امیرحسین ساکت

Porphyry's work titled Isagoge is commonly seen as an analysis of Aristotle's Categories, focusing on universal concepts, with the five predicables considered as different types of universals. Often, the same view is ascribed to Aristotle, but in fact, it is an approach arising from a confusion between universal and whole, as well as a confusion between particular and part by Porphyry in the Isagoge. In Categories, Aristotle does not refer to "whole" and "part" as synonyms for "universal" and "particular. Porphyry, however, in some cases distorting this distinction, uses “whole” and “part” to mean “universal” and “particular”. Moreover, they disagree on the essence of the five predicables and their relation to the universal. Aristotle views genes and species as universals and their connection to individuals as universal to particular, but he distinguishes them from the concept of universal and does not believe every universal is a genes or species. Porphyry, on the other hand, reduces genes and species to mere universal conceptions and consider them as synonyms for universal. It appears that there are two approachs in the philosophical tradition that started with Porphyry. These approachs were perpetuated and broadened by later thinkers. Initially, he altered the understanding of whole and part to universal and particular. Furthermore, he reduced genes and species to mere universal.

Evidently the greek terms καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον appeared first in Aristotle’s works as meaning respectively universal and particular. In Plato’s works καθόλου is rarely used as synonum to ὅλον, meaning “whole”, and nowhere indicates “universal” in the logical sense. To be “whole” is a characteristic of ideas, implying a very high degree in the hierarchy of unity, ordered between the One and maltitudes. Aristotle uses καθόλου in several and even inexact meanings. Sometimes it means “universal” in an exactly logical sense, but often and specicaly in criticizing Plato’s theory of ideas, it indicates “genus” and doesn’t include any universal unconditionally. He criticizes Plato for conceiving universals as separate beings, however, contrary to the common view, καθόλου in such contexts means inclusively “genus”and doesn’t refer to species or any other logical universal. In the like manner καθ’ ἕκαστον occasionally in his works implies “particular”, but criticizing Plato’s ideas, it appears often as a synonym of species. Universal and particular, at the same time have some relation to “whole” and “part” and in that regard genus and species are considered as part and whole respectively. In this article we are going to explain the logical, as well as the lexical relation between “whol” and “universal”, on the one hand, and “part” and “particular”, on the other hand, but lastly there seems to bo no relation at all.

Since early times, Plato’s ideas have been assumed as universal entities as opposed to the particulars. More exact analysis of Plato’s terminology, however, shows the contrary. There is no term for “universal” and “particular” in his terminology at all, and he rather uses the words “whole” [کل] and “part” [جزء], which, considering their similitude to “universal” [کلی] and “particular” [جزئی], have been extremely mistaken for the two latter. These terms are developed in the middle Dialogues being closely related with the controversial issue of ideas. Plato regards each idea as one and simple; however, Parmenides’ criticisms urge him to reconstruct his views. To resolve this problem, he makes use of the term “whole” which implicates a middle state between the One and the multitude in the hierarchy of unity. There is nothing absolutely simple and with the exception of the One, all things include parts. In a sense, however, the idea can be considered as one, for although it includes parts, it cannot be reduced to them and so it is somehow independent of them. Such a kind of unity, lying inferior to the absolute One and higher than the multitudes, is called the whole and belongs to the ideas. Every idea is a whole and possesses the highest possible unity after the One. So “wholeness” is almost a synonym for unity or a second unity. It is not the case that the wholeness appertains to ideas, but the particulars also participate in it.

Plato examines language mainly as a subordinate matter related to the more important problem of knowledge. For him true knowledge is the knowledge of ideas but this is attained only through the particulars. The relation between ideas and particulars, as well as finding a mediating term between them is one of the most complex problems of his philosophy. It seems that sometimes he thinks of language as a mediate between ideas and particulars, since the words resemble both the ideas and particulars and so, beginning from the particulars, one can reach knowledge of the ideas through the words. Thus the names’ bipolar relation to both ideas and particulars makes it possible to acquire true knowledge. The difference between ideas and particulars, however, is so great that some problems emerge gradually in explaining their relation, so far as Plato suspects applying names either to the ideas or to the particulars. On the one hand, he considers names as appropriate to ideas and, regarding the permanent motion and substantial deficiency of the particulars, the names are applied to them solely as homonymous. On the other hand, according to Plato, ideas stand beyond language and their ultimate knowledge requires leaving language, then language from many aspects resembles particulars and therefore its applying to the ideas is not appropriate.

Plato’s different and somehow contradictory views on etymology has long resulted in debates. In Cratylus and some other works he criticized etymology as a philosophical method. He denied any resemblance between things and their names so that the analysis of a name would not discover the essence of the thing. Yet he has practiced in his other works some etymological analyses which seems to be in opposition with his previous view and therefore there has been the debate if Plato at all believed in etymology as a philosophical method. Cratylus is generally believed as one of the so-called middle dialogues, i.e. those Plato wrote in the second phase of his philosophical career, while the aforementioned etymologies appear in the late dialogues. It shows that after Cratylus Plato in his late dialogues has changed his mind regarding etymology and its epistemological worth and subsequently inclined/tended to it. Plato disagrees etymology in Cratylus since he thinks the greek name-givers have failed to gain the truth about things so that the names they made do not correspond to the things themselves. The name-givers, called usually as law-givers by Plato, are the same ancestors who have founded/stablished the greek laws, norms, traditions and the opinions. In Cratylus Plato is suspicious to the knowledge of greek ancestors and his disagree with etymology is one of its consequences. However, in his later works because of some unknown reasons he changes his previous view and praised the ancestors’ virtues and confirmed their superior knowledge. Simultaneous with the change, and opposed to what we find in Cratylus, in later dialogues it is said that the greek names in all aspects correspond to the objects and this seems to be, according to Plato, due to name-giver’s knowledge of the things. Thus the reason why Plato has asserted different views on etymology seems to be that he has changed his view regarding the ancestors. In this article the passages with the subject names, namegivers and ancestors will be collected and analyzed.

The question concerning names and things discussed in Cratylus, repeats the old and fundamental philosophical subject of "phusis" and "nomos"; an essential issue which may be considered as the ground for many theories in Greek philosophy. The question In Cratylus is how relates a name (ονομα) to its object or thing (πραγμα) to which the name refers. Are names by nature, i.e. is there any necessary relation between a name and its object (φυσει), or as long as there is a convention, an object could be called by any name (θεσει). According to Socrates the true nature of anything is tobe found in its idea and not in its perishable material form. Thus the naturally correct name is that which imitates the idea and reveals it.

The separation between ideas and particulars, known as KHORISMOS, leads to some ontological as well as epistemological problems for Plato. On the supposition that Ideas and particulars are separated, we’ll face with a problem in ontology that how is it possible that Ideas be the cause of particulars which have no link with each other. In epistemology this question has to be replied that if the Ideas have no link with particulars, how is it possible to know Ideas through particulars? Plato and the following philosophers, applying their own methods and principles, suggest different solutions. To solve the problem, Proclus makes use of two principles which could be designated as “middle term” and “all in all but appropriately”, both of them have been preceded by the previous philosophers and even Plato, but he was the first who began to use them so vastly and explained them. According to the first principle, there are mediators between Ideas and particulars which transfer the emanation of Ideas to particulars and also prepares the possibility of knowing the former through the latter. According to the second principle, a form of the Idea corporifies in particulars and at the same time, particulars exist potentially in the transcendant Idea.