سوریه

International governments are competing to advance their national interests and are trying to improve their national power and strength. The concept of power is one of the main and key concepts of international relations and politics. For a long time, in the theories of national power, it was measured through hard power. But the conceptual developments and the increase in the share and role of other indicators and criteria such as cultural and intangible aspects led to the formation of a new look at power with the concept of soft power.After the revolution, Iran tried to show its image in the international as a soft power, among the countries that are placed in Iran's strategic environment are Iraq and Syria. Although with the emergence of terrorist groups, Iran has been forced to take advantage of parts of hard power in these countries, but in general, Iran's approach to relations and influence in these countries is based on a soft approach.Considering that the two countries in question have many differences in various fields, Iran cannot seek to influence and expand its strategic depth in these countries with similar strategies and policies.

The Republic of Turkey and Syria have many similarities and differences due to their common history and being within the geopolitical framework of the Ottoman Empire. Syria was the only country that separated from the Ottoman Empire and had long-standing territorial and border problems with the successor of the empire, the Republic of Turkey, which brought the two countries to the brink of war many times. Relations between Turkey and Syria have always been tense since the country's independence from France in 1945, except for a limited period at the beginning of the 21st century. Issues such as: territorial disputes over Hatay province, border rivers between the two countries, the Kurdish issue, Turkey's proximity to the United States and, on the other hand, Syria's proximity to the Soviet Union were among the most important reasons for the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Although Turkey’s role in the civil war and its interference in Syrian affairs have been widely discussed in Iranian academic circles due to Turkey’s involvement in Syria and the conflict between its interests and those of Iran, less attention has been paid to the fact that the history of the conflict between Turkey and Syria dates back decades before the start of the civil war and to the mid-twentieth century. The following descriptive-analytical study attempts to examine the history of Turkey-Syria relations by using a library method and various books and articles in the fields of international relations, history, and political geography, and to explain various aspects of this issue.

Since the start of the internal unrest in Arab countries, known as the Islamic Awakening or Arab Spring, the United States has been trying to use fundamentalist Takfiri groups to reshape the region's political and security landscape to its advantage. These groups have chosen cities as their primary targets for several reasons, including the use of civilian cover and the robustness of buildings to protect themselves from the firepower of the resistance front. Given the persistent threat of Takfiri ideology to the Islamic world, we embarked on this study titled "Combat Tactics of Takfiri Groups in Urban Warfare in Syria and Iraq." Our goal is to identify the urban warfare tactics used by Takfiri groups in Syria and Iraq. We posed the research question: what are the combat tactics of Takfiri groups in urban warfare in these countries? This applied research employs a descriptive-analytical (survey) method, utilizing both descriptive and inferential statistics to analyze the data. Our findings indicate that Takfiri groups prioritize irregular operations over regular ones. This is natural given the urban environment, which necessitates irregular operations, and the operational asymmetry between these groups and the resistance front.

Syria is one of the countries that has not undergone a favorable nation-building process due to the intervention of the great powers. Thus, the geographical map, the state of the borders, and the government of this country have been formed by the great powers. Many challenges, such as ethnic and religious heterogeneity, domination with repression, and consequent tension and instability, have been among the consequences of unsuccessful State-nation building in Syria. The legacy of the failed State-nation building passed to Bashar al-Assad in 2000 Although he initially tried to bring about reform, as the authoritarian trend continued, especially after the formation of the Arab Spring in 2011, Syria entered an acute crisis that quickly had regional and international consequences. The aim of the present study is to examine the pathological challenges of nation-state building in Syria after the coming to power of Bashar al-Assad. The question is, what challenges and harms has the nation-state in Syria faced since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000? The hypothesis is that various internal and external challenges such as ethnic, religious and racial divisions, lack of formation and consolidation of national identity and foreign interventions have prevented the achievement of a successful nation-state in Syria. The present article is of descriptive-analytical type and information and data have been collected by library method

