mahmoud sufiani

 The article explores how art, with its imaginary character, plays a pivotal role in Heidegger's later philosophy. Art is seen as a means to establish a world and reveal the Holy, thus fulfilling the destined task of a people. It is posited that art, in its imaginative essence, serves as a medium through which the Holy can manifest and the historical reality of a society can emerge. The article delves into Heidegger’s shift from his earlier focus on temporality in Being and Time to a later focus on art, arguing that imagination connects these two phases of his thought. This transition also emphasizes art's role in revealing the Holy in the poetry of Hölderlin.In his seminal work, Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the structural components of Dasein, the being that is concerned with its own existence. His analysis leads to an in-depth exploration of time and temporality as the fundamental horizon for understanding Being. However, throughout this philosophical inquiry, Heidegger also hints at a more poetic understanding of Being, one that he does not fully explore in Being and Time. Heidegger gestures toward a mode of Being that is accessible not through rational analysis but through a poetic lens, a perspective often taken by poets, who see the world not just as a collection of entities ready-to-hand, but as an unfolding of deeper meanings. Heidegger later develops this poetic insight in his writings on art, where he positions art as a mode of revealing the truth of Being.One of the key questions the article addresses is the relationship between Heidegger’s early preoccupation with time and his later focus on art. The transition is not a radical break, as some might suggest, but a natural development of his earlier thought. In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that temporality provides the framework for Dasein’s understanding of Being. In his later philosophy, Heidegger expands this notion, suggesting that imagination, the same faculty that allows Dasein to project itself into the future, also underlies artistic creation. Imagination gives form to the fluid, existential temporality that Dasein inhabits. Thus, Heidegger’s shift from time to art represents a deepening of his inquiry into the nature of Being.Art, in Heidegger’s later thought, is not merely a form of aesthetic expression but a way of revealing the Holy dimension of Being. Artworks such as Hölderlin's poetry, which Heidegger extensively interprets, open up a space where the Holy can appear. Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin suggests that poetry has a unique ability to disclose the hidden dimension of the Holy, bringing it into the light without fully revealing its mystery. This is because, in Heidegger’s view, the Holy is inherently veiled—it withdraws even as it reveals itself. Art, with its imaginative and symbolic nature, is uniquely suited to this task of partial disclosure. Through art, the Holy manifests as a "clearing" where truth can emerge.The article asserts that the imaginary nature of art is central to its ability to reveal Being. Imagination, in Heidegger’s philosophy, is not simply a subjective faculty of the mind but a fundamental feature of the existence of Dasein itself. It enables Dasein to navigate between different modes of being, from the practical engagement with the world (ready-to-hand) to the poetic or aesthetic encounter with the world. Art, as a product of imagination, opens up the possibility for new ways of relating to the world and to Being. The artwork, therefore, does not just represent the world but actively creates a new world, a new mode of Being.Heidegger sees art as foundational to the establishment of a historical world for a people. This view is particularly evident in his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, where he argues that a great work of art brings forth a world, a coherent historical reality in which a people can dwell. For example, a Greek temple is not merely an aesthetic object but the focal point around which the historical world of the Greeks is structured. Similarly, Hölderlin's poetry serves to ground the historical identity of the German people by revealing their Holy mission. The work of art, in this sense, is not just a reflection of a pre-existing world; it is the very ground on which that world stands.In the modern age, according to Heidegger, the Holy has largely withdrawn, leaving humanity in a state of spiritual homelessness. This condition is what Heidegger describes as the “flight of the gods,” a time when the Holy no longer appears in the public realm. However, art still holds the potential to reconnect humanity with the Holy. By revealing the hidden dimension of Being, art can offer a glimpse of the divine, even in an age when the gods seem absent. Art thus has the potential to redeem modern humanity from its spiritual malaise by reawakening a sense of the Holy and providing a new structure for the revelation of Being.The article concludes by emphasizing the central role of art in Heidegger's later philosophy as a medium for the revelation of Being and the Holy. Art is not merely a cultural artifact but a way of engaging with the most fundamental questions of Being. Through its imaginative and symbolic nature, art opens up new possibilities for understanding the world and our place in it. In this sense, art serves as both a foundation for historical worlds and a means of reawakening the Holy in a secular age. The task of art, according to Heidegger, is to guard and preserve the truth of Being, ensuring that humanity remains open to the mystery of Being.

