mohsen javadi

In compatibilists believe that we cannot act freely and be morally responsible for an action in a deterministic world, while compatibilists don’t deny the possibility of free action and moral responsibility for the agent, and they believe that we can find some kind of compatibility between moral responsibility and causal determination. This article will analyze Alfred Mele's zygote argument of manipulation, which is an argument in critique of compatibilism between moral responsibility and the deterministic world. Manipulation argument is an argument based on an agent's intuition of a situation in which the agent is under the control of another person or force. It wants to show that an agent in a manipulated situation, despite satisfying the compatibilists conditions, is not morally responsible for her action, and she is like the agent in a deterministic world.

Moral certainty is one of the functional concepts that has recently attracted the attention of some philosophers of ethics and epistemologists. During the last decades, philosophers have approached this concept from different angles; however, they have sometimes provided an incorrect and inaccurate concept of this term because of ignoring its origin and historical development and losing sight of the historical, religious, or legal context in which it might be used. Jean Gerson, the French scholar and educator, created the term “moral certainty” for an appropriate level of certainty. Later, Descartes defined it as a kind of certainty that is sufficient for organizing behavior and assisting people in solving life-related problems. On the other hand, John Locke included absolute certainty and moral certainty in the concept of his own “real certainty”. The concept of moral certainty has also undergone an interesting process of development in Christianity. In church law, the concept of moral certainty is used to describe the mental status of the judge when they should decide with certainty whether the accused is truly guilty or not. In this paper, after referring to the first applications of this concept in the history of Western philosophy in the course of a historical-philosophical research and a study of the development of the concept of moral philosophy in different periods, the authors demonstrate that the concept of certainty has been prone to many changes since the 14th century and its first use in Gerson’s works. They will also clarify the place of this philosophical term in today’s epistemology of ethics after its historical journey and presence in various disciplines, and how the Wittgensteinian approach to this concept has gained widespread acceptance during the recent decades after its introduction many centuries ago.

Normative ethics determine the options we ought to choose by ethically evaluating actions. In reason-based theory, the facts of what one ought to do are grounded and explained by virtue of the facts about reasons. According to this view, we demonstrate that the moral deontic status of options, which is derived from the normative deontic status of options, is determined by weighing the amount of normative weight of the basic practical normative reasons and based on the modified basic model. The modified basic model uses the weight of an unqualified all-things-considered reason for each option in a given situation as the input variables. To support our assumptions, we address the objections raised by opponents. These objections, respectively, include pro-tanto holism, source monism, normative pluralism, non-compositional holism, and the problem of normative options (merely permitted options). After evaluating these objections, we conclude that our assumptions will be defensible.

In his reflections on certainty and his epistemological analyses, Wittgenstein mentions propositions that he calls "hinge propositions". What role do these propositions play in Wittgenstein's epistemological system? What are their characteristics and how many types are there? What is their difference or similarity with other definite propositions such as mathematical propositions? The mentioned items are some of the questions that we will address in this article. According to Wittgenstein, when we reach these propositions, doubt loses its meaning. These propositions are like hinges around which our beliefs revolve. Hinge propositions do not give us knowledge, but they build the basis of knowledge. They are not ordinary propositions because properties such as knowability, being justified or unjustified, being true or false do not have meaning about them. These propositions are the criteria of truth and falsity. In this article after clarifying the concept of hinged propositions, we will enumerate their different types and examine Wittgenstein's claims about propositions. Also, we have tried to show Wittgenstein's meaning by making such propositions and finally we try to criticize his point of view.

In this paper, referring to the different meanings of wisdom, such as the combination of theory and practice, we have discussed the idiomatic meaning of wisdom as “philosophical knowledge”. “Practical wisdom” as a part of this philosophical knowledge is exploratory and does not imply moral commitment. Someone can be practical wise in this sense, but he does not have an ethical life. The meaning of “practical wisdom” has been explained in the works of different philosophers. Because some Muslim philosophers thought that “theoretical wisdom” concerned with the prepositions with the conjunction “is” and "practical wisdom" concerned with the conjunction “should”, the possibility of its interpretation in the light of Hume’s “ought” and “is" problem has been discussed. This possibility has been rejected and the cognitive nature of ethics has been emphasized. In the end, the relationship between “practical reason” as a faculty of soul and “practical wisdom” as a branch of philosophical knowledge has been examined to remove the mistake that the latter is necessarily the result of “practical reason”..

