ابن رشد

Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi and Ibn Rushd are among those who have defended philosophy, and in this regard, in contrast to Ghazali and Shahrashtani, they have written the books Tahaft al-Tahaft and Masara al-Masara, and each of them in a special way, which is actually the basic difference of this Two philosophers come back in defense of philosophy, they have defended philosophy or philosopher. In his defense, Ibn Rushd completely rejects the positions of theologians and believes that theologians have not achieved certain knowledge. In fact, his defense of philosophy is the defense of Aristotle’s philosophy. But Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi did not strongly oppose the positions of the theologians and by substituting argument instead of argument, he helped enrich it. Unlike Ibn Rushd, Khwaja did not consider any particular philosopher in defending his philosophical positions, and even though Shahrashani considered Ibn Sina the most among philosophers in his criticisms, and his criticisms were aimed at Ibn Sina’s views in the books of healing, references, and annotations, with Attention to the nature of philosophy has defended it. Based on the rational method, he explains and presents his arguments by bringing conclusive proofs and philosophical rules and responds to the city’s problems.

For the purpose of criticizing the method chosen by the "mystics" in their theological inferences, Ibn Rushd attributes two claims to them: one- the mystics do not believe in theoretical methods and, two- the mystics believe in knowledge only by adorning the soul with lust, and induction from God. is formed He believes that the only proof of the Sufis for these claims is the appearance of verses from the Qur'an; But the appearances of the mentioned verses are not enough to prove their meaning. In order for a method to be justified and acceptable, it must simultaneously estimate the three components of "generality", "compatibility with the appearances of the Qur'an", and "compatibility with the framework of Aristotelian logic". According to him, the "mystic" method does not have any of the three mentioned components. We assume Ibn Rushd's understanding of mysticism and do not question its correctness. Then we argue that: (1) it is possible to provide a logical formulation of the claims attributed to the Sufis; A formulation that is compatible even with Ibn Rushd's methodological assumptions. (2) The appearance of disputed verses can equally prove both Sufis' claim and Ibn Rushd's claim. (3) Ibn Rushd is faced with semantic skepticism in his search for the Qur'an's verses, (4) In his semantics, Ibn Rushd chose interpretation based on the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy; This way of interpreting is neither general nor compatible with the appearances of the Qur'an; Therefore, the objection that Ibn Rushd makes to Sufis is self-defeating.

The discussion of existence and quiddity and the relationship between them is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy, and various portraits of this relationship can be shown in distinct natural, logical, and philosophical molds. The word “distinct” is a homonym in these cases and has a particular meaning in each one. However, these meanings have been frequently confused with each other in the history of philosophy. One of the innovations of Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction of existence from quiddity, which was only possible in the light of understanding the meaning of the truth of existence. Islamic philosophers, particularly Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, tried to perceive existence differently from Aristotle and not to reduce the question of being to the whatness of objects because of their epistemological distance from the Greek tradition in philosophy. Nevertheless, this approach has also had its own critics. One of the philosophers who criticized the distinction of quiddity from existence is Ibn Rushd. He accused Ibn Sīnā of misunderstanding and heresy regarding the relationship between existence, quiddity, and accidents of existence and believed that Ibn Sīnā had confused the different meanings of existence and the one and had fallen in the trap of sophistry due to homonymy. Ibn Rushd maintained that the origin of the formation of objects is substance and considered existence to be merely a concept that can be abstracted from existing objects. His main criticism of Ibn Sīnā concerning this problem was that viewing existence as an accident for quiddity leads to several misconceptions such as equating existence with substance. However, Ibn Rushd himself had in fact failed to understand the meaning of existence as an accident in Ibn Sīnā’s view. He believed that Ibn Sīnā had equated existence and accident in the sense of a quiddative affair with each other, while Ibn Sīnā’s intention of occurrence of existence to quiddity as an accident was its addition to quiddity.

