mahdi behniafar

This paper is about the condemnation of 1277 that was issued by the bishop of Paris (Etienne Tempier) against the Aristotelian, Thomistic and Averroist theological teachings. This condemnation was initially aimed at protecting the doctrine of God's absolute power and critique of the philosophical and theological reasoning about God, but later it led to new developments that were outside of the initial goals of its founders and were in conflict with it. This research, using an analytical approach, tries to provide an analysis of the backgrounds and philosophical and theological disagreements that led to the condemnation of 1277, and to present a map of its conceptual scope. Then, we have discussed some of the epistemological and theological implications of this condemnation, among which the doctrine of God's absolute power is the most prominent and one of the main goals of this condemnation. But we have also raised and analyzed the long-term implications such as nominalism, secularism, and the development of modern science and its departure from the Platonic perspective, and it has shown that these are hidden implications that were not only unintended by the founders of the condemnation but also in conflict with their main lines of thought.

Eliot Cohen is one of the contemporary pioneers of philosophical counseling. He considers philosophical counseling as one of the branches of applied philosophy. His logic-based therapy (LBT) or his logic-based counseling and therapy is also a subcategory of this claim. His reason is that a philosophical counselor, especially a counselor with Logic-Base Therapy (LBT), empowers the skill of applying philosophy in everyday life, and this method provides his audience with a coherent, clear, and most importantly, methodical framework for applying philosophical ideas and methods in solving psychological problems (Cohen, 2015, p. 34). Cohen has always sought to develop logic-based therapy as an independent and reliable branch among philosophical counseling approaches. We can see this specific trajectory in his works from the very beginning of using philosophy in treatment.
On the one hand, we know that Aristotle, as a systematic philosopher, in the practical dimensions of his philosophy, not only asked what happiness is in life, but also sought to realize it. Cohen was inspired by this issue and generally believes that applying Aristotle's philosophy in philosophical counseling leads to the "self-care" of clients (Cohen, 2003, p. 18). In his treatment system, he has used not only Aristotle's logic and especially his approach to fallacies and his theory of practical analogies, but also Aristotle's moral philosophy and the concept of virtue and its practical application.
The main field of this research is philosophical counseling with a focus on Cohen's logic-based therapy (LBT method). Our main goal is to see how Cohen was able to use Aristotle's philosophy, especially his logic and moral philosophy, in philosophical counseling in his logic-based therapy system.

The main issue of this research is, in what sense Cohen's logic-based therapy should be considered Aristotelian. Answering this question requires answering at least two other questions: first, what is the contribution of Aristotle's moral and logical teachings in the establishment of logic-based therapy; secondly, how Cohen used the classical concepts and themes of Aristotle's philosophy during the establishment and development of this contemporary treatment method.

Following the development of philosophical counseling in recent years, and specifically about Cohen's method as one of the contemporary counseling and treatment methods, numerous articles and books have been written. Some of these researches have generally developed and described Cohen's LBT method, but none of them have directly addressed the influence and role of foundations and themes derived from philosophy and especially Aristotle's logic and methodology in the establishment and development of this method. However, the past valuable research about the LBT method will certainly help us in advancing the goals of this research.
The article Metaphysics of logic-based therapy (LBT) in Cohen's view (Nazarnejad, 2021) is a research that overlaps with part of our research goal and explains Cohen's method and its theoretical foundations. But this article does not focus specifically on the Aristotelian foundations and Aristotelian methodology of logic-based therapy. Perhaps Cohen himself made the most review of the background of our research. In 2000, he published a book called Philosophers at Work, and in its seventh chapter, he discussed the role of Aristotelian logic in professions such as law and medicine. He also wrote a book titled What would Aristotle do? in 2003, where he discussed the role of Aristotle's philosophy in philosophical counseling. In fact, this book may have emphasized the importance of Aristotle in philosophical counseling among other important works of Cohen in his logic-oriented method, but so far, no independent or critical research has been published - especially by commentators - that simultaneously analyzes the effect of Aristotle's moral and logical foundations in logic-based treatment.

Our philosophical method in this research is analytical, and as one of its aspects, we have analyzed documents. In this step of the analysis, we first collected the documents and then organized the claims and their content. Then, by explaining logic-based therapy (LBT) and searching for the obvious and hidden Aristotelian roots in this treatment method, we have presented our analysis and evaluation in connection with the Aristotelian foundations of logic-oriented therapy, especially based on the three aspects of the hypothesis proposed in the problem statement section.