The appeal to Divine Wisdom, either as a direct axiom or a framework for other principles, has been widely prevalent in Mûtâkâllimūn’s arguments. In the present paper, after presenting some cases of this trend and through logical analysis, the Mû’tâzilite Âbd al-Jâbbār’s arguments based on Divine Wisdom are scrutinized and criticized in particular. As a hypothesis, the authors believe that the Mû’tâzilite Âbd al-Jâbbār’s appeal to this divine attribute is, at least partly, inaccurate and thus, his arguments are logically inconclusive. Seemingly, this divine attribute is often used in a posterior method, and this method has been applied merely to rationalize the religious dogmas and the revelatory statements discursively. In addition, elaboration on this particular topic requires a comprehensive inner knowledge about all details of the universe and the ultimate purpose of the creation. Many other cases which, based on this very principle, must have been done or created, and yet are left unrealized, can be taken as serious counter-examples for this theological framework. It should be noted that the main theme of this paper doesn’t concern the objective reality per se, for based on decisive rational arguments and the explicit religious teachings, all Divine actions are carried out in the ultimate wisdom for the ultimate good; rather, this paper aims at questioning the possibility of a comprehensive understanding of such wisdom and the human intellect’s capacity - with all its limitations and failures - for discerning its cases.

One of the important ethical concepts that has occupied the minds of many philosophers in the past years is the concept of "moral certainty". This means whether there are moral propositions that are so certain that no doubt or argument or evidence can face them. According to some philosophers, for example, the statement "the wrongness of killing innocent people" brings us such moral certainty. Among the philosophers who have written in this field, two basic readings of Nigel Pleasants and Michael Kober can be mentioned. Pleasant considers moral certainty to be an absolute and natural concept that is the basis of our moral judgments, and on the other hand, Kober considers moral certainty to be a relative concept and believes that our certainties are rooted in linguistic society, culture and time. In this article, we try to address the different dimensions of the concept of "moral certainty" and the importance of its application in two different and important readings.

The role of divine attitude in the theorizing process is one of the controversial issues, and of course accepting or rejecting this role can have important results. This is why this role-playing is investigated and researched from different angles. The main question is what are the ontological foundations of divine attitude and their role in scientific theorizing? In this research, with the analytical descriptive method and based on the review of library sources, some of the most important different ontological foundations of the divine attitude have been pointed out and stated that theorizing in its different stages can be influenced by the theoretician's divine attitude and be affected accordingly by this attitude. Ontological foundations, along with other foundations such as cognitive value foundations, epistemological foundations, etc., changes the spirit that dominates scientific theorizing, from the creation of subjectivity and theorizing to even the position of judgment.

For Spinoza, religion is a universal and meta-ethnic system actualized for all people through obedience to God. He delineates the seven principles of faith in this context. Spinoza contends that religious doctrines should be simple, minimal, and rooted in history and language. Given his belief that human nature is predominantly influenced by emotions rather than reason, he asserts that religion must be initially reclaimed and ultimately democratized to rescue humanity. According to Spinoza, the key to salvaging most humans lies in rendering religion obedient by distinguishing it from philosophy. Thus, he advocates for the democratization of theology, leading to a moderation of the political authority of religion and a strengthening of the country's political sovereignty. Spinoza's redefined concept of religion is fundamentally democratic, fostering compatibility between his theology and politics. This distinctive characteristic paves the way for the attainment of freedom for individuals and society. This article aims to explore Spinoza's alternative philosophical interpretation of religion and its theological implications within this framework.