In his text Subject and Power (1982), written two years before his death, Foucault stated that the central theme of his research was not "power" but the "subject." His lecture series Subjectivity and Truth (1980-1981) and The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-1982) also confirmed this emphasis, particularly as he considered the overarching problematic of these lectures to be "subjectivity and truth," demonstrating that the subject must become problematized in relation to truth. Finally, in the preface to The History of Sexuality (1984), eight years after the first volume was published, he provided a general outline of his intellectual trajectory and explained why he shifted toward "genealogy." Based on this introduction, the present article, after explaining how the subject relates to the network of power and truth, concludes that the method and approach to studying the subject are "genealogy and problematization." The domain of inquiry into the recognition and construction of the self as a subject is the history of the desiring human and, consequently, sexuality. In fact, the "techniques of the self" associated with the system of sexuality maintain the individual's constant relationship with themselves, which results in the continuous production of subjectivity. Therefore, by studying the history of these techniques, one can arrive at the history of subjectivity. However, this history only leads to the genealogy of the subject when we analyze the intersection of techniques of the self and domination, which is essentially the meaning of "governmentality"—the governance of behavior and the management of possibilities through various truth games. Thus, it is concluded that sexuality is not only an appropriate domain for genealogical study of the history of subjectivity and techniques of the self but also a rich field for understanding governmentality and the more complex ways in which power functions.

In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding.

Introspection is a method used to access the contents of the mind, relying on the thesis of the transparency of the mind. This notion constitutes part of Descartes’s philosophical paradigm regarding the mind, characterized by immediacy, infallibility, and first-person authority. Proponents of the transparency thesis argue that the mind resembles a transparent container, with all its contents, including constant entities like mental states and unstable ones like mental events, essentially known. However, empirical experiments and philosophical arguments reveal numerous apparent and hidden intermediaries in the mind, leading to errors in self-understanding, unawareness of external influences, and the presumption of authority over all judgments. This challenges Descartes’s claim that the mind is transparent to itself. Utilizing the analytic-critical method, this article scrutinizes these characteristics to assess the transparency thesis and dispel its self-evidence.

In the present article we try to trace back what we call the "hegemony of silence" in some of Molavi's verses and poems. The advocates of the "hegemony of silence" over-value silence at the cost of a devaluation of language and take it to have a special kind of intuition, a special kind of insight into the Thing beyond language. This attitude towards silence and language has a long-lasting history and has only been questioned recently. We will try to read this hegemonic attitude against the background of a Hegelian-Lacanian attitude, a modern attitude which highly esteems both language and silence and ultimately considers silence as a linguistic phenomenon. We will argue that these two attitudes have two different logics as their ground: the first attitude, the hegemony of silence, is grounded on Sohravardi's "Imkan-e Ashraf" and the second one, on the retroactive logic of German Idealism. After examining the epistemological and ontological consequences of these two attitudes, we will come to the conclusion that the position of the "hegemony of silence" is a contradictory and impossible position.

In this article, we try to show that in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the body as a bodily subject has an ontological relationship with the world due to its own existential modes. To explain this, it is necessary to know the nature of perception, which is inherently existentially related to the body and consequently to the world. Show me. In general, Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing the duality of Descartes' soul and body in the philosophical tradition and reducing the soul or subject to the realm of thought, tries to prove the corporeality of the subject and to show that the corporeal subject is of the type or flesh of the natural world. And therefore its relation to the world is a natural and existential relation. Thus, by proposing concepts such as the bodily subject, the flesh, the bodily view, being in the world, etc., Merleau-Ponty seeks to show ontologically that we have complex relations with the world, and without understanding these relations one cannot know He had himself and the world.

