جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « آگاهی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

An important philosophical question concerning artificial or machine intelligence is whether it is essentially possible to develop AI that achieves human-level intelligence, or maybe even beyond? In other words, is it possible for AI to attain every aspect of natural human intelligence (or even higher) during its development? Alan Turing, a pioneer of AI, in response to the question "Can machines think?" believes that if a machine can pass the test of answering a human interrogator's questions in such a way that the interrogator is deceived and confuses it with a human, it should be concluded that the machine is thinking (at a human level). But will passing the Turing test really mean that AI has reached the same level of intelligence as human intelligence? Will the realization of fully human-like responsiveness mean that the machine has (independently) acquired all the mental, epistemic, and inferential abilities that human intelligence has? Regardless of Turing's point and belief, is it essentially possible for a machine, as a purely physical object, to achieve true human-level intelligence? What conditions should artificial machine intelligence meet in order to be genuine intelligence? For this purpose, should it also be able to perform complex inferences like "abduction", commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE)? If so, can a machine essentially afford to perform non-formal inferences such as IBE? In this article, we try to address such philosophical questions regarding artificial intelligence.

It is reasoned that mind-body is a modern issue and is not ever discussed in ancient Greek philosophy or middle Ages. The current study has reviewed these reasoning and concluded that typical categorizations of mind-body issue must be divided into general and specific. Separating the issue of mind-body from the problem of mind-body underlines the multiplicity of issues. Proofs are, then, submitted that axial issue in Sadraic psychology is soul-body rather than mind-body. Thus, the solutions and ideas from the earlier cannot be generalized into the latter. Despite that, it is possible to compare mind-body issue against Sadraic philosophy and use its advantages to solve the issue. Such a comparison stands in the need of some modification in the underpinnings or the conclusions of Sadraic philosophical psychology. These findings are meta-philosophical and offer suggestions for methodology and content of Sadraic psychology.

Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the distinction of practice from other acts pertains to its “intentional” nature. In his view, “intention” includes the free will accompanied with the second level of consciousness acting based on the purpose of practice. Therefore, not each voluntary act is called “practice”; rather, practice is a voluntary act that emerges along with the second level consciousness based on the purpose of act. The results of this study, which was conducted following a descriptive-analytic method and through the analysis of conceptual concomitants of practice, indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s definition is not mutually exclusive. This is because, based on the example of “self-conscious” robot, one can assume an agent that enjoys free will and consciousness but its act is not intentional. Therefore, to complete the definition of practice, in addition to free will and consciousness, one needs a third element or the same “choice”. Mullā Ṣadrā does not officially recognize “choice” as the third element of practice and reduces it to the same consciousness and the free will. Nevertheless, the present study demonstrates that he is wrong, and “choice” in the sense of “the freedom to use the free will” must be added to the definition of practice. This study mainly aims to examine the quiddative structure of “practice” in the Transcendent Philosophy and distinguish “practice” from other similar affairs.

The present article, while emphasizing the field and time leading to the emergence of analytical and continental philosophy, tries to study the main and fundamental origins of their emergence in Kant’s philosophy and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of both, to analyze the positive and efficient and the negative aspects of Kant’s philosophical heritage. To reach this purpose, at first some characteristics and differences of the two approaches are described. Then after presenting necessary introductions, through Kant’s general and strong philosophy, we get the two general outputs of analytic and continental approaches. In this way we develop from Kant’s episteme-sophia controversy to his nomen-phenomen dualism to get closer to his uninvited philosophy, i.e., nihilism so as to put into test the analytic-continental controversy. Finally, we try to present some conjectures regarding the required accompaniment of both.

Intuition as a method serves as the foundation of many philosophical arguments in Islamic philosophical psychology and consciousness. Although consciousness and perception are among the simplest and most evident phenomena in our world, they have given rise to the most complicated problems in philosophy. Given their intellectual systems, various philosophical schools of thought have offered different replies to the question of the nature of consciousness and perception. Some arguments draw on sensory data and empirical knowledge to answer the question, and others deploy theoretical and intellectual principles as grounds of their arguments. Furthermore, there are philosophers who utilize intuitive findings to account for consciousness and perception. While the use of intuitive data is ubiquitous among Muslim intellectuals, no formulation has been presented about the nature of intuition as a method in psychological arguments. In this research, the author deal with the following question: how intuition is used in different Islamic philosophical systems, particularly in the three pivotal schools of thought: Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendent philosophies and what is its effectiveness as well.. It seems that the intuitive method is an effective systematic method for solving the problems pertaining to consciousness and perception.

