populism

Contrary to the optimistic predictions following the Cold War about the promotion and consolidation of liberal democracy worldwide, we are now witnessing the expansion and entrenchment of various forms of authoritarian governance. To the extent that, authoritarianism is currently the dominant governance model globally. This reality signifies profound changes in the political and social structures of societies and necessitates greater attention and research to understand its dimensions and consequences. To this end, this research seeks to answer the following questions: What are the distinct characteristics and forms of 21st-century authoritarianism? What mechanisms does it employ to gain and maintain power? What are the differences between authoritarianism in developing and developed countries?

This research employs a mixed-methods approach (quantitative-qualitative) with a descriptive-analytical framework to investigate the dimensions and characteristics of the expansion of authoritarianism in governance. The quantitative section utilizes statistics and data from international organizations such as Freedom House and the V-Dem Institute. The qualitative section, after reviewing and analyzing the findings of prominent researchers in the fields of democracy and authoritarianism, first compares old and new authoritarianism. Subsequently, it compares the ways in which new authoritarianism manifests and emerges in developing and developed countries. The necessary data has been collected through documentary and library resources, as well as statistical databases of international organizations.

Authoritarianism in the 21st century possesses characteristics distinct from its historical forms. This type of authoritarianism generally relies on elections, exhibits limited pluralism, employs less overt violence, and advances more subtly under the guise of democracy. In other words, modern authoritarian regimes, while not overtly despotic in appearance, also do not take steps towards democratization, while demonstrating greater resistance and resilience compared to the past. These regimes avoid actions that would lead to domestic and international condemnation. Repression, mass arrests, and executions are rarely used, and most citizens do not experience direct state violence. Nevertheless, the essence of authoritarianism remains based on the concentration of power and tight control over society, which is exercised through instruments such as the suppression of political opponents, censorship of the media, restrictions on civil liberties, and a lack of accountability and transparency in government institutions. The global spread of authoritarianism, both in advanced countries with a democratic history and in developing countries, has manifested in various ways: the election of populist figures who oppose legal procedures, such as Donald Trump in the United States; the rise to power of far-right figures, such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy; the continued power of authoritarians such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey; and the deepening of authoritarianism in countries such as China under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Based on the research findings, it can be said that the dominance of the democratic paradigm in the form of the third wave of democracy after the Cold War was an unusual and transient phenomenon. This is due to the halt in the progress of democracy and the spread of authoritarian governance models, which have historically been the dominant form of managing societies. New authoritarianism, with its specific characteristics, is becoming increasingly stronger and more prevalent; particularly, young people are to some extent accepting it and may even demand it. Although there is a possibility of internal transformations and a reduction of the grounds for authoritarianism in some countries, evidence suggests that current authoritarian regimes will not easily disappear in the near future.

This study addresses the fundamental question: Why did the American liberal democracy system ultimately lead to the emergence of Trumpism as its final product? The main hypothesis of this research is that Trumpism, as a populist phenomenon, directly stems from the structural and ideological crises of liberal democracy. These crises are primarily due to the weakening of fundamental democratic principles such as civic participation, social justice, and public trust in political institutions. Along with growing dissatisfaction with political elites and systemic corruption, these crises created conditions in which populist and anti-elite discourses transformed into an influential social and political movement, represented by Donald Trump. The methodology of this research is analytical and explanatory. This study seeks to explain how these factors have converged to shape the political phenomenon of Trumpism. The findings indicate that Trumpism, as a direct result of complex processes within American liberal democracy, emerged from identity crises and failures in reproducing equality and social justice. Through a populist discourse, Trump managed to mobilize segments of society that felt excluded from democratic processes. In this context, he exploited deep-seated distrust toward elites and offered simplistic and reductionist solutions, presenting himself as an alternative political force against the liberal democratic system. Thus, the emergence of Trumpism can be understood as a paradoxical response to the internal crises of American liberal democracy.

