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After the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, the traditional policy of westernization of Turkey was somewhat deviated and an active regional foreign policy was adopted. Until the Arab Spring developments in 2011, Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East continued based on the policy of neo-Ottomanism and influence based on soft power. From 2011 onwards, shaping the emerging order of the region became Turkey's main priority. After the coup in 2016, the Party's foreign policy became more independent, pragmatic and militaristic than before. The study aims to investigate these changes with the method of process tracing, the question is: How can the changes in the foreign policy of Party towards the Middle East, from the use of soft power to the use of military tools, be explained? Tracing the process shows that from 2002 to 2024, there were clear signs of a realistic foreign policy. In all this time, interest-centeredness, opportunism, pragmatism and nationalism have been the basis of the policies of the elites of the Justice and Development Party.

Since 2002, with the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Türkiye's foreign policy framework has been transformed by a new discourse centered on the multidimensional doctrine of "strategic depth" in the form of soft power and public diplomacy. Türkiye's foreign policy, especially after the socio-political developments known as the "Arab Spring," provided Türkiye with the opportunity to use Davutoglu's idea of relying on "historical depth, geographical location, and the rich and great legacy left by the Ottoman Empire" to consolidate soft power and play an active role in resolving regional and trans-regional conflicts. But the Muslim Brotherhood's settlement in Egypt left Türkiye alone in the region. Syria became a major problem, leaving it alone in the region and its allies, not paying attention to its national security interests in the field of foreign policy. The rise of ISIS further exacerbated Türkiye's problems in the region.  The unrest in Syria, the escalation of the Kurdish issue in northern Syria, and the future of Syria have put Türkiye in a difficult situation. The withdrawal of Syrian army forces from northern Syria in July 2012 and the Syrian Kurds' takeover of the area caused concern in Türkiye. Türkiye strongly supported the Syrian opposition, with the analysis that the regime of Bashar al-Assad will fall in the short term. Domestic developments in Türkiye's, such as the Gezi Park protests, the end of the project of national unity and brotherhood with the Kurds after the attack of Ceylan Pinar in the continuation of the resumption of Türkiye's internal crisis with the PKK, the disputes over the "presidency" system in Türkiye between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the People's Democratic Party (HDP), the PKK's new hope for the creation of a state in northern Syria, the attacks of ISIS, and international pressures paved the way for the revival of Türkiye's defense policy anf dealt a blow to Türkiye's soft power strategy. The failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016 by the Gulenists accelerated this turnaround. Due to the increasing risks facing its national-security interests in the region, Türkiye gradually increased its hard power approach and replaced it with soft power to some extent.The period of strategic cooperation and soft power in Turkish-Syrian relations generally took place in a tense atmosphere. Since 1998, when the PKK demanded the withdrawal of the PKK from Syria, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Syria began, and after the AKP came to power, it reached the highest level of cooperation with the signing of the military cooperation agreement in 2002. The arrest and extradition of PKK terrorists by Syria to Türkiye and the attacks carried out in the form of joint operations were welcomed by Türkiye, and as a result, the two countries became closer to each other. Due to the importance given to the expansion of economic relations in Türkiye's foreign policy, Syria was one of the countries that had the most extensive relations with Türkiye in the region. In 2009, Türkiye and Syria experienced their closest historical period. But the popular uprising of the Arab Spring in 2011 in Syria led to a civil war in the country and strained relations between the two countries. And it changed Türkiye's approach to Syria from soft power to hard power. As a result, the AKP government, with its foreign policy strategy centered on soft power, intended to be a "model country" and a leader for the people and countries of the Middle East region. Türkiye pursued a policy of soft power in order to implement it through its developed relations with Syria. In this context, relations with Syria have improved rapidly since 2002 within the framework of a zero-problem policy with neighbors, and even in 2009 it became a strategic partnership between the two countries. Despite the zero-problem policy with neighbors, between 2002 and 2011, relations between Türkiye and Syria, which had improved too quickly without resolving the problems, quickly deteriorated after 2011. It is understandable that given Turkey's failure to persuade Bashar al-Assad to reform, the development of relations with Syria was superficial and the use of soft power against the Syrian government was not beneficial. On the other hand, the inability of the AKP's foreign policy decision-makers to predict the Arab Spring also contributed to the strained relations between Türkiye and Syria because the unpredictability of a phenomenon such as the Arab Spring, which affected the entire Middle East policy, prevented maneuvering in Türkiye's foreign policy. Consequently, the Arab Spring process not only reversed Turkish-Syrian relations but also caused a major problem for a foreign policy based on soft power. The policy that was based on the overthrow of Assad led to the stagnation of Turkey's foreign policy in Syria and the Middle East. Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy, which ran from Latin America to Europe-Balkans and from Africa to the Middle East, was grounded by international systemic threats in Syria. After the Syrian civil war turned into a proxy war between global and regional powers, Türkiye's faced a crisis of national security and survival and thus more than the loss of its achievements in the region. Aspiring to be the center country and leader of soft power in the Middle East, Türkiye became a hard-to-survive power-front country. Although in 2016 the entry and exit of Syrian and Turkish nationals was visa-free, Turkey built a wall on the Syrian border, which ended the policy of opening the doors of the Middle East through Syria in this process. Initially, the AKP leaders thought that it was possible to lead the Arab Spring process and even saw it as an opportunity to become a model country. According to this view, Türkiye's policy in Syria until 2015 was based on managing the change and transformation of the government, but neither Türkiye's soft power nor hard power was sufficient and effective to control the post-Arab Spring process and fill the power vacuum, even for Syria. The tense ups and downs in the Middle East were the end of the passionate Turkish-American cooperation that had strengthened Türkiye's foreign policy in the region between 2002 and 2011, but since 2013, the United States of America has left Türkiye alone in the Syrian civil war and began to cooperate with the PYD instead of Türkiye. This brought Türkiye's foreign policy in Syria to a standstill. The growing influence of the PYD and the terrorist group ISIS, which also had the ability to carry out operations on Turkish soil, turned Syria into one of the most serious centers of security crises in the world and greatly worried Türkiye. In addition to failing to achieve its ideals, Türkiye was forced to fight the terrorist groups of ISIS in 2014 and then in 2016 to confront the PYD. The infiltration of the coup plotters into the Turkish state system was the point of internal failure of the country and caused a change in Türkiye's political approach. As a result, both Türkiye's soft power could not control the developments in Syria and fundamental changes in Türkiye's domestic policy, both of which forced Türkiye to adopt a hard power policy, and Türkiye's regional activity after 2016 was accompanied by aggressive measures to address security concerns. In Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Operation Olive Branch in 2018, Operation Peace Spring in 2019, and Operation Spring Shield in 2020, the areas of Jarablus and al-Bab, Afrin, east of the Euphrates, plus 30 kilometers southbound between Tall Abyad and Ras Al-ayn, were taken from ISIS, and especially from the PKK/YPG. It was cleaned up. Therefore, Türkiye's new security doctrine has been considered since 2016, and in the cross-border issue, it has followed the strategy of eliminating threats from the source.