This article discusses about "Negative fact" from the viewpoint of Bertrand Russell and evaluates it after explaining it. First, refers to this point that "Logical truth" in the process of knowing is nothing only "correspondence to the fact". It worth mentioning that the main goal of this research is going to discover some hidden points of negative fact, as one of the components of truth in the field of negative propositions, through examining Russell's theory in this field. Russell believes that negative true propositions have real fact which is really differs from the fact of true positive propositions. So, he has called this kind of fact "negative fact", which is identically other than "existential fact". Russell believes that the acceptance of the "negative fact", as a hypothesis, logically comes from the acceptation of the correspondence theory of truth. This theory has been criticized and supported by opponents and supporters from the beginning. But the author believes that Russell's claim is defensible in this regard as you can see in this essay.

“Applied ethics” is a branch of ethics that deals with ethical issues and dilemmas. Therefore, it can be considered as a knowledge for rational duty. Despite the increasing translation and prevalence of applied ethics in Iran, the connection and relationship of this discipline with the science of jurisprudence have not been clearly explained. Approaches and perspectives in this regard can be categorized into three general types: 1. Primacy of applied ethics over jurisprudence (Fiqh); 2. Applied ethics alongside and parallel to jurisprudence; 3. Primacy of jurisprudence (Fiqh) over applied ethics. This article attempts to critically examine these perspectives and present the correct view regarding the relationship between applied ethics and jurisprudence (Fiqh). In this regard, after discussing the nature of applied ethics, a comparison and assessment of the issues and rulings of applied ethics with the issues and rulings of jurisprudence have been addressed. The third perspective, in terms of determining the religious obligations of the devout, seems more justified. However, accepting this perspective does not mean that applied ethics are useless for the devout, and applied ethics can still have significant functions for the general religious individuals, especially jurists and even theologians.

The concept of common morality is fundamental in medical ethics, and lack of universal content and characteristics of common morality is a product of its multifaceted nature. This study aimed to identify the ideas and experiences of academic faculties regarding common morality in a pluralistic setting to promote conceptual knowledge and strengthen moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. The study was conducted using a qualitative method, employing semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen faculty members who were selected purposively. In order to assess their ideas and experiences, the transcripts of the interviews were analyzed using the content analysis method through directed and conventional approaches. The interviews were coded manually. Two themes were reflected in the interviews: ontology and epistemology of common morality. The study indicates that the debate about the subjective or objective dependence of common morality questions the coherence of Beauchamp and Childress' common morality (CM) theory, as common morality is the result of various individual and social factor that influence moral and decision -making in pluralistic environments. Additional studies are needed in order to investigate the effect of cultural, social, theoretical, ideological and individual factors on promoting clinical ethical reasoning and decision-making skills.

For past 2000 years, the dominant discourse in the field of morality has been rationality, and being influenced by emotion in morality has been treated as a weakness. Hume broke this barrier for the first time and incorporated sentiments into morality. But from 2000 onwards, with the advancement of neuroscience and its involvement in ethics and the study of the moral judgment process, a new opportunity opened up for ethicist to factor in empirical debates, in addition to philosophical debates, on theorizing the role of emotions in ethics. Various theories have emerged in this field. This study examines five important theories related to the role of emotions in ethics, namely the rationalist ,the dual-process model, the social intuitionist model, neo-sentimentalism and the constitution Model. Given that talking about the role of emotion in ethics is still considered a weakness in our ethics, we sought to adapt Allameh Tabatabai's view as a philosopher who first spoke about the role of emotions in ethics and then examine his theory in comparison with existing theories and identify its strengths and weaknesses.

The discussion of the final goal of man, which is discussed in the Aristotelian tradition and Hikmat Mashai as happiness, is discussed in the works of Muslim sages with other definitions such as final perfection. The main question of this article is whether the main desire and therefore the existential ultimate goal of all human beings is to reach a single state of affairs, or do different people have different ultimate goals according to their different abilities and talents? In the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, the principle of the unity of the ultimate goal of man is accepted based on "Ergon argument", but it is also accepted that many human beings are unable to cultivate virtues, due to various reasons, including the lack of external goods (Elitism in ethics). According to Mulla Sadra, each person has a special happiness or ultimate perfection according to his/her ability and talent. Of course, the differences in ultimate perfection, in Mulla Sadra's opinion, are more related to the difference between human intellects and not external goods; but existential differences and consequently differences in the final perfection of people do not cause any special social or legal privileges.