IntroductionIn Islamic religious texts and Islamic thought, humans are often described as the noblest of creations or God’s successors, owing to their superior faculties of thought and will, capacity for gratitude, and their responsibility to uphold the Trust. These Quranic perspectives are evident in the works of Muslim philosophers, notably Averroes or Ibn Rushd. Averroes delves into the religious construction of humanity, employing terms such as "the noblest of creation," "God’s successor," "encompassing the universe," and "image of God." This article seeks to explore Averroes's approach to and explanation of this religious perspective, particularly focusing on the concept of human beings as the noblest of creation. Rather than delving into the nature of humanity itself, this inquiry revolves around the position of humans among all creatures and within the broader system of creation. Averroes's philosophy is analyzed to understand his conception of human beings within the religious realm, incorporating Quranic notions such as "God’s successor" and "the sensory world being dominated by humans." Notably, there has been a dearth of research on Averroes's religious approach to humanity, making this article a significant contribution to scholarship in the field.Research Approach or MethodThis research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology coupled with a critical approach.Discussion and ResultsThe question of humanity being the noblest of creation and other related religious notions can be examined from two perspectives. Firstly, from a teleological standpoint, wherein the entire creation and all beings are believed to have purposes, humanity's purpose is considered superior to that of other sensory creatures. This perspective posits that humanity holds the highest status among sensory creations due to possessing a rational soul, which grants it superiority over other sensory beings. This reason is based on God's invention of the universe. Secondly, humanity's elevated status can be understood through the lens of grace, wherein humanity is seen as encompassing and dominating the entirety of creation, with everything created ultimately for humanity. This "grace-based" reason underscores humanity's position as the noblest of creation.In terms of Averroes's own principles, the concept of humanity as the noblest of creation can be subjected to criticism, as it appears to contradict other statements made by him. For instance, in his work Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (Incoherence of the incoherence), Averroes suggests that it is impossible for a superior being to be created for an inferior one. Rather, it is the inferior being that is created for the superior one to attain perfection and eliminate its imperfections. According to this view, within the hierarchy of beings, celestial bodies hold a higher degree than humans, and humans serve as intermediaries between the intelligible and sensory realms, being closest to celestial bodies. Consequently, humans are deemed inferior to the heavens and celestial spheres. If it were posited that the universe is created for humanity, it would imply that a superior being is created for an inferior one, contradicting Averroes's own philosophical principles. Thus, according to the tenets of Averroes's philosophy, humanity cannot be regarded as the noblest of creation.ConclusionAverroes draws a distinction between the concepts of the "noblest of beings" and the "noblest of creation." According to his framework, God is the noblest of beings, being the most esteemed and perfect entity. However, among created beings, separate immaterial intellects hold the status of the noblest of creation, being pure actualities. Within the realm of sensory entities, humanity emerges as the noblest of beings and creation, primarily due to its possession of the rational soul, which serves as the purpose behind all forms of vegetative, animal, and human existence. From a religious standpoint, Averroes adheres to the idea of humanity as the noblest of creation, as evidenced by his reliance on transmitted religious texts. However, his philosophical perspective introduces the teleological aspect of the universe and humanity. He contends that nothing within the cosmos is futile or purposeless; rather, all beings have inherent purposes. Humanity, in particular, is characterized by its purposefulness, rationality, and essential progression towards perfection. In terms of the power of its rational soul and its capacity for reason, humanity stands as superior to all other beings.

This article aimed to analyze and compare the position of reason and transmission in the views of Averroes and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in Dinani’s opinion. It aimed to answer this major question: Have thinkers who believe in the superiority of reason, presented a single concept for it?

The information in this basic research was collected using library method and was processed in a descriptive-analytical way.

By raising the issue of the connection between religion and wisdom, Averroes raised what is called the relationship between philosophy and politics in Greek philosophers’ opinion.Nasir al-Din believed that the principles of reason prevail over transmission. In a great endeavor, he revived reason through transmission. He believed that the principles of religious beliefs were based on certainty, and certainty was realizedthrough rational reasoning and strong logical proof. He considered those religious beliefs as valid which were based on accurate reasoning and logical proof, otherwise, they were uncertain and invalid.

During the analysis of these two approaches based on Dinani’s opinion, it was found that when thinkers talked of reason, they expressed their opinions based on the requirements of their own time and the principles of their philosophical thinking.

As it is well-known in theology, performing miracles is the main way prophets used to show that they are honest in their claims and are the true messengers of God. In contrast to this famous opinion, some theologians have not considered miracles as proof of the truth of prophecy. Muslim thinkers such as Mullah Sadra, al-Ghazali, Averroes, ‘Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji, and Hiji Mulla Hadi Sabzavari believe that a true believer does not base his faith and certainty on seeing a miracle from a prophet, and the religion which is the result of a miracle is the religion of ordinary people. According to them, miracles cannot bring about intellectual certainty; moreover, it is difficult to distinguish them from magic. In this article, after considering the objections in Islamic intellectual tradition, some other critiques in terms of the role of miracles in proving prophecy are introduced: the reports of miracles are not adequately sequential and multiple; the miracles are exclusively reported by the believers; there is no practical criterion for identifying miracles; the claim that miracles are related to the dominant art and techniques of the prophet’s time cannot be proved, and miracles can be explained in a completely natural –and not supernatural– way. Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that miracles narrated in religions do not serve theological functions desired by theologians. However, the best way for knowing a true prophet is investigating his teachings and experiencing his spiritual aura.

