سید هدایت سجادی

Empirical underdetermination is one of the problems that challenges the position of scientific realism regarding the unobservable level of scientific theories. In response to this problem, Mario Alai claims that underdetermination cannot seriously trouble the realist’s position. Like other realists, he introduces theoretical virtues to break the underdetermination and offers special solutions to get rid of the objections to using theoretical virtues. Although Alai believes that theoretical virtues can break the existing underdetermination in most cases, he admits that today, despite using theoretical virtues, the underdetermination between the alternatives of quantum mechanics theories – Standard Quantum Mechanics (SQM) and Bohmian Quantum Mechanics (QBM) – cannot be broken. For this reason, defending the realist position in this special case, he proposes (and brings up) a new solution that pays attention to the unobservable agreements assumed in the ontologies of alternative theories. In this article, by critically examining Mario Alai'’s approach to the problem of empirical underdetermination, it is shown that his solutions to solving the objections of using theoretical virtues are not without difficulties. Also, after examining some similarities of Alai’s new proposed solution to maintain a realist position regarding quantum mechanics theories with the approach of structural realists, it is shown that his solution faces three drawbacks: 1) Reducing alternative theories to each other and dismantling the problem instead of dealing with it, 2) inconsistency and ambiguity in the truth of parts of the agreements of alternative theories, and 3) lack of guarantee in the existence of parts of the agreements, and ineffectiveness to generalize the solution for other possible cases.

Structural realism is one of the influential views in the contemporary philosophy of science that has been welcomed by many realist philosophers of science. John Worrall systematically introduced this view, and others have developed it. The aim of this study is the investigation the relationship between the formation of the structural realism view and the diverse views of physicists regarding how reality is represented in scientific theories. In addition, it addresses the question of how John Worrall's structuralism developed from physicists' views on physical reality and the representation of reality in scientific theories.

Method of Study:

 The method of this article is conceptual analysis. In this article, we first deal with some cases of the history of physics and quote the opinions of some famous physicists about the realism or antirealism of scientific theories. In examining their comments, we will show how the two different approaches to scientific theories have been and how they have moved together .

It can be considered that, contrary to the ordinary view, which in many cases is assumed that philosophical theories emerge from controversy among philosophers, in this case, it can be seen that John Worrall's theory of structural realism is rooted in philosophical controversies among physicists. Through the comments of Henri Poincaré, John Worrall reached a solid and well-considered view of the realism of scientific theories, with which one can even answer some of the problems expressed in antirealism about scientific theories, especially the argument that Larry Laudan has made so clear and orderly, and even beyond that, we can absorb some antirealistic views in structuralism. The two famous arguments that he tries to incorporate into his theory are the «No-miracle argument» and «Pessimistic meta-induction», which we will partially address in this article. He chooses the path between the two views to introduce his structuralist view which, in his opinion, is well compatible with both of these arguments, and as a result, he wants to show that it is possible to remain realistic about scientific theories, in this sense that we can still maintain the claim that scientific theories inform about reality and show us the reality of the world, but in terms of structure. In summary, we will reach the following conclusions from the review of the opinions of some well-known physicists in the history of physics, as well as a more detailed review of the opinions of Henri Poincaré and John Worrall.

Contrary to the common view, which is considered in many cases, philosophical theories arise from disputes among philosophers, John Worrall's theory of structural realism is rooted in philosophical disputes among physicists; in the sense that the emergence of structural realism arose from a historical context, and had roots in the thoughts of some physicists, including Maxwell, Hertz, Boltzmann. The thoughts of these prominent physicists progressed step by step and led to the emergence of an implicit attitude about structuralism, which was more clearly expressed in Henri Poincaré, and then John Worrall, inspired by these ideas and especially influenced by the view Poincaré introduced his structural realism more coherently and showed that the continuity that we need in the changes and instability of scientific theories to achieve scientific realism must be found at the level of structures. By introducing structural realism, he reconciled two important arguments that did not seem to be easily compatible with each other, emphasizing continuity in the structure of scientific theories rather than continuity in content, and showed that there is continuity in the great body of science.