In Turkey's foreign policy, West Asia is viewed as a region where ideological factors take precedence over practical political calculations. The country's foreign policy activities aimed at expanding its role in the region are largely associated with the Islamist tendencies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This paper examines Turkey's foreign policy with a focus on the relationship between the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which defines the nature of Turkey's foreign policy from Yemen to Egypt and Libya. The study employs a descriptive and analytical method, utilizing neoclassical realism theory to address the question of how and which elements have led to a shift in Turkey's foreign policy towards Islamism and closer ties with the Muslim Brotherhood following the Arab Spring. The hypothesis posits that, firstly, the ideological connections between the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood are the most evident factors facilitating cooperation between these two actors. Secondly, Turkey's foreign policy behavior in West Asia reflects a broader strategy to respond to systemic requirements and Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism in the region, aided by the Muslim Brotherhood. Understanding these systemic requirements necessitates considering multiple variables regarding how AKP leaders perceive regional developments, systemic and sub-systemic factors, strategic autonomy as a means of maximizing power and balancing as a way to enhance Turkey's security within West Asian dynamics.

This writing seeks to outline key questions and trends in Turkish foreign policy, considering its domestic and international dynamisms. What is the appraisal of Erdogan’s Turkiye of its national role and international status and in case of a change in government, what will be the outlook of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Erdogan period? There are some key statements concerning Turkish foreign policy-making: First, Turkiye’s new strategic culture does not recognize a clear boundary between the friend and foe, as it constantly changes according to environmental dynamisms and domestic political debates. Second, war in Ukraine has made Turkiye’s balancing policy face a serious challenge as it has raised ambiguity in anti-Westernism in Turkiye-Russia relations. Third, instead of being a reflection of a turn in Turkish regional policy, the process of normalization of relations with regional countries largely represents a resetting of foreign policy with Turkiye’s domestic dynamisms and surrounding areas’ geopolitical realities. If the opposition parties come to power, the new leaders will not retreat from Turkiye’s spheres of influence in surrounding areas, but policies arising from Erdogan’s personal and partisan preferences will undergo change among which reviving relations with the traditional Western allies will be given priority.

