رضا بخشی آنی

Is the type of political regime effective in shaping the resources curse &weakening the performance of economic governance? By formulating an analytical framework &presenting empirical results, it is shown that the presence of natural resources in democratic regimes has not had a negative effect. Rather, the quality of democracy has been a determining factor in the formation of economic governance. In contrast, the presence of natural resources in centralized dictatorships has had a negative effect on the quality of economic governance. But such an effect is not seen in decentralized dictatorships where political power is divided among members of the ruling group. The results show that in addition to the type of political regime, the type of natural resource is also effective in the formation of the resources curse. Sensitivity analysis indicates the stability of the results to the dependent variable change, the addition of control variables, &the sample change.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of political regime types, including democracy and dictatorship, on the quality of economic institutions as the main variables in the formation of the economic growth process. The political power is distributed among a wide range of interest groups in mature democracies, while it is concentrated in the hands of the elected executive in initial democracies in a way that other groups are unable to participate in political power. In initial dictatorships, the political power is vested in one individual as well, but in mature dictatorships, it is divided among the members of the ruling group and the leader is limited in removing other members of the ruling coalition. The empirical results indicate that the economic institutions enjoy better quality in mature democracies and dictatorships compared to the initial democracies and dictatorships. Moreover, the economic institutions’ quality in mature dictatorships and democracies is not significantly different. The mature dictatorships have better protection of property rights compared to the initial democracies, despite the fact that they lack free elections. The results are robust to change the dependent variable, control variables, the sample, and using the instrumental variable approach.

The China-Pakistan corridor is one of the most important components of the One-Belt One-Road initiative. The present study tries to answer the question of what are the strategies of regional and trans-regional actors towards the China-Pakistan corridor, relying on convergence theory and descriptive research method.Findings show that under the leadership of the United States and with the support of India and Pakistan, the game has been formed in the region, the outcome of which is to create a gap between Iran and China in order not to develop transit routes on both sides in Chabahar port. To that end, the United States became a major player in two regional alliances in South and West Asia. On the one hand, with the US green light, Pakistan was allowed to accompany China in the corridor. On the other hand, in order to ensure Iran's unwillingness for China to be present at the Chabahar port, in 2016 India, as a strategic partner of the United States, entered into the India-Iran-Afghanistan trilateral agreement to develop the Chabahar port. In order to continue this strategy, after the imposition of unilateral US sanctions against Iran, Indian investments in the port of Chabahar were exempted from this embargo. Thus, with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran turning to China's regional rival for the development of Chabahar port in 2016, as well as China's $ 62 billion investment in the China-Pakistancorridor, the opportunity for Iran-China cooperation to develop Chabahar port was takenaway from both sides.

The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of political power on rule of law as a basis for economic development. Political power consists of two key components: power transition and power distribution. Power might be centralized in the hands of a small group or distributed among different groups. Power transition is also distinguished by democratic or non-democratic power. In the present study, the application of descriptive-analytical approach provides evidence that centralized political power leads to the violation of citizens’ rights by the politicians. Conversely, decentralized political power restricts the politicians and consequently, prevents the violation of legal rights. Then, the application of an empirical approach and the analysis of 102 countries’ data reveal that intensification in political power concentration will reduce the rule of law quality. In addition, the results indicate that controlling the power distribution effect will remarkably reduce the power transition’s effect on the quality of rule of law. Sensitivity analysis also demonstrates the results’ stability after changing the dependent variable, adding other control variables and using the instrumental variable method.

Over the past few decades, China has been able to achieve significant economic growth by maintaining the structure of its political system, exploiting domestic benefits, and pursuing an open-door policy in the economic sphere. Despite the common interests of Iran and China in the face of regional and international threats, strategic and stable relations have not been established between the two sides. In fact, the main question is to identify and examine the main variables of Iran-China relations to establish strategic bilateral relations for greater benefits. In this study, with a bilateral perspective from the perspective of Iran and China and using the theoretical model of "interdependence", the strategic framework of long-term relations between the two countries has been drawn. Analytical-descriptive study indicates the existence of cooperation between the two countries in three dimensions of energy, transit and security to form a strategic framework between the parties. Therefore, the main issue of the article is to identify the key components that shape the strategic relations between Iran and China. The basic hypothesis is the existence of transit, energy and security variables as bases for cooperation between the two countries. The results indicate that Iran has three comparative advantages, including sustainable energy supply, secure transit access to Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, and security in the Islamic geography. In contrast, supplying value-added energy derivatives, completing transit infrastructure, and facilitating access to finance are seen as China's benefits to Iran's economy.

