مجید صدرمجلس

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رساله البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رساله الالهیات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

The present essay studies the natural philosophy of Plato in Republic from the perspective of the Form of the Good. The question is this: why and how in Republic the Form of the Good proposed as the greatest god or the first principle? Some subjects in this dialogue are related with natural philosophy; for example, essential-rational goodness of the virtues, critique of the mythology, psychology, eschatology and the Form of the Good. It is worth to mention that Plato is studying some of these subjects in the previous dialogues and others in Republic. In order to examine the mentioned question in the realm of Republic, I am studying some of those subjects that immediately concern with the subject matter. At this dialogue Plato through accepting the ethical virtues as essential goodness and their being reasonable, goes on to the critique of the mythological theology; then Plato founds three laws of the theology and eschatology for his utopia. Finally, he proposes the Form of the Good as the greatest god. The Form of the Good is not a hypothesis but a reasoned principle. A part of the present essay tries to recovery and report a reasoning for this principle. In Republic we encounter an implicit reasoning that proceeds from the gradations of perfections to the most perfect or absolute perfection.

Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics is one of the significant works from Immanuel Kant’s so-called "pre-Critical" period, published in 1766, fifteen years before the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, Kant examines and critiques the claims of Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish scholar and mystic, regarding access to a transcendent, supersensible world. The question of this paper is whether Kant’s critique of Swedenborg’s claims was influenced by Hume. If so, which fundamental concepts in the essay Dreams reflect this influence? In the present paper, we read Dreams in light of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, a work that Kant is believed to have studied before writing Dreams. Through an analysis of both works, we ultimately conclude that some of Kant’s most important positions in Dreams, including his critique of metaphysics, his empirical interpretation of causality, and his understanding of metaphysics as "the science of the limits of human reason," were directly influenced by Hume.

Present article tries to review and appreciate the Persian translation of two chapters of the History of Islamic Philosophy. This book edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman and printed by Routledge in 1996. Apart from editors who are experts in Islamic philosophy and culture some other Professors and researchers are present in the writing of the book. Consequently, the work of Nasr and Leaman and their contributors is a considerable activity in the subject of writing history of philosophy in Islamic tradition. Persian translation of the History of Islamic Philosophy, printed in five volumes by Hikmat press in Tehran. In Persian translation that worked by some professors and researchers, first volume has no scientific editor and because of this in some of its chapters there are difficulties. For example, in the eleventh and twelfth chapters that are on al-Kindi and al-Farabi and translated into Persian by Ruhallah Alemi, we encounter with important errors in conveying the meanings of the original text. Here we study both chapters by comparing between Persian translation and original English text of them. Reviewing of chapters on al-Kindi and al-Farabi are exercised separately but our appreciation is in the Analysis and Consequence part of the essay. Main causes of unreliable or improper translation of some parts are these: 1- lack of scrutiny on the philosophical or historical terms; 2- lack of specialization on al-kindi and al-Farabi's philosophies and their books; 3- not employing any editor by press Hikmat on translator's work. Of course, we expected that Ruhallah Alemi as a university teacher and translator, must have been reviewed his translation. Performing this duty is a necessary condition in academic activities. Other aspect of this matter is a cultural-moral one that depicts our responsibility and faithfulness in teaching and research; a responsibility of a person who is linking the writer with the reader.

In the field of philosophy of religion, the issue of the existence of world after death and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in the hereafter is one of the important and confusing issues as persuades theologians and philosophers of religion to present various and contradictory views about it. Meanwhile, despite David Hume's considerable reputation as one of the most important philosophical critics of religion, the secular irreligious significance of this philosopher's views, especially on the issue of induction and probable reasoning, has not attracted the attention and energy of Hume's researchers in recent decades. The main objectives of this paper, on the basis of methodical research, are to identify the relevance of induction and probable reasoning to the problem of belief in a future state and to the doctrine of rewards and punishments of human acts in philosophy of religion, and to show that the goal of Hume's critical analysis of the credibility and practical significance of religious inductive arguments, by providing an account of the foundation of probable reasoning, is to reject the principal aims of defenders of Christian orthodoxy. It was orthodoxy defender’s aim to show, on the basis of our experience of this world, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments, and that prudence requires that we guide our conduct in this life with a view to our expectations of happiness or misery in the next. We will show that Hume provides a naturalistic account of the psychological mechanisms for the foundations of probable reasoning that generate our beliefs concerning the future, and this account serves to explain why religious arguments concerning the doctrine of a future state inevitably fail to persuade us or influence our conduct, so the doctrine of state of rewards and punishments is of little or no practical consequence for human.