ince the beginning of the twentieth century, with the rise of the AKP in Turkey, its foreign policy has undergone major changes, and efforts to dismantle its neighbors and peaceful relations with the world have become the strategic focus of Turkey's diplomatic apparatus. In this regard, reconciliation with Syria was on the agenda of foreign policy, and the two sides established extensive economic cooperation. But after the civil war in Syria, Ankara gradually began to support opponents of Bashar al-Assad's regime and its effects on Turkey's internal sphere. This study seeks to examine the domestic implications of Turkey's foreign policy in Syria using the Boomerang conceptual and conceptual model. The findings of the study show that AKP politicians intensified control and censorship in Turkish society after interfering with Turkish internal affairs, and with the elimination of the voices of dissidents and critics, they sought to expand authoritarianism. In this sense, Turkey not only failed to achieve its goals in Syria, but also faced domestic crises that systematically altered the effects of the boomerang effect on the functioning of the Turkish government and interior.

Analyzing Turkey's foreign policy positions to the dynamics in Syria is important, considering the strategic importance of the latter country in different dimensions. Turkey’s approaches towards the development of the Syrian civil war have gone through the changing trends since the beginning of Syria conflict in 2011 until today. The article tries to answer the question of what role have the identity notions played in Turkey's foreign policy regarding the Syrian civil war by applying a descriptive-explanatory method and through a constructivist theoretical approach. Beyond the realistic approaches, this paper also tests this hypothesis that Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria could be explained based on Turkey's identical notions. The research findings show that Turkey's foreign policy towards the Syrian civil war in the regional and international spheres has been shaped by an amalgamation of the country's identical notions such as the nationalist concepts, denying the Kurdish factor, opposing the Islamic resistance and competition with Iran, the identity of Muslim brotherhood and presenting a model of Turkish Islam and finally the concept of Neo-Ottomanism.

An important development was made in Turkish foreign policy after Justice and Development Party got into power. The question is "What pattern did govern the security relations of Turkish foreign policy from 2002 to 2013? What security threats will follow for Iran? According to the security studies in Copenhagen School, it will be supposed that Turkish foreign policy from 2002 to 2013 had the considerable modification in the field of security and reduced the volume of security relations in terms of military individually and foreign policy of Turkish mostly relied on the multiple security subjects including the economic, social and political issues. Turkey's relationship with the USA, participation in Israel and Azerbaijan coalition, unity with Arab countries opposing Iran, posed a threat to Iran's security in the political-military, economic, and social fields. The aim of this study is to investigate the various dimensions and security effects of Turkish foreign policy.

The present article seeks to answer the fundamental question of what is the place of the tools of public diplomacy and soft power in formulating the strategy of Iran and Turkey towards Syria and its developments? The hypothesis to answer this question is that Iran has always maintained the tools of public diplomacy based on soft power in its strategy towards Syria; But from 1999 to 2011, Turkey maintained its soft diplomacy based on soft power towards Syria, but with the beginning of the Syrian developments, Syria's strategy gradually turned to a hard power strategy. Because Turkey, according to the doctrine of Ottomanism, sought to expand its strategic depth in the region, and the developments in Syria encouraged Turkey to achieve this goal by establishing the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and expanding the Brotherhood axis. Therefore, Turkey faced the Assad government in the developments in Syria, and it was natural that the foreign policy strategy of this country would change from soft power to hard power. But Iran seeks to maintain its position in the region and Syria, so it has always expressed its support for the Syrian government and people, and public diplomacy has continued in Iran's strategy towards Syria. Therefore, the developments in Syria have also had a negative impact on Iran-Turkey relations. In this article, the descriptive-analytical method is used to collect data from library and documentary sources and in order to refine and systematize the research findings, the concept of public diplomacy is used.