Fichte's philosophy has understood the interpretation of the world by its changing. In this philosophy, theoretical reflection without considering of the change of the world will be meaningless. The most important philosophical achievement of the world according to Fichte, that is Kant's philosophy, despite providing tools for changing the world, does not use it in this direction. Fichte's mission is to establish a connection between Kant's philosophy and the outside world. In this way, Fichte rejects or alters all the dichotomies and theories that prevented the establishment of this similarity in Kant's philosophy, and opens the way for theory of theory-action and subject-object. And we show how Fichte, by this way, has transformed the meaning of freedom, reality and idealism. In this article, the authors carefully examined all of Fichte's achievements along the way, and then criticized Fichte's method and strategy, showing how he fallen into the trap of obstacles that he had previously recognized in Kant.

What is the role of Time in Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant? Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is a controversial and different one in current interpretation of Kant's philosophy. In the light of understanding the meaning of Being, Heidegger works out Kant and intends to consider Kant's project as an ontological one. Now with regard to the main question of this article, we want to show essential and basic role of Time in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. The role which, in our view, is a connective thread in Heidegger's idea about Kant as far as we can't understand mechanism of Heidegger's interpretation without it.

In this article, we try to show that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as the patron saint of the body, offers a phenomenological analysis of the body that is neither psychological nor rational, but existential in nature. Influenced by Heidegger's philosophy, Merleau-Ponty presents an existential analysis of man and his corporeality as the corporeal subject relates to the world. In this article, focusing on concepts such as location, body schema, flesh, absent body, and body perspective, we show that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of these existential concepts has important role in understanding of the lived-body. Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing Descartes' body and abandoning his duality of soul and body, turns to the existential union of the two in the form of a bodily subject, showing that human existence can be understood through this bodily. He contrasts this analysis with philosophical analyzes, including Cartesian philosophy, in which he believes that sensory perception and the body as the foundation of human consciousness play an important role in his pre-reflective understanding of himself and the world.

The French Revolution is recognized as the first concrete presence of the modern individual in history, where he stands for the realization of right and liberty against the absolute power of the king and wants absolute freedom. But Hegel, despite much praise for the revolution, deals with Pathology and critiques the meaning of will, freedom, and individuality in them. At the end of the Spirit chapter of Phenomenology, Hegel deals with the French Revolution, especially the era of terror and, in his dialectical space, rises to the battle by imagining the revolution from the absolute self-consciousness, absolute freedom, partial will, and general will, and proves Robespierre’ and the French nation’s abstract and hollow understanding of these terms. Hegel, after this criticism, also implicitly deals with Rousseau's critique as the foregrounding of the French conception of the meaning of these terms. After examining the outcome of absolute freedom and all its determinations to the end, Hegel redefines the fundamental terms in the Terror section and illustrates how public freedom and will are realized in his political thought system whereby penetrating into the absolute power and will, not only does the particular return to the individual again, but also realizes the whole inside him through outer mediators, and in this way, coming up with a very precise definition of the whole exclusive in individual and returning the external reality to the individual in a complex way.

In this article, we will deal with Wittgenstein’s view concerning the nature of mental states. As we know, Wittgenstein's position in this respect has been regarded by some of his commentators as something like behaviorism. In order to assess their claims, we will first turn to behaviorism in modern psychology as well as philosophical behaviorism, and then state Wittgenstein's own position about behaviorism by emphasizing on the point that, on Wittgenstein's view, "mental phenomena are neither reducible to, nor totally separable from, their bodily and behavioral expressions."