The present essay is a study and an analysis of important theoretical principles that we might find in Protagoras. Subject of this dialogue are moral virtues: their unity/plurality and teachebility or unteachebility. Virtues generally are wisdom, justice, piety, temperance and courage. Reading Protagoras and studying its parts with some points taken from other dialogue Meno, can light on the former; because Meno’s theory of anamnesis (teaching or knowledge is recollection) as a perspective describes the meaning of to teach or teaching (Meno, 79-80). Protagoras wanting this meaning and only takes teaching as a transition of arts and virtues from the elder to the young. Our disscution of Socrates and Protagoras's ideas on education is not only based on their differences and contrarieties but also on their similarities and intractions: coversations that are going between the philosopher and the sophist depict a relative convergence of their opinions on the education of the young. Symbol of the mentioned convergence is the principal view that emerges at the end of Protagoras; Socrates suppose and say we (I and Protagoras) must revise our opinions until arrive at a consequence on the teachebility or unteachebility of the virtues: if virtue is knowledge (wisdom), then it is teachable. (Protagoras, 361a-c). This result is at the same time repeated in Meno (87) and is one of theoretical principles.

This article studies two major principles of Islamic Philosophy, The Principle of Preference and The Principle of Indifference in the philosophy of the Epicureans and Stoics. These principles are two of the most important principles in Islamic philosophy, about which there is much debate; And their study can shed light on some important subjects in Islamic Philosophy. These two principles have various applications in these two philosophical schools and are used in moral, epistemological and physical subjects. The Stoics fully accept The Principle of Preference, and also accept The Principle of Indifference and consider it based on The Principle of Preference. In the Stoic’s view, preference of Indifferences or equals leads to uncaused movement. The Epicureans accept The Principle of Preference in the macroscopic realm of objects or events, while violating it in the microscopic realm or realm of atoms in at least one case, the atomic swerve. The Epicureans do not accept The Principle of Indifference, and in general in Epicurean’s view preference of Indifferences or equals is considered to be possible; However, in some cases it is considered improper and in some cases it is considered permissible. In their view, preference of Indifferences is the supreme example of free will and authority in human beings.

Aristotle defines happiness as virtuous activity in both Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. By his discussing on psychology and considering the virtues of the parts of the soul, he attempts to attain the final definition of “happiness” and “the virtuous activity”. His research in Nicomachean Ethics leads to the conclusion that ultimate happiness is contemplation. But in Eudemian Ethics happiness is defined as “the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue”. In other words, in Eudemian Ethics happiness contains all the virtues, including contemplation and the moral virtues. These two apparently different definitions of the “happiness” show that moral virtue does not have the same status in those two ethical treatises. In this paper, we first express Aristotle's ethical thought in both treatises, and then we show that Aristotle considers moral virtue, at the end of the Nicomachian Ethics, as a necessary condition for happiness and contemplation, but in the Eudemian Ethics, he considers the moral virtue together with contemplation as the constituents of happiness. This difference on the stutus of moral virtue in the happiness issues from Aristotle's different viewpoints on the life of happy man in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. In the first treatise, Aristotle concerns with human beings in “the domain of God-like activity”, but in the second treatise, he concerns with human being in “the domain of human activity”.

In the present essay we first briefly introduce the book Routledge History of Philosophy: From the Beginning to Plato. Its Persian translation is by HasanMortazawi and published in Iran at the year 1390. AH (2011. AD) byCheshme Press.After introductory matters my study focuses on two aspects: the formal aspect of printed translation and 2- the content of Persian translation. Of course this study of the Persian translation is based on the original English text and a comparison between them. On the formal aspect I consider factors as title, order and completion or deficiency of translation. At the study on the content of the Persian translation in comparison with the original text, I consider factors as printing errors, names’ spelling in Persian, fluency and validity of the translation text. The result of this study demonstrates that the Persian translation of the first volume of Routledge History of Philosophy: From the Beginning to Plato is subjected to some unwanted deficiencies. Of them are these: 1- Sometimes the Persian spelling of the special names especially Greek names are not exact or correct. 2- Some of the philosophical terms arenot translated in uniformity. 3- The text of Persian translation is not edited by an editor that is expected to be specialist in the ancient Greek philosophy and maybe 4- Translator’s nonsufficient acquaintance with the Greek philosophy. Translation of philosophical works as other subjects in theoretical disciplines is a technical work and in addition to the skills of writing and grammar needs special information of the subject matter. I’ll be glad if this essay may include some useful points for Mr. H. Mortazawi in revising his translation at the second edition.