This paper aims to understand the key variables influencing changes and continuities of Turkish foreign policy in the post- Arab revolutions, in a systematic way. The Arab revolutions, as an exogenous shock by transforming the structure of regional power and identity, providing uncertain opportunities and threats, has severely changed Turkish assertive and soft power-based foreign policy vision. Over the past decade, regional developments have provided space for Turkey to seek a more active and assertive role in the region, though Turkey’s own limitations, policy choices, and regional dynamics have somewhat restricted its ability to do so. This shift has gradually Middle Easternized Turkey’s foreign policy directions. Through the prism of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), this paper seeks to formulate; what drivers (structural-internal) and how to shape Turkey's assertive and security-based foreign policy behavior in the post- Arab revolutions? To do so, the paper by analyzing the structural and internal determinants in changing Turkey's foreign policy approaches, highlights the role of mediating variables; especially the AKP leaders’ misperception to seize regional leadership, overestimation of their material and discursive capacities, and miscalculations of the shifting Middle East geopolitics and regional rival’s capabilities.

The present article seeks to study Iran's and Turkey's foreign policy approach in the Syrian crisis based on the theory of neo-realism, focusing on its two branches: defensive and aggressive realism. This paper seeks to answer the fundamental question of what factors have influenced the Iranian-Turkish foreign policy approach in the Syrian crisis? The supposition to answer this question is that Iran's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis is based on maintaining Bashar al-Assad, preserving status-quo, fighting terrorist groups, supporting peaceful solutions to the crisis, while Turkey's foreign policy is based on changing status-quo in Syria, By overrule Bashar al-Assad and supporting the terrorist groups and supporting the opponents of Bashar al-Assad. In this paper, from library and documentary reference are utilized with descriptive-analytic research methodology to explaining the subject. In this paper, from library and documentary reference are utilized with descriptive-analytic research methodology to explaining the subject. 

With arrival of Justice and Development Party serious alterations occurred in Turkey's foreign policy and the country's Policy in the Middle East moved towards opposition than cooperation. The changes in Turkey's political and social contexts and the country's emphasis on layers of identity. Brought about ideological tensions that necessitate the investigation of changes in Turkey's identity tenets in the Middle East and it's regional effects. This study argues that Justice and Development Party's application as identity tenets in the Middle East entangles the country in ideological games that it has little in common with; and from another perspective, with a read of Islamism the country enters a rivalry field with Iran and Saudi Arabia each of which represents a part of it's identity (Sunni and Shiite) and from another aspects the two countries have opposite and common benefits. Thus, Turkey's presence in the Middle East brings about more complication in the regional equations and more disagreement in policies; and intensities ideological rivalries. This study was carried and according the Constructivist theory, the research method was descriptive –analytical; and the data were collected through library research.

Turkish new foreign policy over the past decade has been called neo-Ottomanism. Turkey in addition to maintain its ties with the West, tries to establish and develop political relations with the countries of Middle East, in particular those in the historical area of ​​the Ottoman Empire. This research attempts to find analyzing the aspects of the new Turkish foreign policy and answers to these questions specifically that what effects foreign policy of Neo-Ottomanism has on the region and Iran and what challenges may it have for Iran? Theoretical approach of this article is based on constructivist approach and this assumption that the new Turkish foreign policy is a discourse redefinition rooted in way of formation and development of its historical identity. For this purpose, inventors of foreign policy of Neo-Ottomanism try to link historical identity of Turkey with its Western values ruled over it. The country's new foreign policy reflected seriously its relations with surrounding countries. But in spite of the positive effects of foreign policy on relations with Iran, will entail many challenges for Iran.

With the advent of the AKP, Turkish foreign policy took on a new form, the country's policymakers paid more attention to the soft power. Davutoglu and his Strategic Depth theory was of particular importance.In the same vein, and with the economic advancements of Turkey, development assistance and humanitarian assistance became an important part of Turkish instrument of influence in the world.Moreover, the role of the civil society of Turkey, which had become more powerful during the era of Justice and Development Party, should not be neglected.Therefore, the present study seeks to explain Turkey's foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party, based on the theory of Hans Maul, which focuses on the concept of the role of civilian foreign policyAnd explores the tools, goals, and how to apply Turkish civilian power in Africa.The main question here is what are the elements that make up Turkey's civilian power in Africa? Our hypothesis is that the creation of a democratic society with the economic well-being inside and presenting it as a model in African countries, taking multilateral and cooperative policies in the international arena and using economic instruments , Diplomatic, cultural and religious forms of Turkish civilian power in Africa

Syria has been played the role of Iran's entrance to the Arab world and also Iran's strategic connection to the Mediterranean region and the Near East for many years. Therefore, weakening of Syria and overthrowing of Assad regime will lead weakening of resistance axis and also Iran's regional influence. Since beginning of crisis in Syria, Islamic Republic of Iran has supported political system of Syria as main priorities of its foreign policy. Turkey is one of the main regional actors that despite the initial cautious approach in short term in the Syrian crisis, has supported opposition groups through transferring of arms and financial assistance to opponents of Assad follows the policy of regime change. Policies of Turkey towards Syria showed that its policy of zero problems with neighbors has not reached its goals. In other words, Turkey is pursuing its interests and deepening of its strategic influence in post Assad era. Therefore, major difference between the two countries in foreign policy towards Syria is rooted in the difference in attitudes towards future of the region.

