دکتر محسن باقرزاده مشکی باف

In this article, the author attempts to explain something that is rarely seen in Aristotle's ethical and political thought, which is the legal dimension that Aristotle incidentally stated between ethics and politics in order to link the two in the fifth chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics. In this chapter, Aristotle distances himself from justice in the moral sense and, by introducing another into his theory, enters justice in the legal sense under the theory of natural law, which itself is based on the Greek theory of nature. With this chapter of the aforementioned book, Aristotle completely transforms the meaning of law, citizenship, and life under the political state. In a way, politics is completely influenced by the non-subjective right or rights of man from this moment on, and here Aristotle makes a difference between household management, the relationship of gods and servitude, and the political situation, and makes politics a place for realizing the acquisition of moral virtues and ensuring laws based on distributive and corrective justice and other natural rights of citizens.

Leo Strauss, according to the author, is one of the most important interpreters of modern and classical political philosophy, and his interpretations have been very useful and enlightening for understanding philosophers who have created profound ruptures in history. In this article, the author discusses Strauss's complex position toward the founder of modern political thought in the West, namely Niccolò Machiavelli. On the one hand, Strauss speaks of Machiavelli’s irreversible rupture in numerous articles and books, and on the other hand, he considers Machiavelli to be the beginning of theoretical thinking that marks the decadence of the West. Strauss believes that if Machiavelli appeared innovative, it is only because he lowered the intellectual horizon of classical philosophers and made their goals appear unrealistic and imaginary. In this article, the author first explains Greece from Strauss's point of view and then, based on the texts of important philosophers from both traditions, explores how one can not only gain a deeper understanding of Machiavelli by using the tools of classical philosophy but also, in addition to recognizing his rupture, introduce objections and criticisms using the same tools, ultimately providing a more realistic depiction of him.

The central focus of this article is to explore how human autonomy and freedom are shaped using the principles and approaches of Christianity during the early modern period in Europe. The research adopts a historical and foundational methodology. Christianity, as interpreted in a particular way within modern philosophy, emerges as a religion of individuality, freedom, and the liberation of humans from external authority. Descartes' philosophy, in a sense, shares this central theme of freedom with Christianity. He is among the first figures in Western intellectual history to take significant steps toward liberating humanity from external authority. Descartes’ epistemological theory paves the way for greater human freedom and independence by positioning reason as autonomous and self-legislating, reliant solely on its own principles and acknowledging no authority higher than itself. With this approach, Christianity plays a crucial role in shaping Descartes' way of thinking. However, for Christianity to serve as the foundation for all modern transformations, it needed a theologian like Thomas Aquinas, who could bridge the sacred Christian principles with the secular outlook of the modern world. This article examines the relationship between Christianity, the philosophical revolution of Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes' philosophy of freedom.

This Fichte's philosophy is a complex one in terms of the way of historical formation as well as the formation of his concern in the era in which he lived. The author of this article believes that if we want to find a true understanding of Fichte's thought, we must restore his historical status in political and theoretical relations; because it is in such a status that Fichte discovers his special way of thinking. Accordingly, in this research, the writer tries to examine the formation of Fichte's philosophizing method based on four components of the French Revolution, the situation of Germany, Kant's philosophy, and finally his understanding of German idealism and Schulte's critiques, and based on them, provide an interpretation of Fichte's philosophy that the readers are able to understand his philosophy in the context of socio-political history and the thought of his time.

In terms of strategic foundations, the theory of government in the political philosophy of Kant and Fichte have much in common. For this reason, it is not only possible to examine these two political theories in one article, but it also helps to make a more accurate comparison and thus a better understanding of the two philosophers in terms of distinctions. The author believes that the objections of their political theories are to a large extent compatible with each other. Because the government, based on their political philosophy, unlike other areas of thought, has been conceived and written in the field of experience and objectivity. In such circumstances, both philosophers place their abstract foundations as a test of the gravitational field of objectivity or experience, and the question is whether they can establish a union between thought and action and write political thought in the style of their epistemology and ethics. In other words, can they establish transcendental or moral and legal freedom in the realm of external objectivity or the state where political philosophy is to be formed?