Non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning bring many discussions. One way to justify the role of these values is the argument from inductive risk. The aim of this article is to examine a version of this argument that is presented by Douglas. By raising the question about "evidential sufficiency", Douglas advances her argument to justify the influence of non-epistemic values. Assuming the correctness of Douglas' argument, we try to determine the answer of "evidential sufficiency" based on the conclusion of her argument. Even considering both epistemic and non-epistemic values, we will show that the question of sufficiency will not have a proper answer. Because to determine evidential sufficiency, we will either confront circularity or force to add other ambiguous things. Also, we will explain that Douglas should have sought the "evidential sufficiency" by emphasizing more on the practice of scientists in actuality, in which there is no requirement to incorporate scientific claims with policy-making claims. This criticism is sympathetic to some other criticisms of Douglas, according to which she incorporated pragmatic and epistemic domains of science.

This paper aims to examine the problem of the realization of religious science in the field of natural sciences (including Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Geology). In this regard, firstly, while analyzing the problem of the realization of religious science in general, it is investigated its realization in one of the special fields, that is, the education of natural sciences, and then, as one of the solutions to the problem in the field of natural science education, the author's proposal (hypothesis) titled "Theistic Education of Science in the Realm of Attitude" is examined. This proposed solution has been analyzed analytically and has been investigated from two points of view: its compatibility with selected religious science theories (Golshani and Javadi Amoli theories) and its compatibility and internal coherency as an educational construction. The findings of this research show that in terms of the realization of the religious science theories in the field of natural science education, it is necessary to emphasize " Religious Education with a focus on Attaining the Theistic Attitude ", which is one of the requirements of this realization. On other hand, "Attaining Theistic Attitude in Science Education" is not incompatible with the criterion of consistency and internal coherency of the construction, which the compatible combination of these two constructions leads to " Theistic Education of Science in the Realm of Attitude ". Finally, it is shown that " Theistic Education of Science in the Realm of Attitude " as a consistent and coherent solution, brings the issue of the realization of the theories of religious science in the field of natural sciences to a much more effective and practical level, which is compatible with the selective theories of religious science (that is consistent and meets the minimum and common criteria of these theories), and does not conflict with standard science education and is more understandable for experts in this field.

Complementarity is the central component of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which Niels Bohr first presented at the Como and Solvay Conferences in 1927. The content of Bohr's speech was published in an article entitled "the quantum postulate and recent development of Atomic Theory" in 1928. The purpose of this study is to formulate Bohr's philosophical approaches by content analysis of his paper (1928) related to complementarity. The research method is based on the conceptual analysis of the content and text of this paper (1928) from which conceptual inferences can be deduced, and based on them, philosophical approaches are tried to be formulated. Finally, the four philosophical approaches including Unificationism, empiricism (positivistic and metaphysical), anti-causality and indeterministic, as well as anti-realism can be formulated. In addition, for more accurate inferences, we need to refer to the following works of Bohr, or in other words, "Bohr from Bohr's point of view".

This study aims to introduce and review the proposal of "theistic education of science from the attitude dimension of learning" as a solution to the problem of compatibility between science education and religious education in the National Curriculum (of Iran). It addresses the question of whether the proposal has the necessary competence to achieve the goals of the national curriculum, as well as the ability to resolve the ambiguities and internal contradictions of the national curriculum?

In this research, the conceptual analysis method is used for Introducing the theistic education of science and reviewing the national curriculum. Besides, the Inferential analysis method is used for implications and applications of the proposal in resolving the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the national curriculum.

