hamid mohammadi moghanloei

The issue of self-knowledge, while ancient, has always been both challenging and paradoxical. In this paper, considering that the "self" is the central axis of Kant’s thought in all three Critiques, we will attempt to analyze the mystery surrounding self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. To this end, we will briefly examine the following points: (1) What is the difference between self-consciousness and knowledge of the "self"? (2) Awareness of something without having knowledge of it is one of the dilemmas of Kantian philosophy, and this becomes more pronounced when it comes to the "self." However, this mystery cannot be seen as a flaw in Kant’s philosophy, as in the discourse on self-knowledge, the self is always a logical step behind itself. (3) Finally, despite Kant’s claim that the thing-in-itself has no relation to time, we will explore the connection between the "self" as a thing-in-itself and time, which contributes to the mystery of the "self."

In this article with a study of the meaning of substance in empirical philosophers’ viewpoints, we show that Hume's negation of substance has influenced Kant's theory of knowledge. To solve the problem of knowledge, Kant, on the one hand, turns the substance negated by Hume into a thing in itself. In this way, he tries to provide a strong foundation for the phenomena and keep his philosophy from falling into the abyss of absolute idealism. On the other hand, with the Copernican revolution, he turned the substance into one of the categories and determinations of the subject. In this way, he kept its essential role in the formation of knowledge and paved the way for the object to correspond with the mind. Therefore, in a sense, Kant preserves the substance in the meaning of the predecessors, but no epistemic role is possible for this meaning; however, he tries to maintain the epistemic position of the substance in another sense. The reason why Kant, while transforming the substance of the predecessors into a thing in itself, did not abandon the substance, but presented another definition of it, was to be able to explain perception. Because he needed a permanent thing, of course, a permanent thing that can be pointed to its position with the subject, not an unchanging existence that is unknown with the objects.

Many believe that one of Hegel's serious critics is Kierkegaard. In this article, we first try to show that some commentators believe that Kierkegaard's criticism is more related to Danish Hegelians than to Hegel himself. Second, when he meant to criticize Hegel himself, to what extent was he able to criticize the Hegelian system correctly, thirdly, was this anti-Hegelian thinker able to separate himself from the context of Hegel's thought, or is he still criticizing Hegel in the Hegelian Atmosphere? Of course, in this article, only some of Kierkegaard's criticisms have been examined and criticized; Like his critique on the position of the individual, theoretical reason, and historical necessity in Hegel's philosophy. We will also take a look at Kierkegaard's statement about the paradoxical field of faith and compare it with the Hegelian contradiction, and we will look at how much Kierkegaard is influenced by Hegel in expressing this concept. The purpose of the article is to examine Kierkegaard's criticisms, however, Hegel's ideas are also mentioned wherever necessary.