The 5G network has been created to solve the limitation of communication coverage in large areas. One of the challenges of the 5G is the construction of quadrature oscillators in a wide range of high frequencies. Phase error and amplitude imbalance cause a decrease in the image rejection ratio (IRR), which affects the communication error vector magnitude (EVM). The quadrature phases are generated by a one-stage poly-phase filter (PPF) whose resistors consist of four N-type MOSFETs in triode mode, each of its four gate ends is set by a voltage. The feedback circuit constantly adjusts the center frequency of the PPF according to the input frequency by changing the resistance of the MOSFETs. In this research, the circuit is simulated in the advanced design system software environment in the frequency range of 2 to 6 GHz with a central frequency of 4 GHz, which has reduced the quadrature phase error to less than 1 to 9 degrees. Then, the governing mathematical equations of the circuit were extracted and the network function of the circuit was designed in the Simulink MATLAB environment. The main advantage of the Simulink method is the high speed of simulation.

The moral theories of Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei, in the sixth article of his book The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, have fueled many discussions. Some like Morteza Motahari have criticized Tabatabai's theory and considered it to cause relativism (without standards) in ethics. In that article, Tabatabaei clearly says that we make assumptions about the good and the bad to meet our needs. As a result, we cannot consider good and bad as absolute, but they change according to our needs and are relative matters. Meanwhile, in the book Tafsir al-Mizan, he apparently contradictorily believed that if good and bad are not absolute and they change in different times and different societies, ethics may also change, and virtues and vices may replace each other.

Metaethical relativism is in the first place a theory about the ontological status of moral properties and the truth and justification of ethical judgments. Since truth-ascriptions of relative judgments are different from ordinary sentences, relativists should advance a semantic theory about how the content and truth of such sentences are determined. Contextualist take such sentences to be elliptic for a sentence containing a parameter that refers to a reference frame determined by the context of assertion. With the content of different assertions of a judgment varying from one context to other, contextualists are bound to consider the apparently genuine faultless disagreements, which are a main motivation for accepting moral relativism, as mere misunderstandings. Also, they are faced with other problems in pragmatics of moral assertions in cases of retraction and rejection. By refuting contextualism, “New relativists” claim that it is just the truth of moral judgments that is relative, and the content of such judgments does not vary among their different assertions. John MacFarlane makes such a move by adding an index to the circumstances of evaluation of such judgments which is determined by context of assessment, and refers to assessors' preferences. In his de se relativism about values, Andy Egan presents a different theory, which he claims it to be the best if we were inclined to adopt naturalism, internalism, and cognitivism. By accepting David Lewis' theory of de se attitudes, which considers content of sentences to be properties instead of propositions, Egan claims that the value judgments have centered world properties as contents which have no corresponding possible world propositions.  By making value judgments, people self-ascribe such properties. Using Lewis' theory of value, Egan claims that the content of value properties is “being disposed to desire to desire x”. This property does not vary among different assertions of a sentence. Combining this theory with Robert Stalnaker's theory of assertion, Egan claims that he is not faced with the problem of lost disagreement. Like MacFarlane, Egan adds an assessor index to the circumstances of evaluation of relative sentences, but unlike him he claims it to be determined by the context of use. In addition, Egan makes two criticisms against the contextualist account of value judgments, which we have called the naturalist and the internalist problems. Both problems stem from the fact that according to contextualism, an assertion of some content can be evaluative while another assertion of the same content is non-evaluative. Egan claims that his account can avoid such problems. In the present paper, we show that Egan's attempts are unsuccessful. His account is faced with the same criticisms he leveled at contextualism; and if he tries to avoid such objections, his escape routes will open the way for contextualists as well. Also, by accepting Lewis' theory of content, Egan has taken on an additional burden, which is hard to defend.

Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.

