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Intellect is one of the important topics in the history of philosophy since Aristotle and his commentators, some of Aristotle's commentators whom have written a treatise on Intellect. What made the issue of Intellect a challenging issue for Aristotle's commentators is the view of what First Intellect is as a part of the human soul or is level in the hierarchy of beings. Examining it can also explain the ontological position Intellect and its duties. The question is, what is the truth of First Intellect according to Kindy and what is its ontological and epistemological position in his philosophical thought? On this basis,In this article, with the analytical descriptive method, we found that tThe first intellect is always Actual and the cause for the Intelligible and the cause for the second intellects and precedes all of them, and the second intellects are the other three levels of intellect And these three levels of intellect, are a part of the Thinking soul and there is no clarity in expressing Al-Kindi to separate the first intellect from the Soul. Eepistemologically, it actualizes the soul that is potentially intellect. We have reached this conclusion through Kindy's theory of first intellect. And we have reached this conclusion Al-Kindi's theory of the first intellect is a combination of the Aristotelian, Platonic, and Book of Causes perspectives.

Reappraising the concept of God in Al-Kindi’s reflections with the Qur'anic approach displays another of his aspects. In explaining the concept of God, Al-Kindi emphasizes the "Creatorship" and has reflected this in various treatises from his collection of philosophical treatises. The question is how Al-Kindi used the Qur'an to explain the concept of God? Can Al-Kindi's explanation of the concept of God also be considered Qur'anic? To express the concept of God and introduce him as the creator, Al-Kindi, either openly uses the verses of the Qur'an or implicitly uses the Qur'anic themes and the concepts of Ḥaqq, ‘Alīm, ‘Ādil and Qādir to describe God. In some treatises, he cites verses from the Holy Qur'an (Yā Sīn, 78-82; Al-Raḥmān, 6) and in using the Qur'an directly, he considers God as Creator (Khāliq) and in using the Qur'anic themes and views God as Truth (Ḥaqq) which has Qur'anic attributes. In this article, by examining these verses and Al-Kindi's explanation of them, we reappraise the concept of God from a Qur'anic point of view and answer the above-mentioned questions.

Sheikh Shahabuddin Suhravardi, as a founding philosopher, has a special place among Islamic philosophers by including and presenting the world of example in his particular cosmological map. He considers this middle world as a pristine and valuable achievement, so that he can show the direction of illumination and kingdom through it. According to his opinion, ecstasy has many religious and theological capabilities and can be a solution to many mysterious problems that have challenged theologians for centuries. Among these religious beliefs that Sohrwardi has been able to explain by resorting to the world of isolated examples, there is the issue of resurrection,For this reason, accepting both types of resurrection; That is, spiritual resurrection and physical resurrection regarding the immortality of the soul after death by the Sheikh, especially in connection with physical resurrection, is largely due to the proof of the world of a separate example in his illuminative philosophy. In this way, most of the souls, after disposing of the earthly material body, join an ideal form in the world of example, and after that, they are either in happiness and pleasure, or they spend their time in suffering and suffering. Based on this, the present article, which has been prepared in a descriptive-analytical way, aims to investigate the role and place of the world of a separate example in explaining the issue of resurrection and the happiness and misery of the speaking human soul, which is considered one of the religious beliefs

"Contemplation"(Gaze) is used in contrast to "action" in the new discourse, it is used in Uthulujiyya and Enneads in cosmological and existential discussions. The problem of this writing is the analysis of the use of " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads with an existential approach. The question is, is the use of "contemplation"(Gaze) in the Uthulujiyya and the Enneads the same and in the same sense, or is it different in the two works? How is " contemplation" expressed in these two books? The answer is, they are not different in terms of meaning; But they are different in terms of application and method of examining the subject. in the theology of Uthulujiyya, "contemplation" (Gaze) can be attributed to both God and the intellect and soul. "contemplation" is raised in the theory of grace and issuance and is connected with cosmology and theology. And in the Enneads, there is an "contemplation" in all hierarchy of life about God, intellect, soul and nature, and it has a creative aspect. The important difference between these two works is that in the rendering of the Enneads, it pays attention to "contemplation" both in the existential aspect and the epistemological aspect as opposed to "action"; and examines contemplation against action; While there is no such view in Uthulujiyya. Therefore, in this article, we will explain the term "contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads and examine its position in the cosmological system of these two works. The method of this writing is descriptive-analytical.