In a comprehensive statement, from Cohen's point of view, the field of human feelings, emotions, and decisions has an inferential structure that is often hidden. What endangers a person's psychological health is the transformation of these internal conclusions into pseudo-inferences or so-called fallacies. It is for this reason that a person's will and then his words and actions fall into error, and therefore the relationship of a person with himself, others and the world around him becomes restless and confused.
But at the same time, he believes in this Aristotelian teaching that human happiness depends on living according to virtues. The solution to this psychological confusion in logic-based therapy (LBT) is to identify and fix these fallacies by replacing them with appropriate virtues in the same field of thinking.
Our analysis of the Aristotelian foundations of Cohen's logic-based therapy shows that: 1. In some subjects, Cohen has completely taken the basics of his discussion and his method from Aristotle; topics such as the Doctrine of the Mean, some types of fallacies and virtues, as well as the role of practice in establishing virtues in a person's existence. 2. However, in matters such as the deductive nature of human emotions, feelings and decisions, as well as being inspired by Aristotle's theory of "logical slips" and Aristotle's theory of practical analogies, Cohen only has an Aristotelian framework. This means that the foundations of Cohen's claims are Aristotelian, but when applied to LBT, new results were obtained. Overall, it seems that the scope of this second meaning is wider.

In recent decades, Functionalism has become a standard approach towards philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Functionalism is inspired by computer science and against prior theories about mind. Functionalism takes mind as a processor and body as a provider of raw data for this processor. Mind with the help of mental algorithms translates perceptional data to symbolic representations as concepts of objects and events. According to some philosophers, this leads to problems like the problem of meaning. In this paper, with an analytical approach, Embodiment is proposed as a solution to these problems. According to Embodied Mind, regarding the body as a mere machine is the root of all problems in Functionalism. Embodied mind is consisting of three pars: 1. Perception-Motor system which presents meaningful perception of objects and events to the mind. 2. Conceptualization system which unites information provided by perception-motor system. 3. Metaphors, processes in mind, which enable us to think and talk about everyday and mathematical concepts and meta-language. These are processes, mainly unconscious, in mind for understanding concepts. Embodied Mind rejects the idea of body as mere machine and mind as a brain processes. It also rejects symbolic representations as concepts. Concepts are simulators of objects and events, rooting in interaction between body and the world. Human as an Embodied Being exist in the world and interact with it and this is what makes sense of concepts in mind.

This article is concerned of the problem that weather Tarski’s definition of the ‘logical consequence’ in his seminal article ‘On the Concept of Logical Consequence’ (1936), as his article claims, captures the common concept of logical consequence or not. First of all, for understanding what defect had prevailing approach of logical consequence (proof- theoretical approach) that led him to attempt to present new definition of concept of logical consequence, I introduce proof-theoretical approach to logical consequence and examine its default and then explain two interpretations of his definition of the common concept of logical consequence. the First interpretation is that the common concept of logical consequence is the concept that all of ordinary and non-professional peoples in philosophy, logic and mathematics use. the Second interpretation is that what Tarski means by the common concept of logical consequence is the concept that for professional peoples in logic and mathematics is ‘common’ and already used in axiomatics. I defend the second interpretation and after descriptive-analytic examination of his suggested definition of this concept and presentation of example of it, I finally conclude that Tarski in his attempting for capture of the common concept of logical consequence has succeeded.

This paper examines the relationship between the environmental aesthetics approach backed by knowledge (ecological aesthetics) and the possibility of doing an action in favor of environmental conservation. It seems that even having such an approach towards the environment fails to sufficiently motivate people to protect the environment and nature, since there is a tension between the course of daily life and scientifically supported environmental aesthetics. In order to explain such tension, we tend to examine and critique ecological aesthetics (which is in some respects overlapped with environmental ethics) from the viewpoint of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, particularly with reference to his later work including the concept of formal life. Based on this concept, ecological aesthetics can be criticized and examined on three grounds: First, aesthetics is not able to create understanding or appreciation that leads to action. Second, the ecological concept added to reinforce the aesthetics, cannot support aesthetics in this regard and can even make things worse; ecological aesthetics, in fact, diverts aesthetics from its purpose (the purpose with regards to the environment, which is to motivate people to preserve nature) by trying to give it a strong objectivity. Third, the role of ethics in its current form in environmental conservation cannot be an active role.

