قاسم پورحسن

The discussion of existence and quiddity and the relationship between them is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy, and various portraits of this relationship can be shown in distinct natural, logical, and philosophical molds. The word “distinct” is a homonym in these cases and has a particular meaning in each one. However, these meanings have been frequently confused with each other in the history of philosophy. One of the innovations of Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction of existence from quiddity, which was only possible in the light of understanding the meaning of the truth of existence. Islamic philosophers, particularly Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, tried to perceive existence differently from Aristotle and not to reduce the question of being to the whatness of objects because of their epistemological distance from the Greek tradition in philosophy. Nevertheless, this approach has also had its own critics. One of the philosophers who criticized the distinction of quiddity from existence is Ibn Rushd. He accused Ibn Sīnā of misunderstanding and heresy regarding the relationship between existence, quiddity, and accidents of existence and believed that Ibn Sīnā had confused the different meanings of existence and the one and had fallen in the trap of sophistry due to homonymy. Ibn Rushd maintained that the origin of the formation of objects is substance and considered existence to be merely a concept that can be abstracted from existing objects. His main criticism of Ibn Sīnā concerning this problem was that viewing existence as an accident for quiddity leads to several misconceptions such as equating existence with substance. However, Ibn Rushd himself had in fact failed to understand the meaning of existence as an accident in Ibn Sīnā’s view. He believed that Ibn Sīnā had equated existence and accident in the sense of a quiddative affair with each other, while Ibn Sīnā’s intention of occurrence of existence to quiddity as an accident was its addition to quiddity.

Many believe that the problem of imagination was propounded after Suhrawardī and later by Mullā Ṣadrā in a more systematic form. However, the truth is that many of the important ideas concerning imagination were presented by Fārābī, who deliberated over them among his ontological and epistemological discussions. Unlike the Greek tradition, in which imagination lacked an epistemological aspect, and unlike Plato and Aristotle, Fārābī was the first to pay particular attention to its epistemological aspect and explained and analyzed several domains in unity with imagination. Therefore, imagination has various functions in Fārābī’s epistemological system, including protecting sensory forms; the analysis and synthesis of forms; comparison; contrast; imitation; metaphorical thought; education and punishment; provoking act; leading people towards happiness; perception of meaning particularly in relation to the problem of dreams, and revelation and unveiling. Some of these functions are presently receiving great attention in various sciences. Although Fārābī had a negative approach to imagination when it prevents intellection or replaces the intellect, he viewed its other functions positively in his works.

According to the privation theory of evil, evil is the privation of something that a thing should naturally possess on account of its species. This definition of privation is introduced by Aristotle, but Aristotle himself has never explicitly equated evil with privation. In Categories, Aristotle has clearly stated that evil is the contrary of good. This is despite the fact that according to the privation theory of evil, good and evil are an instance of possession and privation, with evil being the privation of good. However, certain passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics appear to support the privation theory of evil. This article will examine the evidence both for and against the privation theory of evil in Aristotle's works. It will argue that (1) the evidence from Metaphysics regarding the privation theory of evil should be considered in the light of the intricate relationship between the opposition of contrariety and the opposition of possession and privation in Aristotle's philosophy, and (2) the evidence supporting the existential approach to evil in Aristotle extends beyond just Categories.

Since the coinage of the term “comparative philosophy” several views have been propounded concerning its whatness, principles, and function. Some thinkers emphasize the end of comparative philosophy, and some others insist on its significance and necessity. There are still others who advocate the beginning of some basic changes in this school from Europe-centeredness to interaction and dialog with others. However, the word “end” has different meanings the investigation of which could lead to three main meanings and referents for it: 1) essential impossibility: the followers of this theory believe that comparative philosophy suffers from an important defect called “impossibility in essence” because of its internal problems and shortages and should not have been formed at all; 2) appearance of all possibilities and actualization of all potencies and abilities, which emphasizes the principle of progress and perfection; 3) end of the past and a new beginning. Following an analytic-descriptive method and relying on Steven Burik’s viewpoint, the present study investigates and evaluates the theory of the end of comparative philosophy based on these three meanings. Apparently, what opponents of comparative philosophy emphasize is end in the first sense because they believe that this kind of philosophy has become “Europe-centered” and cannot enter any dialog or interaction with other scientific traditions and systems. Accordingly, it conceptually enjoys a kind of essential impossibility. Nevertheless, unlike the opponents, Burik believes that comparative philosophy is necessary for stopping the East’s isolation and the growth of Europe-centeredness. Through adopting a critical approach to the “previous comparative philosophy” because of its Europe-centeredness, he pays attention to the “future comparative philosophy”, which bears two responsibilities: 1) maintaining various methods of thinking and 2) facilitating the relationship between these methods without reducing one to another.