A brief look at Turkey's actions in recent years and especially since 2002 (after the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party), clearly shows the changes in Turkish foreign policy.Ankara is on track to achieve improved status in Islam world and international relations and we can see its manifestation in the development of its relations with Islamic countries and the Middle East. This policy is called Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey after decades of one-sided orientation to the West, now adopted a middle ground and more balanced policy toward the Middle East in accordance with its national interests, and expands its relations with the Muslim world and the West. Turkey calls being ranked the world's 10 prime power to 2023 and in recent years the country's efforts to establish balanced relations with world powers, polarization in the Muslim world and settle disputes with its neighbors could be analyzed in this context. This paper attempts to analysis AKP's strategy in foreign policy according to constructivist approach. So, our main question is why was the identity of Neo-Ottomanism the base of Turkish foreign policy? And it is a hypothesis which will follow that Turkey with the aim of restoring its influence in the region and set the political direction and economic development in this area, chose the Neo-Ottomanism identity as its foreign policy.

The reciprocal relationship between Turkey and Syria until the early years of the 21st century has gone through three major disputes- namely the issue of Kurds, and the territorial dispute over Hatay, and sharing the water of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. However, as the political developments took place with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, this country developed into a scene of international rivalries on which the regional powers acted their parts. Acting its part in the developments that took place in Turkey, the Administration made every effort to acquire a social prestige and secure the support of the West, carrying out different measures on different levels-political, economic, and military- against Syria. Applying the analytical-descriptive method with the use of library and documentary data collection, the present article plans to answer the question of "What effect does Turkey's foreign policy under Islamists towards the Syrian developments have on the security environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran?"

Turkish foreign policy has gone through important changes since its establishment due to changing internal and international conditions. Even though its major orientation remained the same as well as its basic principles, the transformation of the global balance of power had important impacts over the Turkish diplomacy. In the last decade, marked by the outcome of the September 11 attacks in the international level and the AK Party rule in Turkey, the latter has taken important foreign policy decisions, which are mainly influenced by Ahmet Davutoğlu’s geopolitical approach, on how to deal with the new issues of the international scene. These can be seen both a continuation of Turkey’s traditional diplomacy line and a new vision implemented to better serve Turkey’s national interests. will be translatedwill be translatedwill be translatedwill be translatedwill be translatedwill be translatedwill be translated will be translatedwill be translatedwill be translated will be translated.

The Turkish foreign policy has shown the paradoxical behavior in the regional and global crisis that has been ambiguous for the most thinkers. In fact, the new Turkish fluctuant foreign policy is a shift in the comparison whit the previous. This fluency in the Turkish foreign policy has been experienced whit a lot of regional and transregional actor like Iran, Syria, Iraq, Russia, EU and the U.S. The main question of this research is that, what is the foundations and principles of Ahmet Davutoglu's doctrine of strategic depth, as the main strategy of Justice and development party between 2002 by 2012 and what its effect on the advance of Turkish foreign policy goals? The findings of this research shows that the strategic depth doctrine try to expand the Turkish foreign policy perspective since Turkey transform to a high capability state whit a multidimensional interest and relation in the region and beyond that. In spite of its economic outcomes, but it leads to a paradoxical and conflicted behavior especially toward Middle East and Islam Word.

The international system and their respective domestic systems have made the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey adopt different attitudes towards the international system, leading to totally different foreign policies being pursued by the two states. In this article, the authors ask the following question: what influential factors have led the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey to adopt different foreign policy attitudes in the Middle East subsystem? The tentative answer is that domestic conditions in Iran and Turkey as well as the structure of the international system and Middle East regional subsystem have resulted in the adoption of different foreign policy attitudes by these two Middle Eastern states. The findings of the research would prove the hypothesis that difference in the Iranian and Turkish foreign policy attitudes in the Middle East regional subsystem has been caused by the aforementioned factors.