This paper examines two rival versions (normative-axiomatic and psychologistic) about the nature of deduction and its relation with intuition in Descartes' thought. The ideal of the first version is to reduce the role of the faculty of memory and, sometimes, the role of the faculty of imagination in long chains of deduction due to their fallibility in Descartes' view. Achieving this ideal also depends on the mental training and practicing to place longer inferential chains in a single Cartesian intuition. This version accepts the independence of a logical consequence, considers deduction to be definable on the basis of definiens such as rules of inference and the basic principles of logic, and does not contradict the axiomatic tree of Cartesian knowledge. But the second version essentially sees deduction as nothing more than an intuitive grasping: a simple mental act that is nothing more than a complex intuition of several intuitive things. Therefore, this version considers deduction to have no logical regulations and considers it indefinable based on definiens such as logical principles and rules, and instead places the grasp of a truth that manifests in a kind of psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject. These two versions try to seem compatible with cognitive objectivity and offer an innate and inadoptable reading of Cartesian logic; But since the second version contradicts both the more fundamental points of Descartes' thought and the independence of logic, this version cannot lead to the cognitive objectivity and innateness of logic in an acceptable way.

The main background of this research is the study of Descartes' method in our knowledge to the sensible world and its relation to the ideal theme of axiomatic knowledge. I do not accept the objection that Descartes deviated from the axiomatic method in the knowledge of the material world, and therefore I have argued that he continued to axiomatic method by developing the rules of inference and breaking the monopoly of syllogism in his Tree of knowledge. One of the most important rules of non-deductive inference developed in his work is the method of inference to the best explanation (I.B.E). Through documentary analysis, I have shown that in addition to the basic formulation of the inference to best explanation (I.B.E), its extensive formulation can be clearly traced both in Preliminary design such as Discourse on Method and in the empirical sections of the principles of philosophy. Studying this development of inferential rules in Descartes's work not only illuminates some aspects of his important and deep idea of replacing the method with logic, but also provides a model for combining empirical knowledge with the axiomatic method. This model inspires knowledge and rational encounter with creative and constantly changing experimental and human events, and based on it, a window can be opened to get out of epistemic anarchy and even value anarchy in such areas.

The quality of life of Jesus has always been one of the most controversial issues even among Christians. In this paper, first, by documentary analysis and based on the early Christian scriptures, we have categorized three extractable views of these scriptures on the divine or natural nature of Jesus (PBUH), and then examined the perspective on Islamic scriptures. The divine nature, the divine-human nature, and the human natural nature of Jesus (PBUH) are three views that have been examined in Christian scriptures as well as the non-divine nature of Jesus (PBUH) that have been examined in Qur'anic thought. continuing with philosophical and theological analysis, we have addressed the paradoxes and some theoretical and theological difficulties facing some Christian views in areas such as "worship", "unity of the divine nature", the question of guidance, and the question of the intelligibility of God's action. The issue of "guidance" has been considered as one of the key goals of prophecy; that the biological propriety of the prophet with his audience essentially make guidance possible, and then at this possibility, it increases the possibility of fulfilling prophecy goals and favoring prophet and then the guidance, which can be extracted from the Holy Qur'an on the Prophet of Islam and the Prophets including Jesus (PBUH), and accordingly, the Prophet's invitation to the Qur'an was favored. But some Christian views that regard all or part of the nature of Jesus as divine are, theoretically and theologically: 1.the gradual realization of salvation and the concept of "guidance" throughout history, 2. the role of the human will of believers in the realization of this, and 3.The successes of the prophets are challenged in this regard, a challenge we have shown that the Qur'anic approach does not face

This essay deals with Descartes' Provisional Morality and some of its epistemic requirements. Here, we shall introduce two rival readings of these principles, one of which does not give a plausible position to these principles and does not consider them to be an essential part of Descartes's system, and the other assumes these principles to be both permanent and universal, and then present our explanation to the epistemic realm and also the human realm of these principles. First, we have presented our account of the relation between these Maxims with Cartesian key elements, namely Doubt and Method. Then we discuss the basic nature of Provisionality of these Maxims; a concept that is apparently normal but has relatively different results and requirements. I argue that the moral code has an epistemic character, not a time; time also depends on the events of Reason. Also, while we argued that these principles cannot be considered temporary, we have shown that the idea of some Descartes commentators that these principles, from the very beginning, were permanent and universal is a misconception that can't be imposed on Descartes. Based on our argument, these principles can be transformed into permanent principles in certain epistemic conditions that we have explained, but at the same time, in certain circumstances, they may also be disaffirmed and, as a result, become temporary principles. When these maxims count as the product of an argumentative process, then a non-argumentative description such as the conservatism of these principles will be an abnormal description that is unrelated to Descartes' will.