Plato, the renowned Greek philosopher, expounds a multitude of ideas within his works concerning the problem of evil. These ideas have exerted a profound influence on ancient and medieval philosophers. However, Plato's theories regarding the origin of evil are fragmented and lack coherence. In his dialogues such as Timaeus, Laws, and Statesman, he references several metaphysical entities as evil principles. Nevertheless, the dialogues do not stand as the sole source for comprehending Plato's views on the problem of evil. It seems that certain teachings of Plato did not manifest explicitly in his dialogues and were orally conveyed to his disciples. These teachings are referred to as the "Unwritten Doctrines," and our understanding of them primarily derives from reports provided by Plato's disciples. Among the first disciples of Plato, the Unwritten Doctrines held equal importance to the teachings contained in the dialogues, and our principal source of information about these teachings comes from Aristotle's reports in Metaphysics and Physics.

Allāmah Ṭabātabā’ī’s view of the immortality of the soul is based on his monotheistic worldview. He has tried to respond to the most challenging discussions and objections in relation to the immortality of the soul regarding the problems of essential happiness and affliction, cancellation, excommunication, and immortality in chastisement. Relying on rational principles and the Transcendent Philosophy and through benefitting from some principles including the principiality of existence, the graded trans-substantial motion, the unity of the truth of the soul and gradation of existence, ‘Allāmah Ṭabātabā’ī has provided a new interpretation of the resurrection and eternity of the soul. Through propounding the problem of eternity, the present paper aims to explain its relation to human purposes and ultimate goals, which are the same as the realization of the true totality of human beings in the light of the soul’s resurrection and eternity. In line with this purpose, the authors have discussed the innovative aspects of his view concerning immortality as well as its epistemological consequences and outcomes. They have also tried to respond to some of the objections raised against the immortality of the soul based on ‘Allāmah’s principles.

Atheism is considered a legacy of the new age. Hume is considered the beginning of this legacy. Despite fifty years of atheism tendency, Antony Flew has thrown tremors into the structure of this heritage by raising questions about the suffering of this approach and has spoken about the possibility of God’s being. His questions about doubting the claims of atheism cannot be considered only as violations or fault and the possibility of refutation. The impulse that he proposed by asking about the possibility of God's being based on the foundations of science in the future produced three results. First, creating a fundamental hole in Hume's claims and atheism, secondly, the possibility of re-examining the claims of atheism and re-reading the arguments of atheists and criticizing it and the possibility of unproven of violations and objections, and thirdly, returning to the correct and accurate re-reading of the arguments of the theists in proving the being of an intelligent principle in the creation of the world.The main idea this article is that first the approach and period of Flow’s first intellectual period regarding the impossibility of positive proof of theism is analyzed, then are explained the triple achievements on the theoretical impulses of the heritage of atheism and at the end his main thought in the second intellectual period is analyzed.