This study shows that there are ambiguities and incoherencies among components of the national curriculum and in particular parts of the statement of the field of education and learning of experimental sciences. On the other hand, the proposal of theistic education of science from the attitude dimension of learning is a consistent and coherent construct and is in line with the theories of religious science, At the same time, it can be considered an effective proposal to solve the conflicts of the statement, and inconsistencies of the goals the curriculum with other parts of the curriculum, including general orientation of organizing educational contents and instructions of science.

Finally, it is concluded that the proposal is in line with religious education, and solving the problem of the applicability and compatibility of religion in the curriculum, generally, resolve the conflict of theoretical and practical aspects to some extent, and it brings the issue of religious education of science to a much more practical level, such a way that it would be understandable for science education specialists.

Most theories of religious science in Iran, not only try to realize the practical compatibility of science and religion, but also seek to apply religious theses in (natural and social) sciences and their education. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the "application of religious science in (natural) science education", which is under the broader problem called the "realizability of religious science theories". in order to analyze and study the problem in more detail, three theses (suggestions) are proposed at the beginning: First, the religious science education is a nonsense ideal and impossible. Second, instead of Religious Science education we must talk of religious education of science. Third, religious education of science is itself a paradox. these theses analytically have examined based on religious science theories, as well as goals, structure and nature of science education approaches. This study shows that religious science education in the current situation and due to the lack of a religious model for science, although not in principle meaningless and impossible, but an ideal (not in the sense of unattainable). Instead, religious education of science is possible and realizable. However according to the standard goals of current science education, biased and dogmatic approach to religion leads to paradoxical "religious education of science" construct. Thus, the problem of "application of religious science theories in science education", not only tied to several other problems, but also it can be reduced to them, And the more accurate answer to the problem is rely on the solutions to those associated problems.

The aim of this paper is to examine some solutions to the question of how a "religious education of science" can be compatible and adapted in the light of theories of religious science. This question can be considered under the issue of "application of religious science in science education", which in a more detailed analysis of the problem, has been reduced to the question of the possibility and compatibility of "religious science education".

by philosophical analysis, hypotheses of this research examined, in the light of Golshani's theory of religious science and from compatibility perspective of "religious science education".

the results of this study showed that in the field of science education, first, the theistic education of science is a maximal approach to the compatible "religious education of science". Second, the "theistic education of science" is achievable in the attitude dimension of learning. Third, the "interdisciplinary approach" is a fair and minimalist approach to the compatible curricula of "religious science education".

Finally, in order to achieve a compatible religious education of science it can be act in a range of solutions from the interdisciplinary approach (minimalistic approach) to the theistic approach to science education (maximal approach).

Heisenberg is one of the founders of quantum mechanics, and one of the pioneers and intellectual leaders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He proposed in two seminal papers in 1925 and 1927, the fundamentals of matrix mechanics (1925) as the first formalism of quantum mechanics, and then the uncertainty relations (1927) as one of the essential components of the Copenhagen interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to formulate Heisenberg's philosophical approaches during the formation of quantum mechanics and its Copenhagen interpretation. The main question of the paper is whether philosophical approaches can be formulated in the development of quantum mechanics through Heisenberg's works? To answer this question, two seminal papers by Heisenberg (1925 and 1927) are examined. The research method of the paper is based on the content analysis of the text (physics) of Heisenberg's papers. The findings of this study show that three crucial principles - observability, correspondence, and analogy-can be formulated from Heisenberg's 1925 paper, which has played a key role in the formation of the fundamentals of matrix mechanics. Moreover, from his 1927 paper, some issues are addressed including interpretation, understanding and classical-quantum relation, the role of experience and measurement, the subject of causality, as well as reality. Finally, it is concluded that through these works of Heisenberg, four philosophical approaches can be formulated including empiricism, Unificationism, indeterminism, and anti-causality, as well as anti-realism, which themselves include other sub-approaches.