This paper is a study and the philosophical critique of the concept of "bête machine" theory with the human environmental behaviors in Modern ages, and our question is what precisely does Cartesian mean the modern and contemporary man's behaviors with animals and the environment? We have first studied and evaluated precisely Cartesian propositions about animals and examined the ability of the theory to cover the whole material nature, including the human body. The doctrine of unity and integrity, the doctrine of Genesis Classlessness and the doctrine of non-thinking activism are three basic doctrines that can be deduced from Descartes' thought. Then we have discussed that the way of defining the environment in the modern ages and some humanistic behaviors in modern and pseudo-modern societies with nature and animals is fully compatible with these three Cartesian doctrines and does not consider any natural and inherent right for inhuman vital organisms. Finally, we have argued that Descartes' ability to extract the moral and legal system governing human behavior with animals and nature can be interpreted in two ways: 1. This perspective is sufficient to extract these Systems; 2. This view is certain, but to extract these systems is inadequate, and as a result, we need to advance and develop our knowledge in metaphysics or in science in order to establish a moral and legal system for dealing with animals and nature. Then, with the advent of the second interpretation, we believe that the mere consistency of these Descartes' principles with this kind of modern moral and legal norms is not a good reason to call the behavior of modern humans to animals and nature as Cartesian. In Descartes's view, progress in science is a necessary condition for the establishment of morality; new sciences and sciences such as animal and natural physiology can be considered as such.

Descartes is called the father of modern philosophy; because he was trying to establish a new pattern of epistemology by explaining his own way in Method. This method is manifested in all aspects of his philosophy in such a way that his moral system is based on this method. Contrary to the reputation he gained in method, he was never able to attain the same degree of general acceptance in the ethics that he was concerned about, because he failed to establish a comprehensive and coherent pattern in ethics. This research introduces ethics in his intellectual coordinates. The purpose of this research is to study the ethics of Descartes in three areas of "the provisional moral, the ethics of belief, and the constant moral." The result of the descriptive-analytic study of these domains is that unlike its name, the provisional moral is the basis of ethics for two other ethical explanations. The constant morals must also be called the derived one. Explaining the relationship of these staggering ethics, it must be acknowledged that it is not possible to have a mutation from the provisional moral to the constant morals. The provisional moral is prior to the method, the ethics of belief is alongside the method and ultimately, the constant moral is posterior the Cartesian method. In each of these arenas, criticisms have been discussed.

The present study investigates the citation behavior in published articles in the Journal of Philosophy and wisdom in the period 1384 to 1393. Firstly, in this analysis, we have a statistical analysis of the reference sections or bibliography of articles, the average number of citations, types of scientific items, the linguistic status of references, author self-citation, journal self-Citation and articles dedicated research areas.
According to above statistical analysis conducted in this paper, at the conclusion of this study, we present and expose ten qualitative analysis in areas such as innovation, bibliometric analysis and research ethics is supplied. The authors reviewed here, as with many other areas of the humanities and even more of them, to write their works primarily rely on books, then articles and other scientific items. But, the result of our literature review derived from citation studies of philosophy and humanities in English articles, is different. Therefore, the special results and unique analysis and survey in research ethics is obtained. In addition, certain relation between the Iranian philosophical productions with categories such as "innovation", "team working" in the fields of humanities, as well as more theoretical knowledge than we have established a global production

Conceptual analysis of “Doubt”, which is considered as the contrast of the certitude, is essential in the philosophical system of two thinkers of East and West: Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī and René Descartes. First of all, this article tries to determine the limitation of the realm of doubt, then studies the typology of doubt in these two thinkers’ views, and their attitude toward doubt, and finally, it will be discussed how they have confronted with the problem of doubt.
This article also tries to demonstrate that: 1. Since al-Ghazali’s doubt is expanded from a philosophical doubt to religious doubt, the realm of al-Ghazali’s doubt is wider than Descartes’. 2. Al-Ghazali commences with this philosophical doubt but he shifts his way to the psychological doubt, but Descartes stays in a philosophical and theoretical doubt.