The end of Comparative Philosophy is the most important and last point of view regarding this approach. So far, Comparative Philosophy has faced various oppositions, confronting these criticisms, a question will be raised: Are these oppositions against the nature of Comparative Philosophy or due to the dissatisfaction or ineffectiveness from it? In the present research, by examining the contexts, the causes and reasons for opposition to Comparative Philosophy have been discussed. In this regard, the appearance of Comparative Philosophy, its progress until the new era, and reaching the opposition's point of view will be discussed with the descriptive-analytical method. In this regard, firstly, the views of the Comparative Philosophy opponents and believers of its end, their purpose, and their arguments will be examined. In the following, the origin of Comparative Philosophy and then the major approaches in the new era are presented. Then, by presenting the fourth approach (which provides an independent definition by reviewing the concept of comparative philosophy), an answer will be given to them. The results of the present research show that the opposition to Comparative Philosophy and the belief in its end is based on the lack of correct understanding of Comparative Philosophy and its precise definition and it's not that the nature of Comparative Philosophy faces impossibility and end

Hume's objections to theological proofs can be regarded as the beginning of a later critical perspective in which a thinker tries to show rational and philosophical proofs ineffective by replacing empirical and natural reasons and equating causes. Hume's criticisms have led to the expansion and flourishing of the philosophers' thoughts in defense of the evidence of theism, and it can be claimed that his forms are an important treasure in philosophical thinking. At the same time, he is an unusual thinker who starts an intellectual rebellion against every normative and common thing. In this article, we try to examine his three basic criticisms, which can be counted as Hume's most important objections and criticisms on theology and the possibility of God's existence, and pay attention to his defects, confusions, and mistakes. Our discussion method is not a natural and scientific approach, but an argumentative and philosophical one. An effort will be made to first examine Hume's interpretations and violations, and then, under the same issue, to present criticisms of his forms. Our main goal is to show that all of Hume's objections are contradictory and negative, and he has not been able to provide a positive argument for his refutations.

Farabi's cosmology is one of the dimensions of Farabi's philosophy that reflects his worldview. Farabi was the first Islamic philosopher to formulate a coherent theory of the universe, which became the model and basis for philosophical cosmology in the tradition of Islamic philosophy. Farabi's cosmology is a mixture of two Greek heritages, both philosophical and scientific, and the other is the heritage of the emerging Islamic civilization, which has been accompanied by his own innovation and initiative. By accepting the theory of issuance, Farabi rejected Aristotle's essentialist view of cosmology and, with an ontological approach, drew his own cosmology. Farabi's cosmology is a paradigm and pattern-oriented system whose origin is known and can be drawn based on the original origin of the destination, unlike the Aristotelian system which is an exploratory system and beings are discovered in the stages of research and reflection. In Farabi's cosmology, implications such as theism, system-orientation, humanism, ontological precedence over epistemology, and causal relationship can be traced. Given that no independent work has been done in the field; the present article tries to describe Farabi cosmology based on Farabi's origin, principles, innovations and initiatives, and then states the implications of Farabi cosmology.

Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two rational and gnostic approaches. This school of philosophy claims to have integrated philosophical and demonstrative aspects of affairs with religious teachings and, specifically, the Imāmīyah Qur’anic-narrative thoughts. All thinkers of the School of Isfahan have comprehensively explained and extended the Imāmīyah ḥadīth or commented on them based the Qur’anic intellectual wisdom. The secretive and allegorical approach to interpretation became prevalent in Ibn Sīnā’s time; however, writing commentaries on ḥadīths and traditional thoughts are among the unique characteristics of the philosophical school of Isfahan. This method has been in use since then, and some of the prominent post-Sadrian philosophers view writing interpretations and comments on Qur’anic verses as an inseparable part of philosophical tradition. Perhaps, the only exception here who has emphasized the distinction between these two fields is ‘Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Nevertheless, the fundamental question here is whether the School of Isfahan, with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical system at its center, represents a philosophical and demonstrative school of thought or depends on religious thought and employs argumentation merely to access previously-established and correct thoughts. Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers have paid attention to this problem and emphasized the consistency of these two methods. The most important questions in this discussion include the following: 1) Is the method of rational argument completely different from the religious method? 2) If they are different, which depends on which? 3) Which is the basis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy: rational reasoning or defending Sharī‘ah and revealed thoughts? How could rational affairs, which can be verified or rejected, and Shar‘ī teachings, which cannot be rejected, be compatible with each other? Here, the author tries to show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to establish this consistency has not been much successful. In fact, in doing so, he has had to either forget about rational reasoning or interpret the religion rationally to prove their consistency.