In Uthulujiyya, "thought" (fikr) is discussed in various ontological, theological, cosmological, and psychological contexts, while "contemplation," (nazar) often contrasted with "action" in contemporary discourse, is explored in theological discussions on cosmology and existential meaning. This paper aims to examine the ontological usage of the terms "thought" and "contemplation" in Uthulujiyya theological discourse. The central question is: How are "thought" and "contemplation" employed in relation to God and the world? Are these two concepts interchangeable? The answer posits that in Uthulujiyya theology, "thought" cannot be attributed to God (a negative approach), while "contemplation" can be ascribed to God, intellect and soul (a positive approach). "Contemplation" is discussed in the context of the theory of emanation (feiz wa soudour), intertwined with cosmology and theology. Based on this foundation, in this essay, we aim to elucidate the theological meanings of "thought" and " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and examine their applications in the its theology and cosmology.

Active Intellect" in Ibn Bajjah's Philosophy is important in epistemology, ethics and human happiness. Therefore, the topic of "active intellect" is discussed in different ways. "Truth of active reason" in the epistemological and existential position, regardless of its importance for the purpose and happiness of man, is the present issue of this article. the question is, what is the existential and epistemological place of active intellect in Ibn Bajjah's theory of intellect. Is it in the human person and related to the soul, or is it in the higher world and something separate from humans? Is it one or plural? Ibn Bajjah assign to the active intellect has the epistemological position of imparting knowledge and forms to the intellects of Human and imaginary images to animals, and in terms of the existential position of the active intellect, his words are mixed and he speaks about the unity or plurality of the intellect in different levels of the intellect, according to the rationality of that intellect and its relationship with the matter. It considers the useful intellect and the active intellect as one. Therefore, in order to investigate this issue and answer the questions raised, we first explain the Cognitive Soul, then we discuss the levels of intellect and what is the active intellect in Ibn Bajjah. And finally, we will analyze and review the said content. The article is written with a descriptive-analytical method

The issue of distinction between existence and quiddity has been openly raised in Islamic philosophy; but there is not agreement regarding the origins of this issue. This article claims that in Uthulujiyya, in the topic of "intelligence", we can find the traces of “distinction between existence and quiddity". In the fifth Mimer of Uthulujiyya, he equates the term "Ma howa")ماهو))what question) with "Lema howa") هو لم)) why question) in the intellect and in other beings it is considered entirely different questions. What is meant the identification of these two sort of questions: the "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lam howa") هو لم) in Intellect? Is it possible to consider the two terms "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lema howa") هو لم) in Uthulujiyya in the subject of reason as "existential" in which the root of the problem of distinguishing "existence and nature" can be investigated? In this article, we intend to examine this issue conceptual-extensional and creatively. In terms of concept, let's explain it through definition, and its examples in the world of reason and matter, and in terms of innovation, we should examine the problem with complete innovation. Therefore, it is necessary to first explain the terms and words used for "existence" and "essence" in the Enneads Uthulujiyya and the understanding these books have of "existence" and "essence" and then to examine "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lema howa") هو لم) and the issue of existence and essence in the intellect in terms of concept and examples. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical.

In Uthulujiyya, " thought " and "gaze" are discussed in different topics. Every thought needs a subject of thought and also an object of thought and " theory " usually means "practice". The problem is, what is the definition and position of " thought " and " gaze " in Uthulujiyya, and are " thought " and "gaze" one and the same, or are they two separate things and related to different domains?
Therefore, in this article, we reread "thought" and " gaze "in Uthulujiyya with approach of epistemology with a descriptive-analytical method and answer the questions raised in the form of analysis.
In this article, two definitions of "thought" and the duties of the soul are presented, according to its first relation, that is, thought in relation to its place, namely, the soul and the intellect. The one is "rational understanding of the soul" and the other is "thought" which means "organization of the body"; But in the second relation, that is, thought in relation to God, thought means "movements from premises to results", and thought is deprived of God for some reasons. But the discussion of "gaze" also has the same meaning in God, intellect and soul different from the thought of the predecessors, which was opposite to "practice".
In Uthulujiyya, "thought" is examined in terms of the subject of thought and its belonging in two fields: "mind and soul" and "God". Thinking is related to both practical science and theoretical science. In this sense, in the face of tangible things and the material world, on the one hand, to get rid of it and return to the world of reason, and also to remember what was taken from the world of reason, a kind of practical exercise to plan and control the body to rid oneself of pains and dependencies. to the world of matter and freedom from it. From this point of view thought is the source of action. But thinking in the sense of "synthesizing sensations" and making general concepts has an epistemological and theoretical and is deprived of God.