The relations between Syria and Iran have been a stable feature in the political landscape of the Middle East for more than 34 years. The Iran-Syria alliance is one of the components that shape the regional order in the Middle East. The political alliance between Syria and Iran has been maintained through a shared understanding of the threat, a convergence of interests in Lebanon and Iraq, and a shared vision of Palestine, Israel, and the United States. This strategic partnership has been guided through mutual economic, diplomatic and political assistance in meeting each other's strategic needs. The purpose of the current research is to investigate the relationship between identity and material interests in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Syria in the period (2015-2020). In this research, the complex relationship between identity and material interests, which are mutually consistent, is examined in order to understand the multifaceted factors that shape the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Syria. While the regional identity of Iran is examined in the framework of Shia-Islamic ideology, the material interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the regional level are usually ignored. Therefore, this article seeks to answer the question, what effect did the identity and interests have on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Syria? This article will examine the economic drivers of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy towards Syria through a critical structuralist approach.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood which follows the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood In 1945, by Dr. Mostafa Sabaei, with the aim of combating colonialism and also confronting the occupation of Syria by France, was created in Aleppo, Significant effects on Syrian developments, particularly the political developments in this country. This party, after being recognized and on the implementation of the Ba'athist Socialist Party in Syria and the support of Hafez Assad and then Bashar al-Assad from this party (Ba'ath), it has always been in tension and opposition to the Damascus government and they are subject to repeated riots and armed attacks. Goal of this research is exploring the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood party and its role in the Syrian crisis and the role of the party in the expansion of the civil war in this country which interprets by reading the library and collect information from authoritative sources and books. The main question in the present article is that if this party had necessary performance and influence in order to achieve the it’s defined goals? It seems Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Party despite stimulation and organizing active age groups (Sunni’s active groups) in the course of the Salafist anti-central government of this country, has not performance and necessary influence and not reached to achieving its stated goals. In this research with the statement of theoretical basis,