The basic question is whether religion should be examined based on the traditional or supernatural view, or should the historical, social and cultural effects of religion on human life and societal changes be considered as the basis of definition? Can we claim, like some religious scholars and sociologists, that religion and its role have ended in the new era, or are we facing the revival of religion and the living parts of religious people? Two basic approaches, traditional and new, explain and define religion with two completely different perspectives. If we don't make the role of religion in human life the focus of research and if we don't realistically consider the role of religion in reducing or healing human pains and sufferings, then we will still move away from the concrete approach in the study of religions and we will not be able to examine the presence of religion as the foundation of life. to give Today, without revealing the function of religion in life, peace, preventing violence and suffering, building the world of humans, providing peace in life, giving meaning to life and showing the value of living, paying attention to the foundations of human ethics, helping others and understanding others. And respecting people, and showing the human position in a glorious way, we cannot properly consider the importance and role of religion in human life. In this article, we intend to present a different meaning of the role of religion and make researchers and those interested in the field of religious studies aware of the importance of studies related to the new functions of religion, and then examine some aspects and different areas of religion in human life.

The desire for immortality has been intertwined with human life since the beginning, and everyone at any level, even those who deny resurrection, have thought about this issue and do not deny the desire for immortality. This article examines the issue of immortality of the soul with an analytical approach and the views of Allameh Tabatabai and Anthony Flew are examined about the most challenging topics related to the immortality of the soul, the problem of inherent happiness and misery, the identity of the personality.What is Allameh Tabatabai's opinion about the existence of a substance called soul? Allameh's opinion about the soul, its quality of immateriality and immortality is derived from the Mulla Sadra’s transcendent wisdom’ (alhikma al-muta‘aliya). Relying on intellectual foundations and based on the Mulla Sadra’s transcendent wisdom’ and using principles such as the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), the substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyya) of the soul, and the unity of the reality of the soul, Allameh presents a new interpretation of the resurrection and the immortality of the soul. On the other hand, according to Flew, is the existence of an independent identity called the soul and its survival possible? Flew denied an independent identity in man called soul, mind or spirit, and followed Hume, Russell and supporters of the physicalism theory in rejecting the subsistence and immortality of the soul. In this article, the author's effort is to explain the theory of Allameh and Flew on the immortality of the soul. Also, Allameh Tabatabai's opinion about the existence of a substance called the soul, Allameh's argument in proving the immortality of the soul will be examined. We intend to explain the strength and weakness of philosophical arguments and opinions presented by flew and answer Antony flew’s problems in rejecting the immortality of the soul from Allameh's point of view.

Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem.

The question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.

 Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). Intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).

All of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of Intellect.

Alvin Goldman offered the theory of process reliablism as one of the criteria for justification in extroverted epistemology. This theory was basically offered in relation to psychology, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind. After the objections offered by Gautier on the theory of traditional epistemology, new theories entered the world of epistemology most of which in two groups: extroverted and introverted. The theory of process reliablism is one of the famous theories in extroverted epistemology and a subdivision of naturalistic approaches. The important point is that the naturalistic approaches (among which is the theory of process reliablism) are more apt to non-religious interpretations compared to other common approaches in epistemology. However, the question arises as follows: "is the reliablism theory in opposition to the normative, moral and religious issues and in opposition to behavioral theories like other naturalistic theories or it can be shown that – despite the common idea – the theories inside the naturalistic and extroverted framework are able to be reconciled with normative foundations?" This is a question dealt with in this article to be answered properly. In this article, we will see that among the various theories offered, Goldman attempts to explain normativity in a different way in his extroverted epistemology.

The aim of this research is to study the nature of intercultural philosophy with a descriptive-analytical approach from the point of view of Ram Adhar Mall, who traveled to the West with an Indian background and founded the Association of Intercultural Philosophy in Germany. Using the relation between culture and philosophy, cultural other, overlaps, truth, pluralism, and tolerance, he has developed an intercultural philosophy with an Eastern reading, which, of course, comes from an Indian Dharma as a fact and different names; but he has transcended its spatiality and tried to critique European centralism and inverted Eastern ethnocentrism, speaking of a white philosophy that is inherently devoid of a particular color, language, and race, and has diverse roots in a number of different cultures. Four-dimensional hermeneutics is depicted between Europeans and non-Europeans. Thus, intercultural philosophy is an attitude or moral commitment and leads to a way of life. It also differentiates them based on the common and overlapping structures of cultures and moves towards a polyphonic discourse in the world without absolute self-concept and tries to re-read Indian philosophy in the world discourse. It also seeks an intercultural society and a world with unequal unity.