A number of Orientalists and a number of Muslim thinkers believe that IbnRushd'sphilosophical and theological books did not enter the Islamic world, including Iran, and that Muslim philosophers and theologians did not pay attention to her books. Reasons such as the absence of Ibn Rushd's books or the lack of loyal students to him have also been presented for this belief. The present article both presents a report from the opposite point of view and shows that Muslim philosophers and theologians have always paid attention to Ibn Rushd's books.To achieve this goal, first Muslim thinkers are introduced who have paid attention to Ibn Rushd's philosophical and theological books in different centuries. In the next stage, I will criticize the reasons that say that Muslim philosophers and theologians did not pay attention to Ibn Rushd's philosophical and theological books. Finally, I show that if Ibn Rushd's books were sometimes ignored, it was because he was not considered an important philosopher.

Islamic thinkers do not think alike about understanding similar verses and the issue of the appearance and interiority of verses, and sometimes there are fundamental differences between them. Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd are in favor of using the method of interpretation in understanding similar verses and considering the way of escaping from the challenge and conflict of appearance and the inner self using the approach of interpretation. Ibn Rushd was famous for opposing Al-Ghazali and writing the book Tahaft Al-Tahaft in his critique of Tahaft al-Ghazali philosophers. Despite the criticisms, he is influenced by Al-Ghazali in some cases, and especially in the matter of interpretation. Al-Ghazali has two approaches encountering the problem of interpretation in two intellectual periods, in both of which he has been able to provide a new model by presenting a special approach in interpretation so that others can take a step in this direction and achieve a methodical understanding of religious texts. He has benefited a lot from this research model in understanding Ibn Rushd's text. According to the research findings, Ibn Rushd was influenced by Ghazali both in the nature of interpretation and in the reasoning and necessity of accepting it, as well as in the means of approaching interpretation. In the present descriptive-analytical study, the influence of Ibn Rushd from Ghazali on the issue of interpretation has been investigated.Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd are both advocates of using the method of interpretation in understanding the text. Although Ghazali is one of the Ash'arite theologians, in the matter of interpretation in both intellectual periods, he distances himself from thinkers such as Abul Hassan Ash'ari, Baqalani, and Jovini and accepts the methodical interpretation in understanding many verses of the Holy Qur'an. Methodology and adherence to a disciplined mechanism in interpretation are the characteristics of using this method by Al-Ghazali.Ibn Al-Rushd, like Al-Ghazali, does not see a conflict between the outward and inward meaning of the verses of the Holy Qur'an. Interpretation is a method that philosophers have the right to use in understanding the Holy Qur'an. Although this method raised serious objections to Al-Ghazali, it is influenced by Al-Ghazali’s interpretation. Ibn Al-Rushd mentions Al-Ghazali in many cases and considers Ghazali's method in this regard to be correct. He speaks about the nature of interpretation, the necessity of paying attention to it, its types and varieties, the division of the audience of revelation, and the permission and impermissibility of interpretation like Al-Ghazali.

Philosophical understanding of the concept of God, and theological understanding of the concept of God from the beginning has faced challenges and conflicts that may be the culmination of this conflict in the Tahafat of Ghazali Philosophers who excommunicated philosophers for believing in three issues. The purpose of this research is to re-read Ghazali's critiques of philosophers and to test his point of view, then to examine the strengths and weaknesses of Ibn Rushd's defense. Al-Ghazali has rightly realized that proving the existence of God is a difficult path by proving the step of the universe, however, believing in the temporal existence of the universe also has false consequences that are no less than the consequences of the teachings of philosophers. Regarding the knowledge of God in detail, Ibn Rushd's answer seems appropriate and can solve Ghazali's objection in this regard. Al-Ghazali differs from Ibn Rushd in that he cites the Qur'an to prove the knowledge of God in all its details, but the philosopher comments on something about which he cannot have a correct and accurate understanding. Regarding the physical resurrection, Ibn Rushd harmonizes the interpretation between philosophical truth and religious teaching, but with the disagreement of Ibn Rushd and Ghazali about the interpretation in the final judgment.