In this article, after the author theoretically studies social-political events, and how to develop the theory of civil society, he goes on to understand and study the development of public will in civil society and the state and the dialectic between them in Hegel's political thought. Hegel was the first philosopher in the history of philosophy to consciously place a strategic position on civil society. And through the three basic elements, namely the legal system, the police, and the guilds and unions, as well as by examining the classes, all of which are in the service of civil society for the first time, it takes steps to form a partial will to form the public will. And through the theory of institutions, not only can he achieve the objectification of the abstract human will, but he also achieves the first stage of a unique general explanation. Here Hegel steps into government. Upon entering the public sector, Hegel quickly distinguished the field on the three principles of the organic matter versus the mechanical matter, the public interest over the personal interest, and finally the general precedence over a part of civil society. Consequently, with the precedence of the state over civil society in its own sense, it considers the public will to be the truth of the partial will, morality, and moral life.

In this article, the author believes that in Sadra's philosophy, the authority of the external world loses its epistemological dignity on accidental stage and merely plays the role of a trigger for the intelligent to compose the intellectual that is of his own origin - that is, intellectual by itself- from the external object, and through it, be aware of the world. The field of knowledge is placed in the possession of the rational by itself, which is the reality of knowledge, and the external world is known by using the determinations that the intelligent in the receptacle of the mind, and the compatibility of the object and the mind, and the incarnation of the form and its role on the soul are questioned. The author try to provide an idealistic interpretation of Mulla Sadra's thought by taking help from Kantian epistemology - in which the mind plays a central role in the development of knowledge. If, in Sadra's thought, the intelligent is epistemically prior to the external world and the external world is known only through the determination of the intellect, then state of direct correspondence between the object and the mind and the reference of the external object to the soul will be ruled out. Mulla Sadra's approach to the world overturns the traditional epistemological vector of the Islamic world; because the vector moves from the intellectual to reality with Sadra, not the other way around. Originality is for the intelligent, and object only borrows its epistemological dignity from it.

By discovering effective reality and then establishing a relationship between effective reality and concepts such as human relations, the nation, and the salvation of the homeland, Machiavelli succeeds in devising a new interpretation of morality, virtue, and its relation to the reality of life. By placing human relations and the public interest in the exploration of moral law, he paved the way for Hegel’s conception of concrete morality and ethnic religion. It is according to Machiavelli’s idea that Hegel came up with the basic idea of ​​the phenomenology of the soul, which is to establish the dialectical relationship between heaven and earth. Accordingly, the contradiction between morality and human nature and desire is eliminated, and by cultivating morality from the roots of desire, human desire and nature introduce morality in general in the name of an understandable ethnic and customary spirit. Also, given the possibility that Machiavelli’s effective reality gives him, Hegel succeeds in establishing a relation between idealism and realism and explains the extraction of idealism from within realism. In this regard, the authors try to establish a relation between the logic of Prince Machiavelli and the evolution of the phenomenological logic of the soul by presenting a new interpretation of the modern Prince Machiavelli and showing the great philosophical possibilities that this work offers to philosophers after him, especially Hegel.

Before Machiavelli, in order to explain the transition from subject to object, he justified concepts that played a pivotal role in the transition from subject to object, or vice versa, which were essentially theological-metaphysical concepts, but Machiavelli in his political thought defined There is a new relation, and it must be achieved, that Hegel was later able to use in his ontology in a complex interpretation - and a critique of the views of the likes of Kant and Fichte, who are and should have dealt with the separation of territory. Influenced by Machiavelli, instead of inferring, hegel's ontological and transcendent affairs should be sought in the midst of the effective facts of this world, and thus he was able to criticize the precedence of subject over object, as philosophically explained by Kant, and the dialectical relation. Study between the two from a normative point of view. The author tries to present a new interpretation of the problem and must explain in Machiavelli's thought the logic of Hegel's transition from subject to object and how to replace normative logic with transcendent logic in this regard.