Sadr, as one of the pioneers in the field of production of religious knowledge, has presented a substantial theory in this regard, according to which he has tried to establish Islamic economics. This theory can be generalized to other fields of humanities and is called "the theory of the scientific birth of religious community" in this research. According to this theory, Sadr believes that humanities is always dependent on and within the framework of a doctrine that has been accepted by the community studied by scholars. The focus of Sadr's theory of religious science is the dependency and relationship between science and doctrine; and on this basis, he explains the possibility of producing such science and its necessity.
The process of production of religious knowledge, from Sadr's point of view, is explained as follows: First, with the help of religious insights and commands and applying the ijtihad method and the approach of coherentism, the jurist uses the superstructure of the Divine law to discover the substructure and basic theories of the school. Then, if this school is implemented in the society and the events of the Islamic society are considered as the data for experimental methods, religious sciences will be born by the hands of scholars of different fields of humanities from the heart of the religious community.

The issue of Contingents and immortality has a special place in Allameh Tabataba'i’s view. Allameh’s approach to the question of immortality is the common method of Ibn Sina and transcendent philosophy of Mulla sadra. The theory of Contingents is a theoretical innovation and epistemological initiative. Allameh Tabataba’i considers Contingents as human’s practical and social thoughts which humankind, through utilizing emotional elements, tries to strike a balance between two actual worlds. This theory help us to understand humankind , its needs, questions, ends and goals , as well as describing the means to reach collective systems and social life, the foundation of rights and collective ethics. citing to Quranic verses, he knows the soul a two-faced being. One face toward the material world, the other face toward the Metaphysics. The main problem with the study was to investigate the relationship between immortality of the soul and Social Contingents .In this present study we intend to study Allameh's innovations in social contingents and its epistemological results and consequences in the discussion of the immortality of the soul.

This article is entitled "Suhrawardi's Critique of Ibn Sina's Theory on Monsters and the Body" which is qualitative in nature and lacks hypotheses and variables. The purpose of the article is fundamental and theoretical. The main question is: How is Suhrawardi's critique of Ibn Sina's theory on the subject of monsters and the body explained? The research method is descriptive-analytical which uses the tools of formal logic and the position of data collection is library.Ibn Sina, while believing in the real existence of the monster, considered the appearance of the body as dependent on its existence and considered the body as a continuous substance composed of matter and independent form. On the other hand, Suhrawardi rejected the existence of monsters and considered them as purely mental and considered the body as simple, but included substance and width, and did not accept the sum of two inks in a single body and accepted it as a substantial connection and continuous quantity. In this article, the right or wrong of these two views is examined.

This article is entitled "Suhrawardi''s critiques of Ibn Sina''s theory on the subject of motion" and has been compiled with a qualitative nature without hypotheses and variables. The main question is: How is Suhrawardi''s critique of Ibn Sina''s theory on the subject of motion explained? Data collection is a library, and the research method is descriptive-analytical, which uses the tools of formal logic and its purpose is fundamental and theoretical. Ibn Sina called the gradual departure of the object from power to action and considered it in four categories: low, bag, here and the current situation. Before Ibn Sina and according to Aristotle''s philosophy, the category of status was not among the acceptors of motion, but Ibn Sina added this category to the discussion of motion. Suhrawardi, with the exception of the low category, agreed with the other three categories, and believed that the quantity of an object, which is always changing, is a matter of quantitative motion, not an absolute object. For this reason, he did not consider movement to be a minor category. He also, due to the rejection of the monster, does not make any connection between the movement of the monster and the body and face.