Since 2002, with the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Türkiye's foreign policy framework has been transformed by a new discourse centered on the multidimensional doctrine of "strategic depth" in the form of soft power and public diplomacy. Türkiye's foreign policy, especially after the socio-political developments known as the "Arab Spring," provided Türkiye with the opportunity to use Davutoglu's idea of relying on "historical depth, geographical location, and the rich and great legacy left by the Ottoman Empire" to consolidate soft power and play an active role in resolving regional and trans-regional conflicts. But the Muslim Brotherhood's settlement in Egypt left Türkiye alone in the region. Syria became a major problem, leaving it alone in the region and its allies, not paying attention to its national security interests in the field of foreign policy. The rise of ISIS further exacerbated Türkiye's problems in the region.  The unrest in Syria, the escalation of the Kurdish issue in northern Syria, and the future of Syria have put Türkiye in a difficult situation. The withdrawal of Syrian army forces from northern Syria in July 2012 and the Syrian Kurds' takeover of the area caused concern in Türkiye. Türkiye strongly supported the Syrian opposition, with the analysis that the regime of Bashar al-Assad will fall in the short term. Domestic developments in Türkiye's, such as the Gezi Park protests, the end of the project of national unity and brotherhood with the Kurds after the attack of Ceylan Pinar in the continuation of the resumption of Türkiye's internal crisis with the PKK, the disputes over the "presidency" system in Türkiye between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the People's Democratic Party (HDP), the PKK's new hope for the creation of a state in northern Syria, the attacks of ISIS, and international pressures paved the way for the revival of Türkiye's defense policy anf dealt a blow to Türkiye's soft power strategy. The failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016 by the Gulenists accelerated this turnaround. Due to the increasing risks facing its national-security interests in the region, Türkiye gradually increased its hard power approach and replaced it with soft power to some extent.The period of strategic cooperation and soft power in Turkish-Syrian relations generally took place in a tense atmosphere. Since 1998, when the PKK demanded the withdrawal of the PKK from Syria, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Syria began, and after the AKP came to power, it reached the highest level of cooperation with the signing of the military cooperation agreement in 2002. The arrest and extradition of PKK terrorists by Syria to Türkiye and the attacks carried out in the form of joint operations were welcomed by Türkiye, and as a result, the two countries became closer to each other. Due to the importance given to the expansion of economic relations in Türkiye's foreign policy, Syria was one of the countries that had the most extensive relations with Türkiye in the region. In 2009, Türkiye and Syria experienced their closest historical period. But the popular uprising of the Arab Spring in 2011 in Syria led to a civil war in the country and strained relations between the two countries. And it changed Türkiye's approach to Syria from soft power to hard power. As a result, the AKP government, with its foreign policy strategy centered on soft power, intended to be a "model country" and a leader for the people and countries of the Middle East region. Türkiye pursued a policy of soft power in order to implement it through its developed relations with Syria. In this context, relations with Syria have improved rapidly since 2002 within the framework of a zero-problem policy with neighbors, and even in 2009 it became a strategic partnership between the two countries. Despite the zero-problem policy with neighbors, between 2002 and 2011, relations between Türkiye and Syria, which had improved too quickly without resolving the problems, quickly deteriorated after 2011. It is understandable that given Turkey's failure to persuade Bashar al-Assad to reform, the development of relations with Syria was superficial and the use of soft power against the Syrian government was not beneficial. On the other hand, the inability of the AKP's foreign policy decision-makers to predict the Arab Spring also contributed to the strained relations between Türkiye and Syria because the unpredictability of a phenomenon such as the Arab Spring, which affected the entire Middle East policy, prevented maneuvering in Türkiye's foreign policy. Consequently, the Arab Spring process not only reversed Turkish-Syrian relations but also caused a major problem for a foreign policy based on soft power. The policy that was based on the overthrow of Assad led to the stagnation of Turkey's foreign policy in Syria and the Middle East. Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy, which ran from Latin America to Europe-Balkans and from Africa to the Middle East, was grounded by international systemic threats in Syria. After the Syrian civil war turned into a proxy war between global and regional powers, Türkiye's faced a crisis of national security and survival and thus more than the loss of its achievements in the region. Aspiring to be the center country and leader of soft power in the Middle East, Türkiye became a hard-to-survive power-front country. Although in 2016 the entry and exit of Syrian and Turkish nationals was visa-free, Turkey built a wall on the Syrian border, which ended the policy of opening the doors of the Middle East through Syria in this process. Initially, the AKP leaders thought that it was possible to lead the Arab Spring process and even saw it as an opportunity to become a model country. According to this view, Türkiye's policy in Syria until 2015 was based on managing the change and transformation of the government, but neither Türkiye's soft power nor hard power was sufficient and effective to control the post-Arab Spring process and fill the power vacuum, even for Syria. The tense ups and downs in the Middle East were the end of the passionate Turkish-American cooperation that had strengthened Türkiye's foreign policy in the region between 2002 and 2011, but since 2013, the United States of America has left Türkiye alone in the Syrian civil war and began to cooperate with the PYD instead of Türkiye. This brought Türkiye's foreign policy in Syria to a standstill. The growing influence of the PYD and the terrorist group ISIS, which also had the ability to carry out operations on Turkish soil, turned Syria into one of the most serious centers of security crises in the world and greatly worried Türkiye. In addition to failing to achieve its ideals, Türkiye was forced to fight the terrorist groups of ISIS in 2014 and then in 2016 to confront the PYD. The infiltration of the coup plotters into the Turkish state system was the point of internal failure of the country and caused a change in Türkiye's political approach. As a result, both Türkiye's soft power could not control the developments in Syria and fundamental changes in Türkiye's domestic policy, both of which forced Türkiye to adopt a hard power policy, and Türkiye's regional activity after 2016 was accompanied by aggressive measures to address security concerns. In Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Operation Olive Branch in 2018, Operation Peace Spring in 2019, and Operation Spring Shield in 2020, the areas of Jarablus and al-Bab, Afrin, east of the Euphrates, plus 30 kilometers southbound between Tall Abyad and Ras Al-ayn, were taken from ISIS, and especially from the PKK/YPG. It was cleaned up. Therefore, Türkiye's new security doctrine has been considered since 2016, and in the cross-border issue, it has followed the strategy of eliminating threats from the source.

The Syrian crisis and the rise and spread of ISIS attracted the attention of the world and transformed the Middle East region in a way that was not imagined before 2011. So that it created different transformations in the internal arena of Syria and it was designated as an arena for the countries of the world to strive to secure national interests. From this point of view, the present article tries to answer the question that according to the problem of state-nation building in Syria, what factors have caused the penetration and expansion of the ISIS terrorist group? (Statement of the problem). The current research tries to qualitatively and with a descriptive-analytical approach, the factors of influence and spread of extremist terrorism of ISIS by insisting on the theoretical framework of the bankrupt state in Syria, by using information collection, including books, articles and internet data. put check (method). It seems that the influence and expansion of ISIS in Syria was due to the incomplete political structure, economic crisis, loss of legitimacy of the government and systemic pressures. Thus, there is a direct connection between the phenomenon of terrorism and the bankrupt government, which means that one of the factors of the rise and spread of ISIS was the weak performance of the Syrian government in the political, economic, social and cultural fields (findings).