This article aims to review and critique Kant's philosophy of mind, its impact on contemporary philosophy of mind, also its impact and relation to functionalism. Kant's influence on philosophy is based on the answers and methods he uses to explain the mechanism of human knowledge. The Copernican revolution of Kant refers to the change in epistemological direction of the object to the subject, for the correct understanding of the object. This approach has had important effects on contemporary philosophy of mind. Now our goal is to explore some of these effects.

Our study method in this article is evaluate these effects in the field of contemporary philosophy of mind and especially, contemporary functionalism.

Kant attempts to explain the mechanism of human cognition by considering the mind as a structured thing that has some cognitive faculties, including the faculties of sense, understanding, and reason. In brief, the effects of such a mechanism in the contemporary philosophy of mind can be expressed in the following cases: (1) The need for a necessary structure of thought and experience. (2) The relationship between certain forms of consciousness and self-consciousness; and (3) excluding the Cartesian self. (4)The separation between sense and understanding is considered as the rise of the subjective matter from a physical foundation, and it indicates the hard problem of consciousness, that is, experience or phenomenal consciousness.

It is not possible to see the influence of Kant's philosophy of mind on the contemporary philosophy of mind as answers or even solutions, but as a way of thinking about problems. Kant's solutions have two characteristics, disregarding them will lead to a misunderstanding of his philosophy. First, Kant has expressed his philosophy of mind in a transcendental form. Taking him out of his vital form certainly leaves some of the most significant aspects of his philosophy behind. Secondly, his approaches are presented in a historical context. For instance, we should consider Kant's statement on the structures of the mind to be a metaphysical mechanism, and his perspective on causation is basically meaningful in a historical context. Admittedly, many of the problems raised in contemporary philosophy were discussed in Kant's philosophy, but the progress and transformation that occurs in these concepts cannot be attributed to Kant. The functionalist interpretation of Kant is possible, but it is in conflict with the most crucial teachings of Kant, which are architecture and the transcendental method. Such a reading excludes many aspects of an individual's mental life, and is based on a purely formal similarity.

This article tries to examine modern humanism and the position of the concept of the subject from Nietzsche's critical point of view, considering the importance and position of instinct compared to consciousness. Man as the subject and subject of knowledge has a privileged position in modern metaphysics, and basically, modernity has an inseparable link with the subject and consciousness. Nietzsche's criticism of the subjective concept of modern man and the revival of the elemental instinct in the drawing of the human face is considered a fundamental criticism of modernity. In this research, firstly, the relationship between instinct and consciousness is examined in the theoretical foundations, focusing on the thought of Rousseau and Schopenhauer, and then the relationship between instinct and moral values, as well as the desire for truth in Nietzsche's view, is investigated. Nietzsche believes that the reduction of man to consciousness (the knowing subject) requires ignoring other dimensions of human existence, such as physical, instinctive, emotional, and historical dimensions, and as a result, he considers the image of modern man as a subject to be an incomplete form of man, which, despite the cognitive and moral centrality in modern metaphysics, has ignored important aspects of human being and natural dimensions that can lead to his prosperity. This article finally deals with the place of body and instinct as natural dimensions of human existence and their priority over mind and subjective consciousness in Nietzsche's anthropology.

In the history of philosophy, the discussion of ontology and how existence is revealed to humans has been one of the most important and fundamental philosophical topics, but in the new period, it is forgotten and the main focus of philosophy turns from ontology to epistemology. The basic question of this article is what is Husserl’s concept of existence, who is the founder of phenomenology in the contemporary period which is the period of neglect of existence? Is it possible to find a trace of ontology and existence in the discussions of phenomenology, whose slogan is "towards the things themselves" and which deals with the constitution of the world in consciousness? This article achieves these findings with the analytical-descriptive method, that no direct discussion of existence and ontology can be found in Husserl's works. However, in his analyses, for example, from two natural and phenomenological attitudes, or in the discussions of intentional objects and the discussion of existence in a certain context-belief, as well as in the epoche, we can understand his implicit perception of existence. The result of the important discussion of epoche is the affirmation of pure Ego and absolute consciousness, and this consciousness is considered as absolute existence. For Husserl, existence acquires meaning through the channel of consciousness. Consciousness does not need anything to exist. Therefore, only consciousness can reveal the existence of the world to us. Finally, the world exists as far as it enters the realm of consciousnessworld to us. Finally, the world exists as far as it enters the realm of consciousness.