The course of epistemological discussions, from Plato’s tripartite definition to Gettier’s cases as well as the contemporary epistemological discussions, has gradually gone beyond the importance of belief, focusing on truth and – more importantly – on justification. This is while the destiny of many discussions on those two parameters depends on the precise analysis of the nature of the belief. Therefore, the main issue in this study is investigating the nature of the belief and its different types as well as paying attention to the distinctive role of metaphysical beliefs in achieving the truth and knowledge. The philosophical background and the analytical approach of this article considers various types of human’s beliefs, a variety that emerges from different themes of the beliefs and is based on their destinations and their different functions, all of whom do not necessarily follow the truth and verity; and this does in itself speak of the variety in the action of belief in its various types. In this study, considering the compositional nature of belief composed of two dimensions (mental and emotional), we have attempted to challenge the unidirectional look of the philosophical and psychological views and, in view of the variety of metaphysical beliefs as well as the role of emotional and the existential properties of the believer in seeking the truth, to clarify the parallel importance of these two dimensions along with cognitive and mental compatibility of the system of beliefs

Richard Paul is a renowned thinker in the field of critical thinking who believes in the implementation of critical thinking in human decisions and actions. By analyzing reasoning and thinking, he found certain ideas that turned out to be significant in analyzing thinking. Here his contextualism is blatant which along with foundationalism and coherenticism seem to be a kind of reaction to skepticism. From this perspective, in epistemology, there is a turn towards social contexts. In this way, contextualism enjoys certain contextual elements such as actions, social relations, culture, and other human situations in justifying a belief or vice versa. Context, in this sense, can formulate Paul’s inclination towards textulism, pluralism, and relativism. The main objective of the present work is to explore the consequences of Richard Paul’s theory. Resolving the problem of contextualism by critical thinking is one of the Paul’s innovations that so far has remained unnoticed. So universal attention towards his ideas made this research necessary for analyzing his views. According to this research, Paul has succeeded to follow a moderate method that contains in itself certain universal standards which at the same time attended to context. Consequently, in his fair-minded critical thinking, Paul has sought to be saved from falling into reductionism, and in this way he has succeeded to reduce the consequences of contextualism.

Leo Strauss held that the essence of society is opinion and the essence of philosophy is knowledge and thought of these two as rivals; thus, he maintained that philosopher has to use esotericism and writing between lines to avoid persecution. Doing so, Strauss advanced a kind of hermeneutics which is invented for interpreting philosophical texts. One could find supportive idea to this hermeneutics in works of Plato, Farabi, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Ghazali and others; but, there are, at the same time, a number of problems which Strauss’ hermeneutics face them: first of all, there are philosophers who hold opinions by strictly adhere to other philosophers thoughts rather than seeking knowledge; secondly, a long-lasting tradition of philosophical commentaries and interpretation undermine Strauss’, because it is not reasonable that a philosopher do not have enough courage and bravery to express their idea but commentators have; thirdly, a significant number of philosophers have not used esotericism in the ancient times, those philosophers weaken the universality of Strauss’ hermeneutics. In this paper, it is showed that hermeneutics of Leo Strauss is authentic for some ancient philosopher, but it could not be used as a general theory of interpretation for any given philosopher and philosophical school.

Richard Swinburne on justification believe in synchronic justification, justification by adequate grounds. One of his epistemic positions gain probable belief. He claims that a belief being justified is spelled out as it being probable. The more probability belief, the truer belief. At first Swinburne distinguish three types of probability:physical probability, statistical probability and inductive probability. Logical, epistemic and subjective probability is three types of inductive probability. Actually logical probability is ruling epistemic and subjective probability. Swinburne expresses criteria for logical probability based on tow patterns downward inference and upward inference. The criterion of simplicity based on upward inference is the principle of efficiency for selection more probable hypothesis. Applying the principle of simplicity in bayes's theorem, propositions with intrinsic probability, probability of predictions, the principle of indifference and testimony, he reply to paradox of probable and problems that are in these propositions. Swinburne's view on probability epistemic faces problems. He equal Partial implicate with degree of rational of belief or hypothesis. Also, the criterion of simplicity is very important for the role of agent in choosing the two sides of the probability, which Swinburne's suggest for minimizing the role of causality faces problems.