parinaz esmaeili

This paper examines the simultaneous decisions regarding advertising, pricing, and service to supply chain coordination involving one manufacturer and one retailer. Demand is impacted by these decisions, with service playing a crucial role in enhancing customer loyalty and boosting sales. The study employs three well-known game theory approaches—Nash, Stackelberg-Retailer, and Cooperative games—to analyze their effects on the supply chain. Optimal strategies for both the manufacturer and the retailer are identified within each approach, and the strategies' results are compared. Results show that the retailer manufacturer, and the entire system achieves higher profits through the Stackelberg-Retailer game compared to the Nash game, while the Cooperative game results in the highest overall profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model is outlined and analyzed to assess opportunities for sharing profits.

This paper aims to conduct a research on the labor-management negotiation in chicken evolutionary game models through catastrophe theory. The both players can compromise or not during the negotiation. The "no compromise" strategy for labor means threat to strike and for management is ignoring labors' demands. Since the model of this research is chicken game, if on player decides to dig in, the optimum decision for other is to compromise, however it is costly to be calling a chicken by the rivals. In the process of evolution, players reevaluate their options to update the payoffs in case of gradual and continuous changes which may happen in effective variables of strategy selection. The continuous changes could cause a catastrophic change in system’s state and its collapse by a strike or lockout. ESS analysis and determining catastrophe threshold in the chicken evolutionary game will be done with the aim of giving managerial insights that help the players to prevent making decisions that could cause unsuccessful negotiation.

This paper considers the advertising, pricing, and service decisions simultaneously to coordinate the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by advertising, pricing and service decisions. In this paper, three well-known approaches to the game theory, including the Nash, the Stackelberg-retailer, and the cooperative game are exploited to study the effects of these policies on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal strategies in each case for the manufacturer and the retailer. Then, we will compare the outcomes of each strategy thus developed. The results show that, compared with the Nash game, the Stackelberg-retailer game yields higher profits for the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole system. The cooperative game yields the highest profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.

Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known approaches in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are exploited to study the effects of pricing and advertising decisions on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal decisions in each case for the supplier, the manufacturer and the retailer. Also, we compare the outcomes decisions among the mentioned games. The results show that, the Cooperative and the Nash games have the highest and lowest advertising expenditure, respectively. The price level in the Nash game is more than the Stackelberg game for all three levels, and the retailer price in the Stackelberg and Cooperative games are equal. The system has the highest profit in the Cooperative game. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.