This article examines Erdogan;s personality and Turkey;s policies towards Syria. Due to special perceptual-psychological nature, Erdoğan;s cult of personality and desire to promote Turkey ;s position as a symbol of pragmatic Islamic policies and competition with rivals, he has chosen Syria as a suitable place to implement his regional security strategy. During the recent crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations and the direct military confrontation between the military forces of the two countries, this issue shows the importance of Syria ;s position in Turkey;s regional political and security strategy. The question raised in this article is, what were the reasons for Erdogan;s government;s tendency to be present in Syria? The temporary answer to the current question is that Turkey ;s security presence in Syria originates from the neo-Ottoman policies of the Justice and Development Party and Erdogan himself as the basic agent of the political structure of strategic and security decisions.

With the beginning of the Syrian crisis and the formation and strengthening of the multi-polar space, with the opening of new social gaps during the Arab Spring, political, ideological, economic and social differences appeared at once. Although this dispute was formed against the rule of Bashar al-Assad, it became a fundamental factor for finding a difference between the opposing groups and turned the crisis of this country into a regional and international crisis. The current research is an answer to this important question: What effect and role do social and cultural gaps and differences play in the occurrence and escalation of the Syrian crisis? The hypothesis of the answer to the current question is that: the crisis of national identity, the strong dominance of the culture of ethnocentrism and ethnic sectarianism along with the intensification of takfiri currents in the absence of a common and homogeneous civil culture between ethnic groups and groups caused the Syrian crisis to strongly diverge. intense political and social and civil war moves. The current research is explained in terms of descriptive-analytical method with reference to written sources. As a result the Syrian political crisis has long-term cultural, social and political roots, and the accumulated identity conflict has caused nation-building in Syria to fail over several decades.

According to the "doctrine of the responsibility to protect", every government must protect its population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. When a country loses its ability to protect its population against such crimes. This responsibility will be delegated to the international community. Due to the widespread lack of human rights in the Syrian crisis, the international community has considered itself to intervene in this country. However, the international community, especially the United Nations, has not been able to act effectively. Considering the current conditions, this article seeks to answer the question of how the "doctrine of the responsibility to protect" has caused the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in the Syrian crisis. To explain the ineffectiveness of "responsibility to support" in Syria, the deadlock puzzle in game theory has been used. Based on this theory, the interests and political considerations of the great powers in the Security Council as the main mechanism for applying the responsibility of protection have prevented the effective and desirable functioning of the doctrine of the responsibility of protection in the Syrian crisis. The hypothesis of the article is that the lack of specific criteria for the implementation of the responsibility to support on the one hand, and the conflicting and complex interests of the great powers in the Syrian crisis on the other hand have affected the performance of the UN Security Council and it faced inefficiency in the serious test phase in the case of the Syrian crisis.

The significance of regional organizations in restoring regional peace and security is undeniable. The Arab League, as the first regional organization in the Middle East, exhibited diverse reactions to the situation in Syria following the events of the Arab Spring. The primary inquiry of this research focuses on how this organization utilized its capacities to prevent the escalation of the crisis and facilitate the restoration of regional peace and security concerning the situation in Syria. Using a descriptive-analytic approach, this article delves into the underlying causes of the prolonged crisis in Syria and subsequently analyzes the decisions and stances taken by the Arab League, such as the suspension of Syria's membership and the imposition of political and economic sanctions. These analyses are conducted through the lens of constitutional commitments as well as political and legal considerations. The findings indicate that the twelve-year suspension of Syria's membership, despite its status as a founding member of the Arab League, not only underscores the complexity and multifaceted nature of the crisis at regional and international levels but also suggests that, in line with the fundamental objectives and principles of the organization, its approaches largely align with the interests of powerful Western governments and the expansionist policies of the occupying regime in Palestine, while running counter to the interests of the regional Arab and Islamic communities. Presently, the Arab League faces challenges such as dual approaches, decision-making influenced by its anti-Iranian members, issues related to immigration crises, and normalization of relations with Israel. From a regional perspective, the league's track record hardly reflects its role as an effective regional organization capable of resolving domestic crises within its member states or addressing international crises such as the Palestine-Israel conflict in line with the preservation of regional peace and security. Consequently, the Arab and Islamic region may continue to exist in a "region sans regionalism."