The symbolic emphasis on the issue of combating economic crimes and the disregard for expert and scientific theories have caused pragmatism to penetrate the field of economic crime criminal policy. In such a way gaining political prestige by government officials in the eyes of public opinion is considered as one of their main goals in the fight against economic crimes. Pragmatic policies that are opposed to rationalism and prudent and scientific approaches, by emphasizing the will of the people and the current needs of society, adopt cross-cutting solutions to issues and problems. An examination of Iran's criminal policy on economic crimes shows that pragmatism has infiltrated the field of economic crimes for various reasons, including the media coverage of economic crimes, the politicization of reactions to these crimes, the lack of public awareness and the state economy, and pragmatism. Findings indicate that pragmatism in the field of substantive policy on combating economic crimes in criminalization is based on events, determining the guarantee of criminal execution according to the requirements of society, legislation by an institution other than the legislature and the basis of Government security is manifested in criminality. The research method in this research is descriptive-analytical and in collecting its data, in addition to analyzing the rules and regulations, the discourse of criminal policymakers has been examined.

Today, liberal democracy has faced challenges including populism. As a populist person or party comes to power, a populist foreign policy with special characteristics in any country, including the United States, emerges. Within this context, Trump had deep impact on the country's foreign policy with his populist slogan, like "America First", his nationalist populism approach, and a conflict between the structure and the agent arose. From this perspective, the main question of this research is how Trump made the American establishment as the Other for its populist foreign policy. The hypothesis of this research is that Trump made the establishment as a major Other to his populist foreign policy through the creation of a bipolar atmosphere and confrontation between the structure and the agent, and the unfavorable conditions of the structure and the existing status of the liberal international order. The paper explains how Trump made the establishment as a sublime Other of his foreign policy by using the paradigm of neoclassical realism, the process tracing method, and by referring to sources and written documents about populism and American foreign policy in the Trump era.

The general purpose of the research is to contribute to the studies of political sociology and the foundations of the legitimacy of power in Islamic countries, including Turkey. The specific purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the state of the Turkish political system during the reign of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The data collection method is documentary and the research method is content analysis.

The central question of the article is how Erdogan used populist policies to consolidate his political power. The hypothesis of the research is based on the statement that Erdogan has prepared a platform for the consolidation of his political power and his party by resorting to various populist policies.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a populist who, by highlighting the corruption and passivity of the previous regimes, with temporary economic development (borrowing) and by using his charismatic personality, has taken the pulse of the religious and historical beliefs of the Turkish people . With passionate speeches and creating a sense of empathy and fraternity with the people,, he has taken steps from the point of making reforms towards to the centralization for political power.er.

In recent decades, we have witnessed the emergence of various social movements in Western liberal democracies. These movements have their roots in a crisis of representation, which refers to the gap between citizens' aspirations and decision-making institutions in representative democracies. The aim of the present study is to investigate this crisis and conduct a comparative analysis of the characteristics of two dominant types of movements that have emerged in response to this crisis. The main question of the article is to explore the similarities and differences between late social movements in Western liberal democracies. In response, the hypothesis of the article posits that in circumstances where the emergence of new social and populist movements in the West can be viewed in response to the crisis of representation in the institutional structure of Western liberal democracies, these two types of movements differ in terms of ideology, organization, leadership, and perception of an ideal political society. To justify this hypothesis, a combined conceptual framework is employed, consisting of the elements of "politics of identity" and the dualism of pluralism and unity. According to this framework, the common element of late social movements can be identified as an "identity concern" stemming from the elitist structure of liberal democracy. However, due to differences in their interpretation of the "ideal society," these movements differ in their characteristics and implications for the democratic system. The research method of the article is descriptive-analytical, and data is collected based on the study of library resources and online databases.