In this article, the author claims that Kant’s political thought is formed both in the break from his moral thought and in the continuation and decline of his moral thought in politics. Kant has previously struggled in the field of ethics to realize autonomy in external and internal nature, as well as in institutions, on the premise that man is evil and that the world of phenomena or experience lacks rationality. And to escape from this problem, he either seeks refuge in the unknown future or in God and theoretically never has a theory to establish a relationship between the world of phenomena and phenomena, or in other words, the subjective and objective. In such a state, the person stands outside nature with his free inside, and the experience or object appears to him as something threatening. Kant brings all these problems with him to his world of understanding of politics. And because it has already created a disconnect between the two realms of subject and object, this continues also in political thought, because it cannot use the capacity of its new understanding of human freedom to achieve the theory of public will and its embodiment outside. Instead, it seeks to establish the government of law and ensure it by forcing the state to achieve good citizenship for society. Thus Kant’s political thought separated from the freedom of autonomy and it falls into utilitarian thought.In this article, the author not only believes that there is a gap between freedom and autonomy in Kant’s moral thought and his political philosophy but also believes that Kant’s theoretical decline in political thought is due to the weakness of his moral thought. That is, not establishing a relationship with the real world or phenomena or experience in Kant’s moral thought and not realizing his autonomy outside, whether on the basis of anthropology based on man’s evil or on the irrationality of the outside world and also not accepting its institutions which is the embodiment of human desires and wishes; all of these have had an inevitable impact on his political thought. in such a way that whenever Kant speaks of politics in the real world, he can never speak of the transcendental freedom embodied in it. Thus, that conflict between subject and object or morality and nature or human desires with social institutions in politics has been reproduced again. In such a situation, as Kant has not been able to bring that abstract moral man into the realm of politics and in concrete cases, explain the conditions of its realization in case of public will, inevitably, one must turn to the government for the realization of both private and public will in the field of politics which is not at all the embodiment of the public will of individuals, but a master who prepares man for social life by coercion and its metaphysical repression. Thus, autonomy is not realized in politics as in ethics in the external sphere, and empirical coercion in the form of government will impose itself on the abstraction of autonomy like God in Kant’s moral thought.

Emmanuel Kant holds multiple and sometimes contradictory views on political thought, so that in different periods of his thinking, we are faced with different political approaches. Since in the face of each of his different anthropological approaches we are confronted with a different political thought in relation to it, it seems that Kant changes the fate of his political thought with the idea he finds in each period about anthropology. In his first approach, he looks only at man as a species, and explains the history of his development on the basis of providential or natural history, in such a way that man does not rely on his own will in the formation of political society, but occurs naturally. However, his view of man in moral thought is accompanied by a complex dialectic of the law of reason, will, and freedom, and is essentially defined by autonomy.The last case goes back to the critique of the power of judgment, which relates to people who together benefit from common sense. For those who even need each other to think and judge, this will go back to the aesthetic judgment that is formed in the imagination and not in the intellect.

Fichte's philosophy has understood the interpretation of the world by its changing. In this philosophy, theoretical reflection without considering of the change of the world will be meaningless. The most important philosophical achievement of the world according to Fichte, that is Kant's philosophy, despite providing tools for changing the world, does not use it in this direction. Fichte's mission is to establish a connection between Kant's philosophy and the outside world. In this way, Fichte rejects or alters all the dichotomies and theories that prevented the establishment of this similarity in Kant's philosophy, and opens the way for theory of theory-action and subject-object. And we show how Fichte, by this way, has transformed the meaning of freedom, reality and idealism. In this article, the authors carefully examined all of Fichte's achievements along the way, and then criticized Fichte's method and strategy, showing how he fallen into the trap of obstacles that he had previously recognized in Kant.

In Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel depicts the dialectical structure of the history of European human consciousness. In all the transitions of consciousness to different outcomes, he has recognized the necessity and dialectical relation and follows it in all fields of history and fields of thought in different currents. In the chapter on the spirit, we encounter two very important currents in social history, namely the French Revolution, and in the history of thought, that is, Kant's philosophy of morality, which appear in two consecutive sections. And it's as if Hegel found a close connection between Robespierre's assassination rule and Kantian philosophy of morality. Where Robespierre's abstract freedom, in order to create absolute freedom in the realization of his generalized partial will, destroys any institution or detail as a factor in disrupting the realization of his free will, and begins a period of tyranny and terror. It is as if such a claim of a common will that tolerates no detail or opposition becomes the internal tyranny of Kant's general moral law (the realization of which is the only way to attain freedom) in order to destroy nature, desires, customs and objective institutions, and so on. And it creates fear and anxiety due to endless contradictions, and the moral person, like the revolutionary person, is trapped within his abstract will by the complete elimination of objectivity, which, according to Hegel, will have dangerous consequences.

In developing his Foundations of the Science of Knowledge, Fichte draws on two theoretical elements, the meaning of autonomy in Kant's thought, and a practical element, the French Revolution. In this regard, by completing Kant's autonomy (using the experience of the French Revolution), it enables it to penetrate the realm of necessity and foreign substance, and thus transforms freedom into a power beyond Kant's imagination. In this regard, he proposes two theories of action and rational intuition, an unprecedented dichotomy with Kant's philosophy in two areas of changing the theory of how experience is formed and the displacement of self-consciousness instead of consciousness. With these two changes, Fichte creates a new meaning of idealism, reality, and subjectivity. These new elements in Fichte's philosophy are formed not only by the dialectical construction between the French Revolution and Kantian autonomy, but also by the way in which the theory of freedom and how it is developed in the French Revolution is discovered. With this event, Fichte frees the Science of Knowledgefrom the double fall of the face of autonomy with necessity and the revolution with terror.