Turkey's policies have undergone various ebbs and flows over the past two decades. These policies have been characterized by both friendly relations with neighbors and inference in the internal affairs of certain countries, including Syria. These changes fall under the broader strategic objectives of the Turkish government, which require further examination. This article aims to investigate the reasons behind Turkey's strategic policy shift towards Syria. The significance of Syria's position in Turkey's regional political-security strategy has influenced the Erdogan government's change in strategy. This article addresses the question of the impact of Erdogan's policy shift towards Syria on Turkey's strategic policies in the region. The research findings, based on an explanatory-analytical approach using secondary data, indicate several reasons, including Erdogan's perceptual-psychological nature and personality, his inclination to enhance Turkey's position, the internal political and economic instability, as well as national security concerns, particularly in dealing with Kurdish groups. These factors have constrained the Turkish government to adopt a new policy towards Syria. This shift of policy will change Turkey's strategies in the Middle East and cause it to abandon its neo-Ottomanist policies. The economic instability of Turkey, national security considerations, the long border between the two countries, the issue of the Kurds, terrorism, and the presence of millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey are all significant factors in this strategic shift. Currently, Turkey is more pragmatic in changing its neo-Ottomanist policies.

One of the most significant, uncommon, and enduring alliances in Middle Eastern politics and security over the last few decades has been that between Iran and Syria. This alliance, which was formed at the beginning of the 1980s and was one of the external effects of the Islamic Revolution's victory, was brought about by changes to other regional alliances and alignments. Despite numerous analyses, it did not collapse quickly; rather, it was strengthened and extended, not only to Syria and Iran but also to Lebanon, Palestine, and other areas of the region, ultimately leading to the formation of the Resistance Axis. This paper aims to address this question: What factors and components influenced the formation and strengthening of the Iranian-Syrian alliance in the 1980s? The paper's hypothesis is that the material and semantic contexts that created the model of friendship and cooperation, as well as close security interaction between Iran and Syria, formed and strengthened their alliance in the 1980s, countering common threats and securing common interests. Examining the issue with the use of regional security complex theory, the analytical-descriptive method, and library and internet sources shows that the most important security considerations (physical and semantic) and the components that shaped and strengthened the alliance between Iran and Syria have consisted of: the existence of common identity, ideological and strategic platforms and fields, and common interests and threats resulting from it at the regional level. As for the regional security complex theory, the analytical-descriptive method, and library and internet sources indicates that the most important security considerations (physical and semantic) and the components that shaped and strengthened the alliance between Iran and Syria have consisted of: the existence of common identity, ideological and strategic platforms and fields, and common interests and threats resulting from it at the regional level, Common perception of the Zionist regime's threat in the region, the existence of revisionist ideologies, and ideological commonalities in opposition to America and conflict with the Zionist regime, Iran and Syria's confrontation with security threat from Iraq and confronting its supremacy, Syria's support of Iran during Iraq's war, the role of ideological religious communities, the efforts of the two countries of Iran and Syria to gain religious legitimacy at the external levels, and to secure the interests of Iran and Syria in the form of unity in the Arab world.

The Syrian crisis is considered to be the confrontation between the power of the US and Iran, and the US has tried to overthrow the Syrian government by weakening Iran. However, in the end, Bashar al-Assad not only did not fall, but the level of Iranian influence also increased. Now, in this research, the main question is what are the reasons for the failure of American foreign policy strategies to contain Iran in Syria? The findings show that the failure of the American strategies to contain Iran in Syria is due to four main factors. First, the pattern of interactions in which various actors, including Iran, the United States, and other regional countries, have intricately cooperated or competed with each other. Second, the failure to manage the expulsion of Iran from Syria, which shows the failure of the United States to achieve its goals in this country, especially in reducing Iran's influence. Thirdly, the influence of the subordinate system through which the changes in one point of the regional system by imposing sanctions against Iran could not lead to the developments in Syria. And fourthly, the role of the great power of Russia, which, with its presence and activities in the region, has helped stabilize the Assad regime and increase Iran's influence. Together, these factors indicate the importance and complexity of regional issues in the success or failure of American foreign policy strategies in containing Iran in Syria. The article was compiled using descriptive-analytical methods and library documents.