Populism is an ideology or a political strategy in which the opinion of the general public is preferred over all mechanisms of the society, which is fundamentally different from the concept of democracy and populism advocated by Islam. The spread of populist policies in a wrong way in many societies has caused people to easily forgo their long-term interests for short-term gains, and if their demands are not met, mistrust of the government and the system itself is created. Descriptive-analytical method has been employed in this research. The main questions of this article are: What are the approaches of political jurisprudential theories to populism? Can the rulers and statesmen of a religious government turn to populist policies from the viewpoint of political jurisprudence? The findings of the research show that populism, whose main characteristics are relying on the ignorance of the masses of society, gaining support by resorting to general and vague promises, taking actions independent of institutions and parties, and demagoguery, is strictly prohibited by Islamic political jurisprudence. In addition to being prohibited in terms of duty, the people who follow these policies are also responsible for their acts and must compensate for the damages.

Explaining the causes of the spread of populism in the world (case study of Iran) Review : Using the descriptive research method, we analyzed the explanation of the causes of the spread of populism in the world (a case study of Iran). The results show that the hypothesis is confirmed, and based on this, class differences and unequal distribution of wealth are the basis for the formation of populism in countries It is developing, including Iran, with the explanation that populism means populism or populism, it is a way of favoring or pretending to favor the rights and interests of the common people against the elites. Political populism is actually the use of people to achieve political goals. A danger that also threatens Iran due to the current economic and political conditions. Popularism or populism is a political doctrine and method in favoring or favoring the rights and interests of the common people against the elite group. In the 20th century, most "populist" movements were identified with Latin American and Indian movements, but since the 1980s, these movements have also gained some success in Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the United States. Class differences and unequal distribution of wealth have been the basis for the formation of governments and even populist social movements in developing countries, including Iran, and the advanced capitalist societies of Europe and the United States have witnessed the emergence of populism and its rapid expansion in recent years.

The constant tendency to focus on the people in the political arena can be seen among various groups in contemporary Iran, including the revolutionary leaders and groups focused on mobilizing the masses to confront the previous regime during the revolutionary movement, the rival revolutionary forces during the power struggle of the early years of the Islamic Revolution, and the leaders of the established government arising from the Islamic Revolution with the purpose of advancing their own domestic and foreign objectives and policies in the post-Revolutionary period. The main components of populism include the belief among political forces and leaders in the authenticity and righteousness of the unorganized masses and their direct mobilization in the field of politics as well as the appeal or pretension to redistribute resources among the masses. Thus, the question arises as to whether these components are only specific to some forces and leaders in the post-Revolutionary Iran, or more or less visible among all leaders and forces, regardless of the obvious differences in their political and ideological tendencies.
According to Dorraj (1990), Islamic populism is characterized by its religious character and  authoritarian, messianic, millenarian, and monistic nature coupled with revolutionary zest. Abrahamian (1993) refers to the non-religious and authoritarian populist nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Kianpour (2006) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as a result of political representation suffering from the representativeness, or more precisely, a result of the problematic of impossibility and costliness of representing different political identities. Using Dornbusch and Edwards’ model, Farzanegan (2009) examines Ahmadinejad’s populism and finds it to be in accordance with the model. Having analyzed Keyhan and Etemad-e Melli newspapers, Zibakalam et al. (2013) conclude that Keyhan, more readily than Etemad-e Melli, pays attention to the categories supporting the populist discourse. For Farati (2013), populism originates from liberalism. Abdi (2014) considers populism to be a response to the short-term demands of people and a result of the contextual conditions and the increase in oil prices in Iran. Sarzaim (2016) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as the main reason for the lack of development during his presidency. Darvishpour (2022) considers the theory of contradictions of the populist revolution—which is based on critical theory, text analysis, discourse analysis, and post-structuralism—a useful theory in the evaluation of the Islamic Revolution.

The Purpose of Research:

Attempting to investigate populism and politics in Iran during the post-Revolutionary years of 1989–2017, this research tries to show the common and distinctive features the political discourses, produced by various forces and in different periods, as manifested in the presidential speeches.