To help improve the teaching and learning of Science, it is assumed that the knowledge of Science history and philosophy can help and all needed is a theoretical framework for doing so, to which this paper is addressed. It is further assumed that using the knowledge of history and philosophy of Science can not only help with the cognitive aspects of teaching and learning science, but it improves the affective and behavioral aspects of these undertakings as well. Not only the learners’ knowledge of what Science and its methods are improves, but once they know what true science is, their skills improve too, and they start behaving like a true scientist. The attitude and the world view of the learners also improve once they become aware of the history and philosophy of Science. Given the inseparability of history and philosophy of Science from Science and its teaching, it is necessary to cover these areas within high school and university curricula in order to prevent any misunderstanding of Science and formation of inexact and non-cohesive views in this regard.

The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical analysis of the problem of the wave function collapse by conscious observer, based on the theories of philosophy of mind. According to the approaches to the mind-body relation, the conceptual problems of this issue are examined both in the context of Cartesian Dualism, as well as emergent and epiphenomenal mental properties. It is concluded that by taking the physical and hardware approach to mind, raised the same conceptual difficulties of apparatuses in Quantum Mechanics, as well as mental and nonphysical approaches have the problem of explaining the mechanism of the interaction between the mind or mental properties and the observed physical system belongs to the external world. Also, by putting forward a thought experiment as well as by further discussions on the similarities between the "wave function collapse" and processes of "making decision" by a conscious observer, their conceptual consequences for quantum mechanics are examined. Finally, it is shown that each aspect of the problem has its own conceptual difficulties, and this issue will remain open under the mind-matter problem.

This paper aims to examine the possibility and sensibility of Religious Science based on the metaphysical consistency of Science and Religion. The main question of this paper is whether the Religious Science is possible and sensible in principle. In order to reply to this question, I confine myself to natural or empirical science, and discriminate between science and technology on the one hand, and between humanities and social sciences from empirical sciences on the other hand. In the first step, I examine Golshani’s view as a brilliant defender of the metaphysical approach of Religious Science and then consider the critical view of Paya, as its opponent. Based on some evidence from the history and philosophy of science, it is concluded that principally religious science in the sense of metaphysical consistency of both areas is possible and sensible. Also, the possibility and sensibility of Religious Science depend on the selected approach to the nature of science or our own philosophy of science. From the metaphysical point of view, the meaning of nature and world and from the epistemological point of view, the meaning of science and its goals could be different in a Religious Science and in Islam can be driven from ‘Tawheed’ principle especially. So, the possibility of religious science is relying on the change in our philosophy of science. In addition, it seemed that the term ‘Theistic Science’ is can lead to less misunderstanding than Religious Science.

This paper، aims to formulate a philosophy of nanotechnology، addresses definitions، historical contexts، applications، and implications of nanotechnology، and its relation to philosophy as well. I explain some philosophical aspects of nanotechnology (as a branch of technology)، which are discussed through metaphysical (ontological)، epistemological (and methodological)، and axiological (theory of value) attitudes. It is concluded that the philosophy of nanotechnology consists of some philosophical inputs (or foundations) and some outputs (or implications)، which covers the general philosophy of technology، and since the close relations between nanotechnology and modern science it also consists of some aspects of general philosophy of science، and philosophy of special science، philosophy of physics، in particular.

This paper aims toward the formulation of unificationist approach in the development process of standard quantum mechanics (SQM) during the years 1913-1927، focusing on Bohr and Heisenberg as the two prominent founder scientists of ‘Copenhagen’ quantum mechanics. In this investigation، we formulate various types of unificationist approaches involving reductionist، analogist، and holistic forms of unificationism، within Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s main works. Thus، one part of this paper is devoted to description and articulation of several kinds of unificationism from philosophical point of view. Another part is devoted to the conceptual and philosophical analysis of main works of Bohr (including atomic model، correspondence principle، and complementarily) and Heisenberg (Matrix mechanics and indeterminacy relations). This analysis includes origins، methods، contents، and consequences of their works on physics، in the specific period of SQM development.