Thinking " in Uthulujiyya in one way means "mind" and "awareness. in another sense means "prudence" and a kind of "controlling", the soul needs more effort and suffering to keep the busyness away from itself. “gaze” also carries the meaning of creative reasoning and action. The difference between “thought” and “gaze” is that action in thought is action and a kind of movement; But gaze is a creative act.
Therefore, “thought” and “gaze” in have both practical and current aspects; But thinking has a theoretical aspect in addition to the practical side. The origin of action and being a verb is different in both thinking, planning and organizing and controlling. In view, it is creation. Therefore, thoughts and opinions in Uthulujiyya do not coincide with each other due to their different meanings and applications in different fields, and for this reason, they are not mutually transferable.

Philosophers, based on their philosophical foundations and their concept of God, have proposed different ways of speaking about God, some of which are positive, negative, Super-Affirmation, and sometimes a combination of negative and positive. Plato, whose method is known as negative theology, also uses analogy to express his meaning. Influenced by his predecessors, John Scott Eriugena chose an eclectic approach to the negative approach with a dialectical approach, and our task is to make a comparative study of the method chosen by Plotinus and Eriugena according to their foundations. With the questions of whether the Indo method can overlap and be reduced to one method or whether the two methods are different and reach different results? Plato's method is negative-detailed, But he uses metaphors to express his purpose. The Eriugena method is also a Super-Affirmation approach obtained from negative-positive coordination. In some cases, Plotinus and Eriugena overlap in their transcendent and Super-Affirmation conception of negative theology and adopt their method of using metaphors and analogies. The positive method in Plotinus carries a negative meaning and the Platonic analogy gives a cognition of "one" to man, but in Eriugena, the positive method finds a metaphorical meaning and is a veil for God.

Al-Kindi is the first contemporary Mu’tazilite Muslim Philosopher, who has translated various works from Greek into Arabic during the translation movement period. Al-Kindi’s impression of metaphysics has been entangled with theology in such a way that in his definition of philosophy he considers it as knowledge about truth and causes and discusses it with a theological approach. On this basis, the present paper is intended to examine Al-Kindi’s impression of God and the writer attempts to clarify the limits of the independence of his thought from the Greek thought and the impact of the Islamic and Qur’anic approach concerning the concept of God. According to Al-Kindi’s definition of primary philosophy, “what status does God have in Al-Kindi’s philosophy?” Is Al-Kindi’s God a philosophical God affected by an Islamic-Qur’anic outlook or a God affected by the Greek outlook? Either as the Cause or as the Truth, God has an important status in philosophy for al-Kindi. Al-Kindi’s philosophical outlook and his definition of philosophy are to some extent affected by Greece and the Islamic approach. “Truth” and the “One” are two features of the Qur’anic God in Al-kindi’s view; and “pure is-ness”, “primal cause”, and “prime agent” are also the features of the philosophical God affected from Greek philosophy in Al-Kindi’s view. In this research, we would examine the concept of God given the definition of primary philosophy and Al-Kindi’s impression of it.

According to Allameh Hilli, the concept of God is based on the two concepts of "necessity of existence" and "perfection", and these two concepts are the basis for explaining the semantics of attributes. The concept of "necessity of existence" is a philosophical concept that has entered from the peripatetic philosophy into the theological discussion of the school of "Hillah" and although the concept of "perfection" presupposes the discussion of attributes and even the proof for the existence of God, it is discussed little in Islamic theology. Here, the relation between these two concepts in theology as well as the explanation of the attributes of God is discussed. The question is: “What is the relation between "necessity of existence" and "absolute perfection"?”; Are these two concepts deliverable to each other or are they based on two independent concepts? The concept of perfection for Allameh Hilli has been expressed with completeness, and in the semantic analysis of attributes, including positive and negative attributes, the concept of "perfection" is the background and default; But the concept of "necessity of existence" is the basis in the semantic analysis of some negative and positive attributes. Accordingly, in this article, by explaining the semantics of the concept of perfection and necessity of existence, and examining the semantics of attributes based on those two concepts, we arrive at the relationship of equality between the two concepts of necessity of existence and perfection; In other words, with the negation of the perfection of existence, existence will become meaningless, and with the negation of the necessity of existence, perfection will become relative. Since this issue is a theoretical and conceptual discussion, its method is also descriptive and analytical. By conceptual analysis of Qur'anic attributes of God and their philosophical explanation based on "perfection", practical benefit is also obtained.