The technique of documentation and the qualitative content analysis were used for data collection and data analysis, respectively. For the purpose of content analysis, several stages were followed: determining the content, determining the categories, determining the unit of analysis, coding, and conducting an analysis. The study considered the paragraph as the unit of analysis. The statistical population of the research consisted of all the speeches addressed by the presidents during their presidency. The sample population was also determined on the basis of systematic classification.

Concerning the political dimension of populism, 18, 16, 36, and 26 codes were identified in the speeches addressed by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinjad, and Rouhani, respectively.  The most frequent code in Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speech was related to militancy while participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, and denial of the institutional mechanism were observed as having the equal weight in coding. Anti-elitism is the only component absent from Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speeches. Concerning Khatami’s speeches, the political dimension of populism was mostly represented in the following components: participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, and militancy. Anti-elitism and denial of the institutional mechanism were not observed in Khatami’s speeches. Militancy and simplicity and avoidance of political complications were, respectively, found to be the most and least frequent components in Khatami’s political populism. The political dimension of populism in Ahmadinejad’s speeches encompassed all the components, with militancy being the most frequent followed by simplicity and avoidance of political complications, denial of the institutional mechanism, and consideration of himself as the real representative of people. Rouhani also represented all these components, except anti-elitism. In the dimension of cultural populism, all the presidents used the component of admiration for national and religious values and heritage. All the components of the economic dimension were most frequently used by Ahmadinejad, except the component of distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures. After Ahmadinejad, Rouhani frequently represented the economic dimension, but neither distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures nor emphasis on income redistribution were found in Rouhani speeches. Among the five components of the economic dimension, Khatami and Hashemi-Rafsanjani only referred to the component of  fault-finding in the economic status quo. Concerning the social dimension of populism, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani used all the relevant components, yet Khatami was found to have put no emphasis on the integration of society but on social pluralism.

Owing to the nature of the Islamic Revolution that involved the masses in the political and social arenas, the politicians who came later to the scene had no choice but to tend towards the masses— though with varying degrees of intensity. The political society in Iran has experienced a kind of misunderstanding about populism for several years. This research worked well to show the inaccuracy of the dominant narrative in Iran, proving that populism is a spatiotemporal entity that differs from one society to another. Political leaders in Iran consider people wise and virtuous, and express it by various articulations. Yet the otherness figures differently among the presidents, depending on the circumstances of the time. Framing his articulations within the framework of Islam, Hashemi-Rafsanjani considered the right of the masses from the economic perspective by referring to the component of not encroaching on their rights. The otherness is depicted to be the hypocrites, the Pahlavi regime, and the administration of Mir Hossein Mousavi inside Iran, and the evil non-Islamic states outside the country. People were important to Hashemi-Rafsanjani in an unorganized way, and he considered the participation of the masses as a symbol of real democracy, thus showing little faith in institutions

Gaining power by the Justice and Development Party with a democratic and pragmatic face was a new voice in Turkey's political environment which managed to reflect and represent the real issues of the society and be popular with the public. However, since 2013, the ruling Justice and Development Party has transformed from a popular quasi-democratic political party to an exclusionary populist party; In a way that most theorists of populism, many analysts of Turkish issues, as well as writers of prominent news media such as Guardian, Bloomberg, New York Times and Foreign Policy, called Erdogan and his party "populist". Accordingly, the current research, by using the theoretical framework of populism, especially the ideas of people like Kurt Wieland, Robert Barr, Kenneth Roberts, and Pappas, in the form of "populism as a political strategy", tries to answer this main question that what the causes of Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party's tendency towards populism were in the last decade; And how did Erdoğan utilize populism to achieve his desired goals? The findings show that, in the last decade, relying on populist tools and positions such as the foreign status of political actors, anti-establishment attraction, personal ties, unorganized mobilization, etc., Erdogan has artistically used populism as a "political project to build and maintain power" for himself and his party. The research approach is political sociology, qualitative research method, causal explanation type and data collection method, library, and also using virtual resources.