In this research, we are trying to explain how Niccolò Machiavelli Basically criticizes the foundations of classical political thought, and in breaking off those foundations, paves the way for a new vision of politics as well as the establishment of political science. In this essay, Aristotle's political philosophy is presented as the representative of the logic of classical political thinking and we interpret this thought on the basis of the three strategic terms of nature, luck and virtue, as well as the complex relationship between them and their relation to politics in Aristotle's perspective and we will show that politics follows the naturalist-ethical view of Aristotle. We also discuss simultaneously how Machiavelli works with three terms that set against the terms of Aristotle (Which include power, virtue , and the homeland) invalidate the foundations of Aristotle's political thought and, consequently, classical political thought. And opens the way for the creation of a new political thought that forms outside the field of gravity of nature power, of fortune power. Where man is only relying on his will and virtue and without the need for a force of nature and fortune, It changes the logic of political relations to its own advantage.

Fichte, In the book of the foundations of the natural right, in a Double-sided dialectic, not only deduces the concept of the right in beginning from abstract terms such as rational being, activity, freedom, consciousness, another, and the concept of intersubjectivity, but, at the same time the inclusion of all those terms is realized on the basis of the concept and principle of the right. Therefore, in the intellectual system of Fichte, all these concepts form a complex set understood only with each other, because they are created dialectically from each other and can only be realized with each other. But at the end of the way, due to the inference of the law of right and all its proportions through reason, we will show the free rational being Timely and logically as the head of the pyramid of the strategic terms of the philosophy of right and politics of Fichte. In the following, to realize its law of right and guarantee it to people in the outside world, Fichte deduce the commonwealth (as the will of the public) and politics as the state science, and consider this new science as a servant of right that The basis of its essence has a priori been derived from free rational being.

Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of operative intentionality as embodied and motor intentionality opens a way to elucidate a new meaning of cons titution and objectivity. His analysis of such intentionality provides a tangible and pre-reflective but meaningful and embodied means for the purpose of having a world and intentional objects. Merleau-Ponty believes that consciousness, due to its intentional character, is directed toward its own objects in the world. The objects of consciousness are not determinate and definite things, but they are in the field that is intrinsically meaningful, and this meaning is revealed in the encounter of the subject. Consciousness uses the body as a point of view to encounter the objects. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty places consciousness in the body and considers the body as a subject-body that is present in the world around itself and is in contact with the objects through perceptual experience. What emerges during this experience is a kind of pre-reflective perception of the tangible world as a place of practical life. The subject is always present within the world through his body and in this world he researches and acts and gives objectivity to indeterminate objects through embodied encounter. This determination is due to the motor intentionality and the synthethic unity of the body. In this article, we are going to highlight the role of the body in this determination.

In the book of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant deals with postulating strategic terms such as free will, autonomy, the law of reason, the duty, and the complex relationship between them, which incorporate in kant's thought the base of the doctrine of Kant's ethics, law, and politics. In the meantime, not only moral is itself based on a struggle between will and law, but also moral is in a Double-sided dialectical relationship the foundation of the formation of a free will, autonomy, and realization metaphysics within man as an end. But when these autonomy beings try to create a community and form ethical-civil state with common rules based on moral guarantee In the outside world, they will be captured by another who believes in absolute freedom, In this area, my freedom will not be guaranteed. Therefore, one has to enter another situation in which all his rights are guaranteed by a external warranty, which is nothing but a juridico-civil state. Therefore, mankind, in order to preserve morality (and consequently its autonomy and freedom)from The ethico-civil state, which is merely subject to internal control, enters the juridico-civil state All duties are subject to external Legislation.

Cancer is one of the leading causes of death in the world. The characteristics of resistance to treatment and its rapid progress are the high mortality rate reasons. Patients who have been diagnosed with the disease are losing their self-awareness, which itself has a negative effect on the treatment process. However, it seems that such patients need to be considered on depressive disorders even after complete treatment of cancer. After receiving the bad news of cancer; patient, his/her family, be anxious. They initiate the patient's support until the end of the treatment period, without attention to such sudden support's adverse effects. The aim of the present study is to survey of cancer treatment and care's phenomenological and descriptive situations of the philosophy of medicine and psychology point of view. Post- disease disorder has a fundamental relationship with this fundamental situation.