Social trust as one of the indicators of social capital is one of the new concepts that has been proposed today in the economic and social studies of developed societies. Increasing the level of trust as a social capital is very important in shaping a moral environment in society. Therefore, the present study was formed with the aim of evaluating the role of social capital in the formation of a moral environment with emphasis on students' trust and awareness of executive officials.                 

The present study was applied in terms of purpose and descriptive-analytical in terms of method. The statistical population of the study was the students of Golestan Azad University, of which 384 people were randomly selected as a sample. The analysis tool was a researcher-made questionnaire. Data were analyzed using non-parametric Chi-Square test and SPSS software.

The results of Chi-square test showed that students with a coefficient of 38.26% have a low level of trust in executive officials. Also, students with high coefficients of 79.74, 77.41, 64.51 and 76.35%, respectively, have high public and social awareness, moderate economic awareness and high political awareness.

Creating a favorable moral environment creates high levels of trust among different segments of society. Also, an ethical society considers awareness as a virtue and strives to increase the awareness of its citizens. With increasing levels of trust and awareness, social capital is strengthened and civil society and civic life are established.

All beings in the world according to Ṣadr al Muta'allihīn, benefit from awareness (consciousness) in accordance with their existential order. Therefore, material bodies such as elements, inanimate bodies and vegetable, which are generally considered to be devoid of consciousness even have knowledge and awareness in general usage (custom). Ṣadrā has tried by two different approaches to justify the diffusion of the knowledge to material objects philosophically. He has attributed knowledge to objects with the same material identity by proving the absolute objectivity of existence with knowledge in the first way, and he considered knowledge to be proved for them through the union of objects by intellectual principles (masters of species) in the second way. The main issue in this article is whether the same results can be obtained from these two approaches or not. And which of these two ways is stronger and superior than the other? Both approaches have been studied by analytical and comparative method in this article and it has been firstly proved that the results of these two approaches are not the same, and the awareness that is proved for material objects according to the first approach is different from the knowledge that is proved according to the second approach, secondly, the second approach is stronger and superior for some reason.

The approach of Descartes and his subsequent philosophical tradition to consciousness did have epistemological consequences. The distinction between subject and object, and the question of how the mind and body relate, the entanglement of the mind in its ideas that led to the problem of “egocentric predicament,” the problem of the identity of the perceptual object, skepticism, and the issue of valuation regarding the gap between the mind and the object are some consequences of this approach. Consequently, alternative approaches have been proposed by philosophers to avoid such consequences. Among these approaches is phenomenology with the narratives of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with its intentionality, Heidegger’s doctrine of “being-in-the-world” and Merleau-Ponty’s idea of conscious bodies tried to explain the mechanism and characteristics of consciousness. The present article seeks to examine the problems of the Cartesian-European epistemological system, to show how to deal with these problems, and finally to analyze and critique the characteristics of each approach to see whether these alternative approaches could have managed to solve these problems or not.

Explaining the nature of mental phenomena, particularly consciousness, is among the most important issues in the philosophy of mind and contemporary anthropology. Western and Islamic philosophers have regularly commented on this issue but, due to the recent development in cognitive sciences including neurology and artificial intelligence, the analysis of “consciousness” is largely disputed. Searle is a contemporary analytical philosopher who, in his own opinion, has presented an innovative approach for solving the issue of “consciousness” and its relation with brain and nervous system. According to him, the equality of consciousness and physical affairs is denied and Cartesian dualism is avoided. Issues such as consciousness are characteristics of brain cortex and effect of brains’ internal processes. In Searle’s view, causality of brain’s internal parts and characteristics of its cortex can solve the challenges associated with the relationship between body and mind. The present research has adopted an analytical-critical method to explain Searle’s view and analyze it critically. It was revealed that, on one side Searle’s analysis of the causality of intercellular parts is violated and on the other, realization of consciousness in the brain is impossible. Searle also fails to provide robust evidences on his claims.

