative and anthropological bases of peace from the perspective of religion and then explains the fundamental, ontological, and anthropological approach to peace in view of the Islamic doctrines by recapitulating the main points of the discussions.