AbstractVarious analyzes of the growth of so-called new nationalism in Europe have been presented. Major analyzes focus on the consequences of inequality for political economy, globalization, European integration, and the issue of immigrants. According to this study, the emergence of the new nationalism to the historical roots, cultural heritage, and identity of EU countries as a fundamental variable in neo-nationalism in many analyzes has been neglected.This research addresses the various factors that led to the emergence of the new nationalist ideology in the European Union. The hypothesis of this article tries to conceive economic crises, migration, and the social-economic gaps by globalization and highlighting the identity interests and historical-cultural heritage of social forces which give rise to a new nationalism among the EU countries and its representation in the face of unionism.This also provides opportunities and consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran that necessitate appropriate policy in this area. Explaining the new nationalism and then explaining the reasons for the emergence of the nationalism idea in the European Union led to the main scientific method to this research.

Currently, the Sadr movement is considered the most important and influential political-social movement in Iraq, and the leader of this movement; Moqtada Sadr has a prominent position among Iraqi politicians. The Sadr movement, which is rooted in the school of thought and practice of Ayatollah Martyr Seyyed Mohammad Sadr, in the years after 2003, gradually became one of the most important political movements in Iraq, and its young leader was able to turn the significant social capital of this movement into a great political capital. So much so that in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2018 and 2021, Sadr's movement became the axis of government formation in Iraq by winning the most parliamentary seats. After holding early Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2021, while it was thought that the new Iraqi government would soon be formed and the political process would be completed due to the almost decisive victory of the Sadr movement and the acquisition of 73 seats by this movement, the process of forming a government faces serious obstacles. faced, and there is still no clear perspective for a lasting solution to Iraq's political deadlock and differences. This article, considering the premise that Sadr's movement and its leader are one of the main and most important factors in the emergence of the current situation, has chosen as its goal to examine Sadr's actions in recent developments. The findings of the article show that Moqtada Sadr's actions follow the pattern of populist actions and Moqtada Sadr tries to manage the political-social atmosphere of Iraq for his own benefit by adopting populist approaches in the fields of ideology, discourse and political action.

Modern Democracy has been facing various crises historically. The current crisis is rooted in a dual origin. On the one hand, orientation to shape a hidden quasi-oligarchic state and, on the other hand, the eternal specter of populism. Where this dilemma originates from and what effects do both have on democratic order? to respond to this central question, the paper hypothesizes that the origin of the dilemma traces back to reductionist conceptions on two dimensions of modern democracy; that is, on the one side, an elitism inherent to liberal-capitalist (more especially, neo-liberal) structures that makes democratic policy-making dependent on the requirements of the capitalist system. On the other side, an implicit populist potentiality of democratic structure weakens the rule of law due to resorting to ‘ordinary people’. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of comparative analysis, as a theoretical framework, of approaches to defining democratic legitimacy; i.e. philosophical (normative) and sociological (descriptive). The research is conducted in an analytical–descriptive method and library-based data gathering. In conclusion, overcoming the crisis of modern democracy entails strengthening the participatory quality of democracy to make an equilibrium between the majority and the minority. Participatory democracy seems the structure in which normative and descriptive conceptions of legitimacy can overlap.

Far-right or radical right political parties are on the rise across Europe. The popularity of these parties can be attributed to the socio-economic issues and the increased social discontent. The rise of these parties in Europe has manifested itself in various areas, posing fundamental challenges to the maintenance of peace and stability in this continent. Far right was already identified as the National Front in France, the heart of Western Europe. Its discourse is very popular in France because of the European debt crisis, the large number of asylum seekers in this country, and the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. This study aimed to identify the features of the far right and why these extremist ideologies have been increasingly posing a serious challenge to peace and stability in France. Accordingly, the main research question is: "How will the rise of the far right affect the political climate of France?" A descriptive-analytical research method was used in this study, and the required data were collected by using the desk method and analyzing the documents, consultative and interpretive views, books, articles, doctrines, and regulations.  Findings suggest that strengthening the role and position of the far right in the future political and decision-making system of France could mean this country's distancing from the EU, its independence from other international organizations, and the undermined integration process in the EU.