Given the realities of the international system within the current arena of war and its resulting damages, actors persistently focus on each other’s economic advantages. In this context, the West Asia region, characterized by tension and volatility, specifically highlights Syria—a country that has endured a decade of conflict—for its favorable economic traits. These attributes stem from Syria’s access to open waters and its proximity to European and African nations. Notably, Iran has maintained positive relations with Syria for many years, dating back to the era of Hafez Assad. During the eight-year defense against Iraq, Syria supported Iran, fostering strong ties. Considering Iran’s continued presence in Syria, prioritizing economic components to advance national macro strategies becomes a constructive governmental response. Both regional and global powers actively seek to enhance their influence and economic standing in other countries. Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism and power dynamics have gained prominence, prompting large governments across geographical regions to assert their roles in economic and political spheres. Consequently, the power struggle among actors in Syria extends beyond its borders, projecting an external image.
But despite the efforts of some powers to change the power dynamics in Syria, the ISIS caliphate came to an end, and the conflict zone was confined to the north and northwest of Syria. Meanwhile, Bashar al-Assad remained at the helm of power, and relentless attempts were made to overthrow him. This situation opened up opportunities for other governments to establish a presence in Syria, particularly in its economic sector.
Over the past decade, Iran has gained greater importance and status in the eyes of Damascus, especially within the context of the fight against ISIS in Syria. A notable example of Iran’s significance to the Assad government is the administration of the Latakia port, which was granted to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has also engaged in favorable economic activities within Syria.
In light of these developments, the Iranian government has transitioned from military spending and the fight against ISIS to a focus on soft power and economic influence in Syria. It now occupies a unique position in the country’s economic geography.
Based on this fact and Iran’s presence in the Syrian war against opposition forces and ISIS, as well as its support of the central government, this article analyzes the impact of Syria’s geo-economic position on Iran’s strategic situation in the Middle East region between 2018 and 2023. The hypothesis of the article posits that Syria’s geo-economy, following the fall of ISIS, has solidified Iran’s influence within Syria and enhanced its regional role in both political and economic dimensions.
This article has collected data and analyzed it based on geoeconomics theory. According to this theory, controlling and influencing global and regional markets, as well as having access to the economic highways of many countries worldwide, ranks among the most crucial objectives. Achieving these goals necessitates tools such as attractive foreign investments and long-term, low-interest loans.
 
In light of this, concepts that hold significance in the economic sector—such as trade, investment, financial policies, economic aid, and sanctions—have gained prominence in the field of geo-economics. These components, once less critical before the collapse of the Soviet Union, now play pivotal roles in the competition among major powers since the 1990s.
 
These economic tools can spark competition between nations across various domains, particularly within different geographical areas. According to the principles proposed by the theory of geo-economics, Syria possesses a favorable economic geography for other states. Given the challenges faced by the Syrian government over the past decade, revitalizing both the political and economic aspects of the country necessitates attracting foreign capital and engaging in trade with other governments while distancing itself from security-related discussions.
 
This article analyzes the data using a documentary and statistical approach, employing the descriptive-analytical method with the assistance of geo-economics theory.
Based on the obtained data, Iran’s presence in Syria stands as one of the most critical levers within the West Asian region. According to available information, Iran has consistently expanded its cultural and economic footprint in Syria, particularly during the presence of ISIS and even more so afterward. This proactive approach by Iran underscores its recognition of Syria’s unique situation, especially following Ebrahim Raisi’s visit, and its strategic intent to enhance its position in West Asia.
 
Investing in Syria promises significant economic success for the country and contributes to bolstering regional prestige. Consequently, Iran’s presence in Syria, coupled with the creation of economic incentives for domestic investors, will further strengthen its influence in the country and facilitate the return of capital to Iran. From a political perspective, this presence aligns Iran more closely with its allies and strategically positions Syria within the depths of West Asia. As a result, Iran finds itself in the closest proximity to other regional competitors, poised to play an even greater role in shaping the future of regional dynamics compared to the past decade.
Therefore, based on the data, the following results have been obtained: 
1- With its presence in Syria, especially after the fall of the self-proclaimed ISIS government, Iran has demonstrated its intention to leverage the country’s economic interests.
2 -Iran has firmly established its presence in areas like Latakia, strategically exploiting Syria’s economic potential.
3 -Following the liberation of Bokmal by Iranian forces and under their directives, the Al-Tanf route—previously controlled by the US—has been significantly neutralized. This has ensured the continuity of an economic route connecting Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
4-By establishing a transit route between the resistance forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran facilitates connections across multiple corridors, including the North-South corridor, the China-Pakistan corridor, the China-Central Asia-Iran corridor, and the West Asia corridor. This network enables seamless access for Iran to the Mediterranean Sea via Latakia.
As a result, Iran’s presence in Syria has deepened the country’s strategic significance within the region and the global context. Syria, particularly Latakia, has emerged as a pivotal gateway to other lands.