In the present essay we study the Persian Translation of Routledge History of Philosophy:Renaissance and Seventeenth-century Rationalism. This work is volume 4 of ten ones and published first time in 1993 by Routledge. Editor of this book is J. R. A. Parkinson. Persian translator of the book is Seyyed Mostafa Sharaeeniwith the editorship of Hassan Fathi and in Iran first published in 1392.
After a brief introducing the English text, our studying divided to two parts: 1- Study on the formal aspect of the Persian translation and 2- Study on the material aspect. For the both aspects we compare some pages of Persian translation with the original text at random. Our relative conclusion is this: Persian translation is credible, understandable and useful for Iranian students of philosophy. Experience and expertise of Persian translator and his attention to the philosophical terms are mainly from factors that make his translation as an academic reliable work. Of course there are some unwanted slips that their correcting depicts ethical task and philosophical originality of translator against readers.

In the Meno there is a paradox (aporema) claiming that research and therefore learning is impossible; because we know a something or not. If there is knowledge, we dont need to research and if there isnt, we cannot search; because we havent any idea of a subject-matter. Plato resolves the paradox by the theory of Anamnesis: knowledge/learning is recollection. This theory presupposes the pre-existence of the soul and its transmigration. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle discusses the paradox and resolves it by separation between previous universal knowledge (of major premise) and the particular knowledge of things.
Al-Farabi in the treatise Harmonization between the opinions of Plato and Aristotle, tries to reconcile their principal views which one of them is on the paradox of Meno. He relates their views from Plato's Phaedo and Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and then harmonizing them. Al-Farabi as a Muslim philosopher has no attention to the theory of soul transmigration in the Phaedo and looks at the arguments of the immortality of the soul as a witness that Plato uses in answering the problem of knowledge/learning. Because of this interpretation and his focusing on the essence of recollection theory, Al-Farabi eventually reconciles the recollection theory (of Plato) with the theories of deduction and induction (in Aristotle).

In this article we will examine the Persian translation of a famous book name “God and Philosophy” by Etienne Gilson. Here we compare between two parts of the translation and its original text: 'Preface' and the first section 'God and Greek Philosophy ."For this comparison we have two reasons: 1- The Persian translation ( )ﺧﺪÇ æﻓﻠﺴﻔﮫ is a much referred book in teachers and students of Islamic and Western Philosophy in Iran. This is because of the importance of the subject, the outstanding Writer and the famous Translator: Shahram Pazooki. 2- In the second edition the Translator speaks of some revisions; while there are many points that are necessary for new revising and editing. In my opinion first of all this is a writer or a translator that can revise his/her work better than others. On the other hand a writer or a translator must not forget his/her cultural and ethical duties.

In addition to the immortality of the Soul (psyche) as a principal issue, there are other issues in the Phaedo. One of them is claiming that the pure knowledge is attainable only after death at the afterworld. In the first, the function of the present article is describing and explaining the claim. To this end, we must inquire the meaning of the pure knowledge in the Phaedo. Based on the point of view of the Object and the Subject of knowledge, we can issue two meanings: a) Pure knowledge means a Direct cognition, and b) Pure knowledge means the Form of Knowledge (Knowledge itself). In the second phase we are trying to reconstruct proofs for Plato's claiming. Why the Pure Knowledge in this world is Impossible? In attention to the two meanings of the pure knowledge, it seems that we can project two reasoning: a) Proof by the distinction of the direct cognition from the indirect and b) Proof by the falling short of the sensible things from their Forms (Ideas).

The “Digression” in Plato’s Theaetetus (172-177) compares between philosopher’s life and orator’s of which I’m going to render an analytic report. There are some questions: how and why Plato’s discussion on the general definition of “Knowledge” is led to the “Digression” and what are the key themes of it? What is the role of the “Digression” in the Theaetetus? The “Digression”, apparently and besides the content, not conflicts with the whole of the Theaetetus. Because Plato, naturally and not conventionally, transits to the “Digression”, from the process of a judgment on the superiority of some people to others. After all, the content of “Digression” is in consistence with Plato’s doctrines. The apparent conclusion of the Theaetetus, relying on the individuals, is negative. However, the “Digression”, explicitly or implicitly, refers to the previous existence of the Forms. But, regarding to the “Digression”, the impossibility of the definition of “Knowledge” without universal Forms is the important message of the Dialogue.