The author reconstructs the preface of Hegel's philosophy of law according to the three gaps that Hegel has found in German thought and culture in such a way that not only the reason for writing the book Philosophy of Truth is clarified, but even the necessity of breaking through these gaps is explained. In the field of theoretical and practical philosophy, Hegel first struggles with subjective idealism, which believes only in the determinations of the subject and leaves the external world as unknown and does not pay attention to its internal logic, and eliminates the disconnect between subject and object. In the same relation to subjective philosophy he then confronts German nationalist movements that pursue their own profit-seeking and emotional self-sufficiency, replacing the understanding of the "is" or the actual with the arbitrary "musts" of subjective political philosophy and beliefs. In this regard, not only by its method of logic, it removes the contradiction between "subject / object" and "is / must", but also, by removing the gap between the rational and the external reality, gives external validity to the external determinations of the realization of the idea; In this way he can create a new understanding of the state that encompasses all the dialectics mentioned, and defends this state throughout the preface against the arbitrary will that leads to German nationalism and subjective philosophy.

The French Revolution is recognized as the first concrete presence of the modern individual in history, where he stands for the realization of right and liberty against the absolute power of the king and wants absolute freedom. But Hegel, despite much praise for the revolution, deals with Pathology and critiques the meaning of will, freedom, and individuality in them. At the end of the Spirit chapter of Phenomenology, Hegel deals with the French Revolution, especially the era of terror and, in his dialectical space, rises to the battle by imagining the revolution from the absolute self-consciousness, absolute freedom, partial will, and general will, and proves Robespierre’ and the French nation’s abstract and hollow understanding of these terms. Hegel, after this criticism, also implicitly deals with Rousseau's critique as the foregrounding of the French conception of the meaning of these terms. After examining the outcome of absolute freedom and all its determinations to the end, Hegel redefines the fundamental terms in the Terror section and illustrates how public freedom and will are realized in his political thought system whereby penetrating into the absolute power and will, not only does the particular return to the individual again, but also realizes the whole inside him through outer mediators, and in this way, coming up with a very precise definition of the whole exclusive in individual and returning the external reality to the individual in a complex way.

As Hegel has stated in the foreword to the foundations of the philosophy of right; the central argument in this work is to eliminate the arbitrary of the will, which is the folk meaning of freedom. Hegel seeks to trace the realization of the concept of freedom as an idea in the subject matter. The author argues that in both Hegelian transitions between the three main parts of this work, namely from the abstract right to morality and from morality to ethical life, he has eliminated the autocracy of will as a appearance without concept. In the wrong dialectic and its resolution, is captured by the arbitrary will of the individual who puts the mass into an infinite constellation. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the general sphere of the human being in order to legislate the good as morality. In this section, conscience as the determinant of the inner good of the human being, after forming all the institutions and rules of custom within himself. This way he claims to be absolutist, which Hegel considers to be the result of Kant's ethics and in line with the logic of the terror government in France. In order to remove this arbitrary, Hegel trans to The distinctive aspect of his moral philosophy, that is, the ethical life, in which the content of moral laws must be framed through the institutions of the actual social world in which the person resides

In this research, we are trying to explain how Niccolò Machiavelli Basically criticizes the foundations of classical political thought, and in breaking off those foundations, paves the way for a new vision of politics as well as the establishment of political science. In this essay, Aristotle's political philosophy is presented as the representative of the logic of classical political thinking and we interpret this thought on the basis of the three strategic terms of nature, luck and virtue, as well as the complex relationship between them and their relation to politics in Aristotle's perspective and we will show that politics follows the naturalist-ethical view of Aristotle. We also discuss simultaneously how Machiavelli works with three terms that set against the terms of Aristotle (Which include power, virtue , and the homeland) invalidate the foundations of Aristotle's political thought and, consequently, classical political thought. And opens the way for the creation of a new political thought that forms outside the field of gravity of nature power, of fortune power. Where man is only relying on his will and virtue and without the need for a force of nature and fortune, It changes the logic of political relations to its own advantage.