One of the most serious subjects in Friedrich Nietzche's works was his controversy with Nihilism problem. If we take Friedrich Nietzche's works as a philosophical theory, we would be in the big wrong study, because it is not only as a theory but he interpreted it like a possibility that proceeds on two level: First, as a denial and negation of life and to make transcendental values accessible. Second, as a debasement and decadence of these high values that life was neglected for them, but perception of Nihilism as a possibility of creating of the new values depends on the reviewing of dual means of "will of nothing". Nietzche in one his subjects called "Ascetic Ideal" shows that Christianity while was a totalitarian valuator structure, finally with leading to moral concepts like the truth, the honesty and confession of the sin has aimed at God and after of his (God) death, Christianity was transformed into devaluing structure. Nihilism for Nietzche is not only the spoiling of Christianity values but his more basic mental disturbance is this spoiling that should not be a decadence of the possibility of creating of new values, thus the redemptive aspects of nihilism could not have been abandoned, because Nietzche deeply did believe the redemption.

In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. Conciseness for Merleau-ponty is not a mere subject which constitute the eternal essences and natures and gives meaning to phenomena, but it is the body-subject that direct toward the world and cannot be separated from this field of action in the world. The objects of this subject-body are also in the phenomenal fielding that determined by directing the lived body toward them and it comes out of ambiguity and thus, their meaning is born. Accordingly, intentionality for Merleau -Ponty, is the orientation in the world and directedness toward the world itself, and the intentional states are realized in collisions or physical states in a physical and concrete environment. In this paper, we try to provide an interpretation of the concept of intentionality from the perspective of Merleau-ponty, which he calls it "practical intentionality", and we want to express its differences and similarities with Husserl’s intentionality. The main difference between the views of these two philosophers is in Merleau-ponty’s criticism on Husserl’s of Noesis-Noema structure. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and it is not possible to analyze it by a distinction between matter and form.

Derrida's reading of Husserl’s concept of "now" reveals in the context of his critiques: the critiques which accompany with presupposing of the denial of metaphysics of presence. By putting phenomenology under the metaphysics of presence, he assigns phenomenology a part of the same ordinary tradition of western philosophy and considering the solution to free his philosophy of this current framework to attend to its opposition, that is, otherness. Accordingly, Derrida also considers the concept of now as the indicator of presence in opposite of the absence and criticizes it. He introduces his most important critique about now on the base of two apparently irreconcilable possibilities of this concept. These possibilities consist: expanding now, now in continuity with retention and protention and the other is now as origin point with its primordial character. In this article, first we express Derrida’s critiques of the concept of now and then by evaluating them and referring to being limit of primal impression and threefold structure now, we indicate that these critiques are not accepted on Husserl’s attitude to the concept of now. Because with regard to being limit of primal impression and as a result of its dependence to the parties of the limit, its perception excluded as origin point and perception of an object will be the enduring perception. Threefold structure now, provides a mutable continuity from primal impressions and retention and protention that on the base of it, no primal impression solely and without considering this continuity is understandable.

Objectivity is one of the most basic and difficult issues in modern and contemporary philosophy. The present paper is devoted to this issue from viewpoint of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Since perception, particularly sense perception, in view of intentionality, as lowest level of objectivity can act as the base for perceiving the objectivity of other objects, whether real or unreal (ideal), it has been discussed in this paper. To do this, objectivity of the sense perception and its role in leading the mind toward essential and ideal objects, and conversely, the role of latter objects in objectivity of the perception itself will be explored. Because the concepts of objectivity and evidence are correlate in Husserl’s philosophy, and since evidence as the self-given manifests itself, from the very beginning, in the lowest level, namely the objects of sense perception, and considering that evidence and objectivity of sense perception concern this lowest level, the critical viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology provides a firm and new basis for objectivity if taken at its full competence.