The resurgence of far-right discourse is one of the most important challenges facing European countries today. The aim of the present article is to study the impact of the resurgence of right-wing discourse on the social life of European Muslims. The main question of the article is that “What challenges can the resurgence of far-right discourse in Europe pose to Muslims in Europe?”(Issue) In response to this question, the hypothesis is that “the resurgence of far-right discourse by articulating the central sign of racial nationalism and xenophobia towards Muslims provides the grounds for the securitization of Islam and the restriction of the political and social rights of European Muslims.” In this article, the qualitative method (descriptive-analytical), especially the analytical method of discourse has been used.(Method) The method of data collection has been library and the use of specialized magazines and reputable Internet sites. The main finding of the study is that the resurgence of far-right parties, especially in the last decade, has led to the spread of conflict and the intensification of restricting Muslims from their social rights in Europe. These conditions can deepen religious solidarity, awaken Muslims and stimulate their sense of identity in the face of unequal social structure.(findings)

The present study seeks to investigate the causes and factors of the growth of nationalist populism in some Western countries, including the United States. The present article claims that Western modernity and the widespread phenomenon of globalization in various economic, cultural, security, and political fields as a prominent feature and the prevailing current of this century, which has brought with it conflicts that are one of the results. Or the products of these conflicts have been the emergence of populism in the politics of governments and the rise of far-right populist parties in Europe and populist currents in the United States. The findings of this study show that the growth of populism along with other factors, mainly due to the consequences of globalization (globalization) such as economic crisis, growth of xenophobia in the form of anti-immigration policies and identity crisis and dissatisfaction, social collapse, fear and anxiety And the crisis of identity and the failure and non-implementation of the goals of the phenomenon of globalization. Qualitative research method, causal explanation and data collection method, library and also the use of resources, while re-reading the theoretical concepts of populism, and expresses its characteristics and tries to explain the grounds for its growth and formation. To enlighten these countries to some extent.

Although violence based on religious teachings, which is typically based on mere words, is not entirely new and has a long history in religions, but what we see today as violent fundamentalism with all its features is new, is less unprecedented in the history of religions and sects. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism in this article is a reading of Islam that has not existed in any of the past historical periods except the present age; and its hallmark is violence. Islamic fundamentalism is a reading of Islam that has not existed in any of the past historical periods except the present age. Therefore, finding a way out of this religious reading requires that we first understand the logic of its emergence and reproduction. Therefore, in this article, we sought the logic of the emergence and reproduction of Islamic fundamentalism and finding a way out of it. Achieving it also requires mastering how it emerges and reproduces. In this regard, in the present descriptive-analytical article, we used the ideas of Alireza Shojaeezand, Mostafa Malekian and Sara Shariati in this field. On this basis, we found the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the contemporary tension between Islamic collectivist ideology and individualistic and globalized liberal ideology. Also, the adoption of a populist mechanism is the basis of its reproduction. Therefore, we believe that strengthening civil society is a sufficient condition for overcoming Islamic Fundamentalism.

With collapse of the bipolar system and the end of the cold War, the Central and Eastern European countries who were newly abandoned from the communist system tried to join European Structure. The Counties of Vise grad joined the European Union in the first wave of expansion of the European Union in 2004. The global financial crisis 2008 had a profound impact in the economic situation of the people Europe and the reform process in the east of continent faced slowness. Flood of immigrants to Europe affected by Syria Crisis surprised, and central European countries and the nationalist and extremist right parties have strongly resisted. the Brexit and subsequently, the victory of Donald Trump in American`s elections in 2016 has significantly influenced the victory of populism parties in decision-marking centers in Eastern Europe.The main question of this research is how populism phenomenon spread among in vise grad group countries? the research method gathering information through library and research findings shows that populism phenomenon not only split Europe, but also intensified the discourse of Xenophobia and Islamophobia in this region.