Fichte, In the book of the foundations of the natural right, in a Double-sided dialectic, not only deduces the concept of the right in beginning from abstract terms such as rational being, activity, freedom, consciousness, another, and the concept of intersubjectivity, but, at the same time the inclusion of all those terms is realized on the basis of the concept and principle of the right. Therefore, in the intellectual system of Fichte, all these concepts form a complex set understood only with each other, because they are created dialectically from each other and can only be realized with each other. But at the end of the way, due to the inference of the law of right and all its proportions through reason, we will show the free rational being Timely and logically as the head of the pyramid of the strategic terms of the philosophy of right and politics of Fichte. In the following, to realize its law of right and guarantee it to people in the outside world, Fichte deduce the commonwealth (as the will of the public) and politics as the state science, and consider this new science as a servant of right that The basis of its essence has a priori been derived from free rational being.

To realize human autonomy, Descartes establishes the dialectical relation between consciousness and freedom through the three essential elements of understanding, will, and divine power. Through the free will of negative, as methodic doubt and the destruction of all presuppositions, the basis of consciousness is referred to the human being and releases it from external authority. By building a knowledge based on the innate concepts that come from within and without mediation consciously re-establishes knowledge. In this way, human beings not only gain autonomy of understanding but also freedom through the effort of a systematic and restrictive understanding. Because with the entry of the limiting of understanding in the area of the will, freedom is no longer meant to be nonchalance and lawlessness. But freedom within the limits of certain judgments of understanding and its legislation and divine power are enclosed. Through this process, it is promoted to positive freedom. Descartes, by declaring that the natural imaginations are verifiably confirmed by divine confirmation, relied on God to guarantee the knowledge of the understanding and in this way, he describes freedom as God's guarantee. Therefore, in Descartes' philosophy, the realization of positive freedom under dialectical conditions form on the basis of the complex relationship between will, intelligence, and divine power, and all of the elements that constitute a whole will only have meaning with each other.

In the book of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant deals with postulating strategic terms such as free will, autonomy, the law of reason, the duty, and the complex relationship between them, which incorporate in kant's thought the base of the doctrine of Kant's ethics, law, and politics. In the meantime, not only moral is itself based on a struggle between will and law, but also moral is in a Double-sided dialectical relationship the foundation of the formation of a free will, autonomy, and realization metaphysics within man as an end. But when these autonomy beings try to create a community and form ethical-civil state with common rules based on moral guarantee In the outside world, they will be captured by another who believes in absolute freedom, In this area, my freedom will not be guaranteed. Therefore, one has to enter another situation in which all his rights are guaranteed by a external warranty, which is nothing but a juridico-civil state. Therefore, mankind, in order to preserve morality (and consequently its autonomy and freedom)from The ethico-civil state, which is merely subject to internal control, enters the juridico-civil state All duties are subject to external Legislation.

In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel criticized major claims of sense-certainty that have strategic importance across the book’s process. The sense-certainty claims that it has partial and singular cognition of its immediate object; and supports his claims in three steps and through the three havens as the absolute object, the absolute subject and the absolute Intuition. Considering the text of Phenomenology of Spirit, we attempted explanation and interpretation of how Hegel could pervade into the claims of sense-certainty using these key terms of his philosophy, i.e. mediation, subject and object contact, Conception of universality in a partial circumstance, as well as the power of negation (which are first suggested in the sense-certainty part and play essential role throughout the book) and throw them into an internal Contradiction and indicate that through its steps, the sense-certainty actually comes close to corroborate the universal circumstance by all its efforts though it looks for corroboration of the singular circumstance.

Niccolò Machiavelli has definitely discovered the continent of political science before any other philosopher in the new era, and introduced a new logic for understanding political forces in the staging of power. In this research, the author seeks to bring Machiavelli's political thought and, consequently, the new political thought into account using the three key terms of effective truth, fortuna/virtu and homeland(patria), along with an interpretation of the complex relationship between the three and the dialectics of each of these concepts and Other concepts that shape the necessity within them. In this review, Machiavelli gradually melts not only the content of the classical political thought vocabulary in the magnetic field furnace of his new approach to politics, makes them a new meaning, but also Virtue-centered approach, Ethical ideals in Politics and fortune force put aside forever, and He introduces Effective truth is replaced by virtue, Virtu and politics Technique instead of fortuna and He introduces the salvation of the homeland as a criterion of virtue and morality and In this way farewell to political thought ahead of himself.