Direct Doxastic Voluntarism claims that all or some of the states associated with our beliefs, that is, the formation, maintenance, justification, and suspension of our judgments, are under our direct voluntary control. The followers of this view emphasize the important role of the will according to their own intellectual principles and in a way insist on the agent’s activity from an epistemological point of view. The present study, while analyzing the views of some epistemologists who believe Direct Doxastic Voluntarism seeks to answer the question of whether our beliefs and judgments are formed under the direct control of the will. Evaluating Direct Doxastic Voluntarism shows that although this approach is not very justified, due to the extreme role of the will for the formation of all kinds of beliefs, and confirmation and suspension of judgment. This has led to a global version of this thesis that may not be acceptable for most epistemologists. Yet by limiting its scope, it can be defended about some beliefs because of its compatibility with individuals’ cognitive experiences. By accepting a less global version of this doctrine, the present article examines the views of some direct voluntariors while denying the extreme scope of the will and emphasizes its position and reasonable role in the subject.

This article first explains the classical version of the Divine command ethics in both Christian and Islamic traditions, and then by pointing out its coherency, at least in appearance, with Divine sovereignty and absolute power, it tries to show why this idea is not accepted by a significant number of the Christian and Muslim theologians. William Wainwright answers this question by using Ralph Cudworth’s objections to Divine command ethics. In total, he considers seven objections and criticisms as the main reasons for Christian theologians’ turning away from the theory. By presenting these seven objections, which are mainly taken from Ralph Cudworth’s book, we try to find similar examples in the Islamic tradition and compare them with Wainwrights’ arguments. Some of these objections can be seen in both Christian and Islamic traditions of moral rationalism. But some of them, despite the similarity in content, have different formulations. Also, some objections are specific to Christian or Islamic theology. Last but not least, there are intra-religious objections based on revelations in Islam and Christianity against the theory of Divine command, which is not the subject of my discussion in this article.

Realizing the motivation of human behavior has been one of the most significant issues of human beings. In this regard, there are two approaches: egoism and altruism; egoism considers the motive of all human benevolent actions to be self-interest. but altruism considers all these kinds of behaviors as merely providing another’s welfare. Daniel Batson and Thomas Nagel are supporters of altruism in different ways. Batson advocated psychological altruism by an empirical approach and offered altruism-empathy hypothesis, while challenging egoism. Existence of motivation for altruism in human nature was proved. The emotional feeling of empathetic concern creates an altruistic motive for the well-being of others.Nagel defended the possibility of the rational motivation of altruism with a Interpretive methodarguing unbiased altruism is a requirement of rationality so it is purely moral and it is an undeniable condition of morality and fundamental principle. Batson's altruism is not necessarily moral, and he tends to put together self- interest and other-interest motives.Descriptive-analytical approach was used to evaluate their views. It has been indicated that their perceptions of altruism and its relationship to morality are distinct, but they can be supporter for each other in rejecting pure egoism and defending pure altruism.

The relationship between rationality and morality is one of significant issues in philosophy that has been discussed since a long time ago. The spread of moral relativism and belief in instrumental rationality challenge this basic principle that nothing is given priority -or should be given priority- unless it has some merit to be prioritized. The present article is a research study on the philosophical attempts made by Nicholas Rescher to defend rationality of ends against instrumentalist views of rationality.

In this research study, besides data collection and extracting relevant information to the subject under study, research fiches were accurately made and then analyzed using comparative classification and thematic coding. The method of data extraction is library research and the analytic-argumentative method was used for inferring the results and answering the questions.

Rescher believes that inattention to rationality of evaluation results in an impaired understanding of rationality and leads to part/whole fallacy. To him, rationality is of three types: rationality of beliefs, rationality of actions, and rationality of evaluations. In addition to having an instrumental aspect, rationality of actions also includes an evaluative aspect that determines the appropriateness of ends. The comprehensive concept of rationality coordinates and integrates these two aspects in a coherent manner. Although Rescher acknowledges the importance of the gap between reality and value, he believes that this gap can be overcome via appealing to self-evident truths without necessarily adopting an instrumentalist view towards rationality. In Rescher’s view, having a relativist view towards rationality is logically impossible. By demonstrating the aims and fundamental principles of rationality, he argues that rationality is universal. At the same time, by introducing a normative hierarchy to obtain a rational solution for a specific problem in a real-life situation, he acknowledges that rational decisions do depend on situational conditions. In other words, he recognizes that rational relativism is inevitable in the lower levels of the normative hierarchy. Despite Rescher’s accuracy and deliberation in presenting ends rationality and overcoming many challenges in this regard, there are various arguments on serious components of his conception that need further reflection.