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a think tank that has a leading role in shaping US republicans’ foreign policy. The current study applies a descriptive-analytic method and the Game Theory to indicate the role of AEI in shaping US foreign policy against Iran. This study follows a descriptive-analytic method to content-analyze AEI’s published reports on Iran. The present study also adopts a statistical approach to calculate the weight and share of Iran related reports that are published at this think tank. The results indicate that AEI’s policy against Iran, including the six categories of Middle East, Intelligence, Defense, Terrorism, Latin America and Critical Threats’ Center has a significant effect in shaping Trump administration’s Iran foreign policy. According to the statistical data, about 85 percent of AEI’s reports on Iran, concentrate on Middle East and Terrorism, highlighting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) threats, General Ghasem Suleimani's assassination and the development of US withdrawal from JCPOA. Finally, the application of Game Theory and analysis of this think tank's strategies toward the withdrawal of US from JCPOA indicates that other choices of US against Iran will reduce the efficiency of desired Iran diplomacy. Therefore, US withdrawal from JCPOA will result in a Nash Equilibrium between the two countries and they won't be reluctant to get out of this equilibrium state.

The main question of this study is: Why is the economic performance of some dictatorships such as Middle East monarchies, better than that of some democracies such as Latin American republics? In this paper, by adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and using historical observations, it has been argued that economic institutions historically influenced by political institutions. Political institutions form the two key components of any political regime, including power transition and power distribution. In this paper, based on historical observations, we show that the concentration of power on the Shah in Pahlavi Iran has led to rentseeking policies. The high concentration of the Shah's power prevented any political competition over efficiency and accountability, and had expanded his interference in the economic and political issues, such as military purchases, bank licensing, and ownership of large economic and industrial enterprises. Therefore, the property rights of economic activists independent of the Shah's power were not legally protected by economic institutions, and the protection or violation of property rights was exercised arbitrarily by the Shah. In contrast, the distribution of power among the ruling group in dictatorships such as Oman, Qatar and other family monarchies in Middle East led to the formation of efficient economic institutions. Because the king's power to deprive other members’ property is limited, and they are able to set up private enterprises to gain benefits. Finally, statistical analysis confirms the results obtained from historical observations and indicate that distribution of power has major role on the formation of economic institutions.

The weak economic performance of resource-rich countries results in the economic studies’ great concentration on the role of institutions in resource curse literature and employment of theoretical or empirical approaches to determine the cause of this phenomenon . In this paper, we argue that the two independent variables of political institutions and natural resources influence the economic institutions which are endogenous variables; by applying a descriptive-analytical approach and making distinction between function of “economic institutions” and “political institutions” . Political institutions form the political power structure to specify the elites’ scope of power in the establishment of favorable economic institutions, which aim at distributing the resources among the affiliated groups . We also use the empirical approach to show that natural resources do not have any significant effect on the quality of economic institutions by controlling the effect of political institutions . In contrast, the better quality of political institutions results in the better quality of economic institutions .

Unbundling of institutions has been ignored while investigating the effects of resource curse on their quality. Meanwhile, the effects of institutions on economic performance and the process of their vulnerability to resources can differ based on their performance and roles. This study aims at Unbundling of institutions and investigation of the effects of their dependency on natural resources on their quality. Three factors of development level before dependency, geographical situation, and colonialism has also been seen as effective in the quality of institutions. Results reveal that dependency on oil and minerals reduces the quality of political and economic institutions. Findings support the theory that dependency on resources can weaken the quality of institutions and consequently lead to resource curse in resource-rich countries.