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the barriers to intellectual education on Hegel's point of view. The present research was qualitative research and the research method used was qualitative content analysis. The results of this study showed that the individual barriers to rational education from Hegel's point of view are: self-centered, fear, abstraction, negative skepticism, austerity and social barriers to rational education are: utilitarianism, collectivism, hypocrisy and fear of judgment. Negative. According to Hegel, obstacles to intellectual education begin when a person, due to lack of personal independence, lack of free will and lack of reciprocal and equal relationship with another, can not act as an independent intellectual being or when actuality It should not act as an independent rational being, but as an object serving the interests and purposes of other people. However, Hegel considers the obstacles of rational training as other stages of raising awareness as a step towards the development and promotion of the individual's personality, because consciousness faces these limitations and the intellectual obstacles and suffering that it suffers in the meantime. Can be aware of his inadequacies, which leads him to put himself in front of himself as an object and by exploring himself, to re-measure his understanding of himself, to know what he is. And it overcomes its one-sidedness.

In his works, Kriegel criticizes a common viewpoint in the philosophy of mind upon which there is no direct relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. He knows the problem of this view in that its proponents have not been able to make distinction between different kinds of self-consciousness. Kriegel, after making distinction between four different kinds of self-consciousness, refers to this point that there is a kind of self-consciousness which is prior to every other kind of self-consciousness. This kind of self-consciousness, called intransitive state self-consciousness, accompanies all other kinds of consciousness. Indeed, intransitive state self- consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness that is implicitly along with a conscious mental state and it is the root of first-person view. Kriegel’s viewpoint has a long background in the history of western philosophy inasmuch as its roots can be traced back to Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Aristotle, conscious being attains self-consciousness through or implicitly with being conscious of something else. Avicenna criticizes this Aristotelian viewpoint in his works and along with dividing self-consciousness into two different kinds: self-awareness and awareness of awareness emphasizes this point that first kind of self-consciousness is the very essence of conscious being and is the same as its specific existence. Accordingly, it is not separated from the conscious being and it is not depended on the presence of other beings and being conscious of them. So, it is prior to every other kind of consciousness. This Avicenna’s criticism although is principally directed at Aristotle, it equally aims the Kriegel’s viewpoint.

In The Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nigel argues that naturalism has failed to provide a complete explanation of the universe. Main of Nigel's objections to naturalism are the issues that arise in explaining the mind through a naturalistic view. Naturalism has so far failed to provide a complete explanation that includes mental phenomena, especially the quality of consciousness. Nigel's proposition is that a more complete explanation of existence of all aspects such as consciousness can be given by taking a metaphysical view, similar to that which existed in Aristotle's teleology. In this article, it will be said that Aristotle's theory is not enough to solve this and the problem can be solved by taking Avicenna's teleology.

Nigel opposes the extremist view of explaining the universe as such a naturalist do. In The Mind and the Cosmos, Nigel presents his critique of naturalism from the point of view of mind-related issues, including consciousness, values, and cognition. The reason for the inability of naturalism to provide a complete explanation of the universe from Nigel's point of view is that it uses tools designed for quantitative measurements; when something like consciousness has a qualitative nature. Nigel's argument for the flaws of naturalism is as follows: 1- theory of naturalism necessarily needs to provide a comprehensive physical explanation of all the phenomena in the universe. 2- Consciousness is one of the phenomena of the universe. 3- Consciousness is a phenomenon that can’t be explained in the physical sciences. 4- Therefore, the theory of naturalism is not complete. Contrary to what naturalists think, complete explanation of universe must have order in matter from the beginning. Perhaps, Nigel thinks, in explaining consciousness as a part of universe, one can rely on ideas such as Aristotelian teleology which is related to the basic elements of the universe. Therefore, the end of the formation of the conscious man has been within matter from the beginning.

