دیکتاتوری

The intellectual dough of Asid Mohammad Kasravi was formed during the constitutional movement and under the influence of its ideals. A person who dresses as a clergyman in the first stage of his life, but due to the formation of a series of intellectual events, distances himself from this stage of his life. He experienced two world wars, the constitutional movement and the dictatorship of Reza Shah. His intellectual and research background also made him comment on various issues and think on various issues. Kasravi was one of the intellectuals of the constitutional movement and its ideals, but this movement quickly became authoritarian. Kasravi, who had experienced both spaces, discussed them in his works. The important point is that Kasravi, unlike many critics of Reza Shah, in spite of some negligible criticisms, strongly defended Reza Shah's actions. Subjugation within social institutions provided for personal domination and submission. Kasravi's goal was to validate the nationalist values ​​he sought, which in some of Kasravi's works in this regard followed his unifying nationalism. And it has no territorial integrity, and local power is a rebellious power.

The main question of this study is: Why is the economic performance of some dictatorships such as Middle East monarchies, better than that of some democracies such as Latin American republics? In this paper, by adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and using historical observations, it has been argued that economic institutions historically influenced by political institutions. Political institutions form the two key components of any political regime, including power transition and power distribution. In this paper, based on historical observations, we show that the concentration of power on the Shah in Pahlavi Iran has led to rentseeking policies. The high concentration of the Shah's power prevented any political competition over efficiency and accountability, and had expanded his interference in the economic and political issues, such as military purchases, bank licensing, and ownership of large economic and industrial enterprises. Therefore, the property rights of economic activists independent of the Shah's power were not legally protected by economic institutions, and the protection or violation of property rights was exercised arbitrarily by the Shah. In contrast, the distribution of power among the ruling group in dictatorships such as Oman, Qatar and other family monarchies in Middle East led to the formation of efficient economic institutions. Because the king's power to deprive other members’ property is limited, and they are able to set up private enterprises to gain benefits. Finally, statistical analysis confirms the results obtained from historical observations and indicate that distribution of power has major role on the formation of economic institutions.