Syria is one of Iran’s strategic partners in the political and security fields and it was one of the first countries that after the Islamic Revolution, recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran, and hence the official relations between the two countries began. Syria, as one of the countries affecting the resistance, has been involved in the internal crisis imposed by the West and its regional allies since late January 2011, causing heavy losses to the country. With the role of Iran and other Syrian allies, the relative security in the country is established and with the start of the reconstruction period, it is necessary to compensate for the damage caused by the crisis by restoring the power of the past and strengthening its important economic and commercial sectors. As a strategic ally of Syria, the Islamic republic of Iran is now able to expand its presence in the west Asia region from the military - security layer to the economic layer with its role in the reconstruction period. The article seeks to show what level Iran is in the political economy over to its regional rivals, and how it is based on its competence to support the Syrian government. using the descriptive-analytical method, this paper studies Syria's civil war and its need for trade and the provision of commercial and business space, owners of capital and business and business owners can invest in this country and provide a good economic benefit to Iranian and Iranian investors .

Iran's Islamic Revolution is one of the most important revolutions of the last century, which has had effects on the world that need to be investigated. Therefore, this article has analyzed the impact of the Syrian government and the Muslim Brotherhood on the Islamic Revolution in a descriptive and analytical way using library sources. Because the government and the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria was one of the supporters of the Iranian revolution at the beginning of the revolution and took some influences from the revolution; Therefore, it is necessary to investigate this influence. After the studies conducted in this field, there have been some achievements, such as the fact that Imam Khomeini has taken measures such as announcing the World Quds Day, using the opportunity of Hajj and sending Iranian officials to different countries to spread the revolution to the world. But this revolution has had two effects on the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: firstly, it led to the revival of the Muslim Brotherhood Front in the country, and secondly, after Iran's lack of support against Hafez Assad, this front became hostile to Iran and stopped supporting Iran and turned against it. They took measur.

Despite the passage of more than four decades since the Iraq-Iran war, due to the effects that this war has had on geopolitics and regional order, and specifically on Iran's political-security approach and regional policy and its influence in the West Asian region, it is worthy of paying attention. Therefore, the question that arises is that how did the Iran-Iraq war affect the relations between Iran and Syria and the expansion of the regional influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Investigating the issue using the defensive neorealism approach, descriptive-analytical method and using library and documentary sources shows that this war made Iran's strategic loneliness and its unwanted isolation and lack of an ally in the region more obvious and the strategic proximity of Iran and Syria and The expansion of the scope of security cooperation between the two countries from Iraq to Lebanon and Palestine led to confrontation with the Zionist regime and it caused attention to regional influence and strategic deepening and countering security threats with the help of non-governmental allies in Iran's regional political-security approach. This ultimately led to an increase in political-ideological influence and strategic depth and regional deterrence power of Iran in West Asia.

This article, with the aim of enumerating and formulating political strategies and considering the essential role of Syria in strengthening the resistance front, seeks to answer the basic question, what are the political strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deal with Takfiri groups in Syria? In this regard, the type of research in this article is "developmental-applied" and the case-field method has been used. The sample size of the statistical population for qualitative data was determined by the purposeful homogeneous, heterogeneous and snowball methods until saturation, and considering the specialization of the research subject and the limited availability of experts to meet the scientific needs of the research, fifty people were selected. The full form has been determined. To collect information, interview method and researcher-made questionnaires were used, and to check the validity of the questionnaire, the opinions of experts in the field of study were used, and Cronbach's alpha was used to check the reliability of the questionnaire. After obtaining the opinions of the statistical community, data analysis has been done using descriptive and inferential statistical techniques and methods. Finally, with regard to the four categories of strategies counted in the SWOT matrix (WT, WO, ST, SO) and the compilation of propositions for the basis of the elements of strategy formulation, we reached three strategies as the main political strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Syria.