According to Aristotle, the end in natural affairs is something that has existed in an organism from the beginning. The apple tree has an end that is eternal. Such a view is inconsistent with the theory of evolution, which is of interest to scientists and Nigel. An important idea that Avicenna points out is that motion is raised in physics, and if we go to causality in metaphysics, go to existence. In the discussion of metaphysics, it is not like the physics of motion and change, but it means what exists or does not exist. The difference between the actual and the ultimate cause is a tool we can use to have complete explanation of the universe.

According to Aristotle, teleology is something that entered ontology because of its epistemological need, and therefore entered metaphysics from nature. But in his philosophical system, Avicenna discusses the end from a theological and metaphysical point of view and from there to physics. Therefore, with Avicenna's argument and his metaphysical approach, one can explain the emergence of consciousness in matter. He can believe on natural causes and evolution and hold teleological cause to explain the creation of consciousness from the ordered matter at the same time. In other words, the end intended in Avicenna's view can sum up with the natural history of the formation of species.

The very relevance of the disabled has been argued and martyred many times by Sadr al-Mutalahin, and it is accepted that the existence of the disabled in its essence needs a cause, and this need is due to the cause of the disabled, and it is not possible for the disabled to have existence or lack of independence. ; What is at stake is whether it is possible for the intellect to consider the nature of the disabled independently of its cause, in other words, whether or not the disabled can be referred to as the independent of the intellect; In this article, we have stated that the reference to the independence of the intellect to disabilities is not in conflict with being external in nature, and that Mr. Sadr al-Mutallahin's arguments for denying the intellectual independence of the disabled are not complete.

Perception of time is of an intellectual nature, and the human mind can easily divide it into seconds and minutes, for example, and measure it. However, when speaking of the truth of time, one is in fact faced with a complex and difficult mystery. The attempts at disambiguating this mystery has resulted in wide-spread disagreements among philosophers and thinkers so that some of them hold that time exists while some others deny its existence. Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, a contemporary Iranian thinker, conceives of time as an ontological entity. He has reanalyzed and reinterpreted the views of several thinkers regarding time and believes that everything in the world of being is manifested and emerges through the channel of human consciousness. He emphasizes that the relationship between Man and time is so strong that its rupture is meaningless. Dinani maintains that time has two dimensions: one is the material dimension, which is realized in the material world, and the other is the Ideal dimension, which is indeed perceived as a path towards the world of meaning. The latter, while being material, is of an Ideal nature. In his view, time in its material dimension is the same as the measure of motion, and time in the world of thought is identical with the form of human perception.

With his phenomenological method taken from the teachings of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus critiques the two paradigms of artificial intelligence, namely symbolism and connectionism. He then approves a trend from the third paradigm of AI, namely artificial life, with special conditions. This trend is known as "Heideggerian AI". After a brief review of Dreyfus’s critiques of the first two paradigms of artificial intelligence, this article examines his final opinion on the possibility of accepting Heideggerian AI. According to the author, the possibility of Heideggerian artificial intelligence based on Dreyfus' theories can be demonstrated in at least three ways. These three approaches are presented as follows: The first approach is presented using the Daniel Susser’s approach and is based on interactionism. The second solution is expressed by citing John Searle and distinguishing between strong and weak artificial intelligence; the third explanation demonstrates how this is possible based on the doctrine of co-instantiation, inter-consciousness, intelligence, and intelligent behavior.

In his book, From Bacteria to Bach, Daniel Dennett offers a special understanding of consciousness. According to Dennett, consciousness among other phenomena must be examined by physical sciences. To achieve this goal, Dennett tries to show that the formation of consciousness is the result of non-intelligent processes in the design of organisms. The most important non-intelligent design process is evolution by natural selection. In addition to biological evolution in the design of the brain, the design of human culture and language is also done in what Dennett calls “cultural evolution”. According to Dennett, consciousness is an illusion created by these design processes. In this article, we will first explain Dennett's views and arguments in his book then, his views on consciousness will be evaluated and criticized. The main point of this critique is to emphasize on the irreducible properties of consciousness to physical properties. It will also be noted that in Dennett's theory, cultural evolution cannot be occurred without the intervention of consciousness. Thus, it follows that in order to have a complete picture of the universe, the phenomena of consciousness cannot be removed as an illusion from the set of the entities of the universe, and that is still needs to be explained.