dr. ali haqqi

One problem attracted the minds of many philosophers in Islamic philosophy is that of place and, following it, vacuum. The question: do vacuum and fullness exist? and given their existence, are they something other than place or are they included in it? In the paper, has been intended to answer: what may be known as the particularities of them? How may one prove their existence? There have always been two perceptions of the place: one taking place as the outer surface of a body, and the other as being of three dimensions of length, depth, and width in which the body is situated. this question, however, arises: Is a body of three dimensions? If so, does the place which is of three dimensions include all dimensions of the body thoroughly? In other words, is a body thoroughly situated in its place or each of its dimension is situated in one dimension of the place? Most Muslim philosophers have negated vacuum; some of them, however, have sought to prove it. As concluded in this fundamental research with an analytical and descriptive method, Avicenna has viewed the place as being the outer surface of the contained or the inner surface of the containing body and in any case, place may not be other than the placed, mutumakkin, that is, the contained or the containing. He, therefore, cannot accept the vacuum as an environment free of any material. Ibn Sina has based the falsity of vacuum of on three principles: 1. the vacuum`s lacking of dimension; 2. The assumption of its infiniteness; 3. Proving the falsity of movement in an infinite environment.

The status of caliphate (viceroy) is one of the positions which belong to a complete person. Among all creatures, God has chosen human being for this status. But are all humans equal in the achievement of this position? What are the differences between real and conventional and minor and major caliphate? I will explain Molla-Sadra's view as a philosopher and Nasafi's view as a mystic. Using a comparative method in this article, I will try to answer this question: are the theories of Molla- Sadra and Nasafi on Caliphate in accordance with each other or they have differences? Although it seems, at the beginning, that their theories are in accordance, but speculating on their words makes it clear that their views are different.

In Shaykh Ishrāq’s cosmology, the world is divided into two sections of light and darkness and according to the principle of gradation of light certain ranks
are introduced among lights, which are different from each other in their intensity and weakness. After the world of lights, there comes the world of material bodies, which is pure darkness and there is no light (except for sensible vertical lights) in it. Separate study of each one of the ranks of the world in Shaykh Ishrāq’s View, the way that rank appeared, and its relation to the higher ranks of being, especially to God or the Light of all lights are the topics we have addressed in this article. Since for presenting a more accurate picture of Suhrawardī’s cosmology, his ontology is to be taken into consideration as well, we have considered some of important principles of illuminationist ontology, such as essentialism and gradation in quiddity and demonstrated how Suhrawardī’s viewpoint about the world is connected to his principles of ontology.

Religious experience is one of the issues developed in the fields of new theology and philosophy of religion and in the context of new religious studies. Religious experience has a special role in pious life and consists of a vast scope including prayer, supplication, answering supplication, spiritualintuitions, etc. Mystical experience, which is closely related to religious experience, gives meaning to mystics’ life. In this kind of experience, the mystic unites with ultimate reality and attains an indescribable state. This unity is most important distinction between religious experience and mystical experience. Religious experience is different from mystical experience and every religious experience is not necessarily a mystical experience. However, since both are a kind of experience, the present paper compares them. Revelation is also an experience exclusive to prophet, with features not found in the two other experiences.

Husserl and Mulla Sadra are two philosophers who, despite their ideological differences, have dealt with the problem of certainty and its nature. Propounding “reductions” and “epoche” by Husserl and the question of “union of intellect, intelligent and intelligible” by Mulla Sadra, they have described the way to achieve certainty and its quality. In this paper, we have dealt with the similarities of these two philosophers epistemologically. Propounding the theory of the union of intellect, intelligent and intelligible and also showing the importance of human agency in understanding; regarding knowledge and soul as non-corporal things and all of the non-corporals are present for each other; Mulla Sadra has offered a special meaning from certainty that has no precedent. Of course, it should not be forgotten the place of intuitive knowledge and dependence of conceptual knowledge on it in this meaning of certainty. This meaning of certainty can be seen in Husserl, too. He corresponds the act of consciousness, ego, and object of consciousness to the intellect, intelligent and intelligible. Husserl like Mulla Sadra accepts the role of knowing agent as the focal point and refers to it as “transcendent ego”.

Raising epistemological discourses in the interdisciplinary science of philosophy have prompted various researchers of science to examine the general principles governing human sciences and knowledge from a different perspective. As a result, the philosophy of the Qur’ānic sciences, as one of the Islamic interdisciplinary sciences, has the intention to study the nature, issues, fundamentals, and functions of the Qur’ānic sciences and their relations to other sciences on the basis of the principles and fundamentals of epistemology, in order to open newer horizons in the epistemological domains of the Qur’ānic sciences to the general public.

In Aristotle’s view, the explanation of an object or an issue is carried out according to the real form or reasonable essence and the utmost objective (ghāyat) it has and the goal it achieves. For instance, why do objects fall? According to Aristotle and his followers, motion is explained as per the innate tendency of anything seeking to return to its natural resting place. The resting place or “natural station” of fire is up and that of the earth is down. The heavier objects have a stronger tendency downward, hence should fall faster. The motion’s utmost objective – in both meanings of extreme and purpose and objective – is more of interest than the trends that take place in the meantime or prior to it. Thus, causality is described with respect to the future goals (ultimate causes) and essential inclinations (formal causes), rather than by the impressions of past events (efficient causes), which act upon passive and talented matters (material causes). The above words do not mean that observation had no place in Aristotelian science. Aristotle had personally done considerable researches on biological classification, which involved accurate observations. However, the issue of ultimate objective, i.e., assuming everything and every action as purposeful and with an ultimate goal, had not yield theories that can be tested by earlier experiences.

The writer tries to remove the doubts from the concept of "historicity" and study and analysis this notion particularly from Popper's perspective. For elucidation of this concept, other notions such as "history" and "philosophy of history" along with their different meanings are explained so that the relation of historicity should be fully clarified with the above mentioned entries. Historicity enjoys various aspects and dimensions that this article has either not paid attention to them entirely or has sufficed to be brief in this regard.

Was Hume really a skeptic empiricist? The common picture that existed about Hume sometime ago outlined him as an empiricist who, contrary to his preceding empiricists, could deduce skepticism which was a corollary of empiricism from it. According to this interpretation, Hume's entire project is negation and rejection of metaphysical knowledge as well as a science based on principles of empiricism. However, in the first half of twentieth century, David Camp Smith presented a more positive interpretation of Hume. According to his interpretation, Hume's objective is not entirely negating and rejecting; rather, his prime purpose is to indicate that man's fundamental beliefs, which according to the principles of empiricism are not adoptable from experience or intellect, are originated from human nature, and, somehow, the nature imposes them on us. This analysis by Smith transforms Hume from a skeptic empiricist into a naturalist philosopher. The present paper seeks to make a brief comparison between these two interpretations on Hume.