presidential system

The functioning of the parliament in democratic governments on the one hand and the relationship between the executive and legislative powers in this system on the other hand plays a prominent role and it also raises the merit of responsiveness of the bureaucratic system to elected political representatives andparliamentarians. The main question of the article is that according to the status effectiveness of the islamic council in the sixth and seventh periods, which of the presidential and parliamentary models was iran,s political system close to? In this reseach work, three variables of legislative function, supervisory function, function of the parliament and relationship of the parliament with other political institutions have been studied and analyzed using archived information and qualitative research method. The result suggests that the role and influence of the islamic council as an independent authority has decreased and iran,s political system is close to the presidential system, which has been an increasing trend.

Article 87 of the 1358 Constitution made the prime minister responsible for forming the Council of Ministers and obtaining a vote of confidence from parliament. After the approval of Article 1 of “the law on adding articles to the code of procedure of the parliament about requesting the vote of confidence and the manner of holding it” in 1363/ 5/9, the prime minister was obliged to request a vote of confidence from the parliament both at the beginning of each term of the parliament and in the conditions stipulated in Article 87, after the formation and introduction of the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Council of Ministers was formed based on political will of parliamentary majority. This indicates that the vote of confidence to the ministers follows the parliamentary logic of the political system. After 1368 revision of the Constitution, president made responsible to obtain a vote of confidence for the Council of Ministers after being formed. By stating that “with the change of the parliament new vote of confidence will not be necessary” in Article 133 and removing the post of prime minister, the political system approaches the presidential system. The practical procedure of vote of confidence, after the revision of the Constitution, also confirms the adherence to the logic of the presidential system.

Political transition which rooted in ancient culture is a concept that has become very important in the age of modernity. The transition of political systems in the form of democracy is justifiable and its perpetrators also benefit from the political experiences of developed civilizations. The transition is important in saving a society that has not functioned properly from the ruling political system. The theory of the transition from a presidential to a parliamentary political system has also raised the issue. In fact, describing transition in the Iranian political system requires understanding the desired inefficiency of a system against a system that has not yet been fully experienced in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, in this study, we examined the transition from the presidential system to the parliamentary system in order to explain the possibility of this by analyzing the political theories of the transition and measuring the theory of the transition to parliamentarism. Our main issue has been how to experience the transition from the current political system of Iran to parliamentarism. The result is based on the loss of power from individuals and the division of power between political groups and parties, which only in this case a transition is possible. The research method is descriptive-analytical.

One of the most important fundamental issues in the policy sphere is the discussion of the organization of the state and the regulation of the internal power relations of the state, in which the type of political system as well as the principle of separation of powers is very influential. Because according to the type of political system and the acceptance of one type of separation of powers, different ways of regulating the ruling powers such as the presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential-semi-parliamentary system are raised, in which each country, the political system And they have designed a specific structure. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the system of the Ummah and Imamate as a general framework for the realization of divine sovereignty and religious democracy and the level of regulation of the relations of power, the semi-presidential semi-parliamentary system has been determined. The main theme of this research is the analysis and political assessment of the change in the way the power relations are regulated within the framework of the Ummah Imamate system and the evaluation of the resulting effects. This paper uses the descriptive-analytical method to find the answer to the question of how the change in power relations, especially the executive branch, is evaluated and what works on it? The main findings of this research are that in changing the form of executive power assuming that there are no restrictions on the religious foundations except the necessity of maintaining the system of the Ummah and Imamate, there are, from a political point of view, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, The possibility of changing the form of the executive branch, especially the removal of the post of presidency, faces fundamental constraints, as the main symbol of the republican system is the president.

From the time that it took political authority in Turkey, the AKP constantly raised the issue of changing Turkey's political system from the parliamentary to the presidential system. Under Erdogan's leadership, after the coup in April 15, 2016, the party was able to reach its goal thanks to the political support of parties and social accompaniment through 2017's referendum. The purpose of this article is to examine the President's powers as the head of state and the relationship between the president and the legislative and judiciary forces as well as to criticize and evaluate these changes. In this regard, it has been dealt with the changes in the constitutional material, specifically those that are related to the executive body, through a comparative study comparing the new and previous constitution in order to examine the types of political regimes based on the key concept of the separation theory, and explain the Legal and political consequences. The present paper seeks to find out how much the President's powers in the new constitution have changed in Turkey and to which model of political systems the Turkish political system has been approached? The claim of this article is that with the increase of the powers of the Turkish presidential powers, the Turkish system is approaching the presidential system. The findings of this paper, which have been found analytically and descriptively through a documentary method, show that the constitutional changes increase the powers and scope of the president's authority. This may destabilize the border of the separation of powers in Turkey's new political system. The documents of this claim show the increase in mutual eligibility of the President in dissolving the parliament and holding early elections, holding the parliamentary and presidential elections simultaneously, the extension of the term of parliamentary and presidency periods, the president's ability to be the secretary-general of the party during the presidential period, the authority to select the majority of the members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, as well as the Constitutional Court and the election of senior government officials without parliamentary approval, and the tightening the process of monitoring the ministers.

The results of Turkish general and presidential parliamentary elections demonstrated that we are not witnessing special changes comparing to previous elections and Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party is still the most popular and influential party in Turkey's society. Still, the votes to the aforementioned party have decreased comparing to the last election. Also, analysis of the results of the opponent parties, especially those of the Republican People's Party, points to the fact that in the mid-term, the replacement of the dominant party and passing of the power is highly unlikely. Bahçeli's National Movement Party supported Erdoğan and Justice and Development Party during this election; their coalition put the opposition in a much more difficult situation, especially because Meral Akşener, the Good Party's leader, refused to accept and introduce Abdullah Gül as the common candidate of the opponent parties. The results related to Kurds suggest that in the Kurdish regions of South and East South, the main competition is between the two poles supporting Erdoğan and Öcalan, and other parties have very few votes in these regions. The People's Democratic Party which is a satellite party of Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) could get acceptable results despite difficult situation and many limitations. Evidence suggests that in Turkey's macro political picture and in the new presidential system, Erdoğan can have the opportunity to take actions in order to achieve the "2023 Vision" goals; however, he should also take some problems and obstacles of the way into consideration.

One of the main functions of the constitutions is to organize political power within the various branches of government. They do this according to the different interpretations of the doctrine of the separation of powers which in turn create different system of governments i.e. parliamentary, presidential and hybrid systems. Yet, each of those systems has its own characteristics in a given county. One might ask regarding these differences and implications whether one type of government can be preferred to another. Is it the case that one type of government be better than another one? Main argument of the present paper is that none of them might be preferred to another one regardless of the expectations of their designers and the relative success of them to realization of the those aims and expectations.

Despite the variation in political systems (parliamentary, presidential...), the executive branch is regarded to be in charge of foreign policy. The IRI Constitution has failed to draw a clear line between the limits of authority and the jurisdictions of legislature and executive in respect to decision-making and law-making in the realm of foreign policy, and led to often contradictory interpretations, although it is committed to the principle of Separation of Powers. This article aims to illustrate some of the causes for this constitutional ambiguity. Relying on the interpretation of some articles, it also emphasizes the need for a new constitutional interpretation concerning foreign policy which is based on the principle of efficiency and consists in features such as decrease in the number of institutions responsible for foreign policy and their concentrations in executive on the one hand, and parliamentary control over executive using legal instruments like hearing and inquiry on the other.