According to Rescher’s view, since all virtues are not equal and comparable, their achievement requires optimization that is making a balance between means or instruments for achieving ends in the best way so it simultaneously concerns efficiency and teleology. If rationality requires the optimization of incomparable and contradictory virtues to reach self-actualization, moral virtues should be combined with nonmoral virtues to get balanced. Therefore, the inconsistency between rationality and unconditionally general moral values and obligation to an absolute moral system becomes evident. Rescher’s definition of humanity and existential commitment to understanding oneself are among other controversial subjects Rescher should attribute people’s moral disagreements either to irrationality or oddness of some individuals and deny moral and rational disagreement among people; while it is improbable. Based on the findings of the current research, some of the elements of Rescher’s conception of rationality such as optimization, humanity, existential commitment to understanding oneself, and the relationship between reality and value are subject to serious challenges and criticisms. In this article, we will discuss these challenges and criticisms thoroughly. Ultimately, we are going to demonstrate that Rescher’s conception of rationality with its broad and novel perspective has set the stage for further philosophical and moral deliberations.

The current essay tackles Saint Augustine of Hippo’s conception of the issue of angels; and is based on Augustine’s book: The City of God, one of the most influential works of Augustine that contains a synopsis of the foundations of angelology in the era of Church Fathers. In his book, Augustine discusses such issues as the eternity and emergence of the angels and their spiritual and luminal creation; and claims that angels enjoy free will and therefore are divided into two groups: good angels and bad angels; and he focused his book on the former group (good angels). According to Augustine, angels do not have any role in creation and everything is an immediate creation of God; however, their knowledge based on the model of seminal creation influences the phenomena and the creation of other beings in the world. According to Augustine's belief that has its origin in Christianity, although angels have an influence on the life and orientation of mankind in some ways, they do not have a stature to mediate for the prosperity and happiness of mankind, and it is Jesus the Christ solely who is entitled and competent for such mediation.

The relation of causal necessity with free will has been a source of great debate in the history of philosophy and theology. However, in recent years, it has also been discussed in the science of Usul al-Fiqh. After explaining the compatibility of causal necessity with free will, Ākhūnd Khurāsānī speaks of the 'shattering of his pen.' Two interpretations have been given for this statement. Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī considers the theory of compatibility that Khurāsānī presented as being correct. However, he interprets the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to another matter, i.e., the problem of the recompense of an agent in the case where causal necessity is accepted. His explanation of the aforementioned compatibility and the permissibility of the recompense of sinners has been evaluated in this article. On the contrary, Muḥaqqiq Na'ini considers the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to the problem of the conflict between causal necessity and free will. He says that aside from the popular preliminaries of free will, such as knowledge and intention (which are the products of causal necessity), there is a need for something that he calls 'talab'-a noetic action that stems from the governance of the soul. He considers this talab to fall outside the scope of causal necessity. This paper seeks to examine the views of these two illustrious students of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī so that the various Usuli dimensions of this discussion can be clarified.

One of the most important issues in the field of religion is to gain a proper understanding of religious writing and speech. The misunderstanding of them will lead to division, deviation and even turning away from religion. In the Islamic tradition, Ibn Roshd with the theory of tawil (esoteric interpretation of the Quran) and in the Jewish tradition, Spinoza with his own interpretive (hermeneutic) theory, have seriously addressed the issue. Despite the differences in some principles, the mechanisms they have proposed are very similar in how to achieve a correct understanding of religious texts. Believing in two categories of overt and covert texts, returning the covert texts to the overt ones, validating the appearance of the text, paying special attention to the grammar of the source language, avoiding the interference of presuppositions and prejudices, seeking intra-textual evidence, paying attention to the occasion to get rid of conflict and using natural methods are among the common mechanisms presented by these two rationalist philosophers. This article intends to first provide a descriptive explanation of the mentioned mechanisms and then comparatively show the various aspects of the harmony of these two philosophers on this issue.