For a long time, philosophers have considered contemplative knowledge and thinking to be the specific perfection of the human species. The question is how is the relationship between thought and theoretical reflection with action? According to the relation between theory and practice in the fields arises the two thinkers? Is it merely a commentator of Aristotle or Avicenna has also developed his ideas? If it develop in all aspects or have been neglected it in parts? What is the "relative Causality " of opinion and practice in Aristotle and Avicenna? The relationship between theory and practice can be studied under twofold issues: First, the relationship between theoretical and practical potential in terms of epistemology; The relationship between knowledge and action manifested in mysticism, happiness, politics, ethics and prophecies that speak of it as practical wisdom. Discussion and action in Aristotle's and Avicenna`s views that all of these approaches; Accordingly, the relationship between practical and theoretical reason and practical wisdom of Aristotle and Avicenna with Relying on the " Causality " approach considered.

According To Eriugena, it is not true to attribute a property to God in the sense that one does to the creatures; but they can be used beyond the sense in which they are used for the creatures. Because God, on the one hand, is the ultimate cause of the creatures -the attributes of creatures are ultimately from God- and, on the other hand, transcends them. Since Eriugena simultaneously negates and affirms the attributes about God, his theory can be called an apophatic-cataphatic theory in which, the negation of the attributes is because of God’s superiority to creatures. Surprisingly, it is also the case for Avicenna. That is, his theory can also be called an apophatic-cataphatic theory. Nevertheless, Avicenna’s view about the negation and affirmation of attributes is different from that of Eriugena. He contends that “necessity of existence” can be attributed to God positively while the other attributes are subject to either negation or correlation. According to Avicenna, it is not important for an attribute to be apparently negative/positive, because an apparently negative attribute can be in fact positive and vice versa. In this article, it will be argued that despite Eriugena's idea, Avicenna’s theory is in contrast with divine ineffability.

The concept of perfection in Aristotle's metaphysics is expressed with words like Energia and Entelecheia, Both in English have been translated into actuality. Aristotle has spoken on various topics of Energia and Entelecheia: In metaphysics, in the discussion of form, Potentiality and Actuality and four causes It is discussed. In psychology, Soul is defined as perfection. And in physics in motion debate, And in ethics, the discussion of happiness has used "perfection" and " Actuality". The question is what is the meaning of the two terms Energia and Entelecheia And what is the relationship between their meanings in these different topics? Why did Aristotle use two words to express his purpose? Can these two words be delivered?
Aristotle did not provide for explicit and clear definition Energia and Entelecheia. The distinction is expressed in the form of examples. The difference between Energia and Entelecheia is very delicate; Energia means certain work Entelecheia means perfection and Totality. In this paper, we seek to explain the meaning of Energia and Entelecheia in Aristotle's thought in the various topics Aristotle has spoken of as the concept of "actuality" and "perfection", and explain their position and difference. To this end, we brought and analyzed Energia in four meanings Which are delivered to each other and Entelecheia in two senses Which can not be delivered And we came to the conclusion that "Energia" is a preliminary meaning for the meaning of "Entelecheia".

One of the major issues in the names and attributes of God، is the semantic interpretation of how to interpret and apply the concepts and predicates that talk about God. A historical survey proves that Imami theologians’ theological views are derived from the Qur''an and hadith. The Quran ascribed some attributes to God that prompted scholars to discuss and analyze the applicability of these concepts to God; accordingly، different views emerged Including Allameh Hilli’s apophaticism which is similar to the apophatic–cataphatic way of Thomas Aquinas. We''ll explain how three meanings of the apophatic-cataphatic. Erigena stated one of the meanings and Thomas Aquinas and Allameh Hilli stated another one which seems similar to each other. While Hilli’s negates the anti-attributes، Thomas negates the attributes which are specified to creatures. Then we explain the meaning of the attributes regarding creatures and God، and then، will discuss the “gradation theory” of Allame Hilli and “Analogy theory” of Thomas Aquinas.