In the Islamic tradition, since it is impossible to promise the absolute superiority of reason over revelation, some considered reason to be merely a servant of religion, and some believed in the harmony of reason and revelation and non-conflict. Ibn Rushd's explanation in the treatise "Fima al-Maqal Fima bin al-Hikma wa Shari'ah min al-Utsal" is based on the premise that Shari'a is right and that which leads to better knowledge is obligatory, and while rational reflection is obligatory Shari'ah, then its product (philosophy) It is also right, and since right does not contradict right, then there is harmony between sharia and reason. In order to resolve possible conflicts, he also raises the issue of "interpretation" and suggests that we should allow religious propositions that are in apparent conflict with reason. In his view, the Shari'a, due to the differences in the talents of the people, has an appearance and an interior, and the inner understanding of the Qur'an owes to the rules that only a philosopher can use to interpret the Sharia. In this article, with reference to the above-mentioned treatise, first the evolution of the concept of intellect and its divisions is stated in order to reveal the meaning of philosophical intellect which Ibn Rushd seeks to prove its similarity with Sharia. Then, by stating the types of possible conflicts between reason and sharia and mentioning Ibn Rushd's answers, we come to the conclusion that while explaining the non-conflict between reason and revelation, he has also defended philosophy.

The present article reviews the status of "a religious epistemic" era of two Muslim philosophers Ibn Rushd (520-595 AH) and Mulla Sadra (979-1045) is based on two works, "al-maqāl season ..." Ibn Rushd and "The project has three principal "is Mulla Sadra.The aim of this study is to review each of these two philosophers pathological position adopted in the face of the Islamic society of his era recording processes have knowledge of such an account, the thinking part of the time.This research is descriptive - analytic.
In this article, we briefly discussed the socio-political situation era two philosophers, then examined the position of each of these two men in two books about the study, compared to the existing currents in contemporary religious thought.
And then, to compare the similarities and differences of thought and action in the field at the end of two philosophers to the conclusion that both thinkers, with different criteria intended to identify the "obstacles to the attainment of a religious epistemic" are. Through adoption of religious sciences such as jurisprudence, in a religious epistemic, Ibn Rushd damage from lack of rational methods of deduction is legitimate, and the adoption of the Hereafter in a religious epistemic, these terms of Mulla Sadra, lack of attention to "self-knowledge" and of the Apocalypse.

The question of the relation between reason and revelation existed in the most ancient periods of history of human thought. Like others, Muslim philosophers were also preoccupied with such a question. The present article studies Farabi and Averroes's opinions (about this issue) and compares them with each other. The comparison shows that they, having their own original ideas, were present at two critical moments; when Islamic philosophy was on the rise and when Islamic philosophy was revived (after it was attacked by al-Ghazzali). Both philosophers agree that reason and revelation are in harmony with each other, for they speak of the same reality with this minor difference that Averroes admits the apparent difference between them and attempts to resolve it through the science of interpretation whereas according to Farabi there is no difference at all between the two for the audience of philosophy is quite different from that of religion. Referring to the works of these two philosophers, this paper studies their most important ideas and compares them with each other.

It has been seen, in the writings of western scholars in history of philosophy, that Avicenna was considered as a commentator of Aristotle, and many of Muslim and Arab authors have accepted this view, more or less. But as we Know he denied it in the several positions of his works: (Introduction of Hekmat-olmashreqien,outobiography and Almobahe ssat,).
The questions about of Avicenna’s philosophy: Is the philosophy of Avicenna continuation of Aristotle one? If not, what are the differences between tow philosophy (philosophy of Avicenna and Aristotle one)? And what criteria for recognition of these differences is reasonable? The article with using the Averroes reading of Aristotle, answers these three questions, and tally the differences on narration of Averroes, who is the credible and important commentator of Aristotle- regardless of Averroes’s critic of Avicenna and the answers to him.
Thus, as shown in the article, Averroes believed the philosophy of Avicenna is different from Aristotle one in more than fifty stands and isn’t the continuation of it. The Averroes’s point of view can be considered from three aspects: the phrases that show the differents, the Fundamental principles, and the philosophical details (more than the fifty stands). The criterion is the same comparison Averroes has done, as listed.

One of the most important questions on Kant’s philosophy is the meaningfulness or meaningless of metaphysics. This article tries to answer two questions on Kant’s philosophy:1- Is the metaphysics, in the philosophy of Kant, meaningful or meaningless?
2- Is the meaningfulness or meaningless of metaphysics, for Kant, so important for contemporary philosophy?
In this paper, firstly, I argue that we can call Kant’s approach to Metaphysics not as a linguistic one (including; language metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of ordinary language or linguistics) but it is a transcendental epistemology. Secondly, in terms of problem-based, the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of metaphysics not only is not the basic problem of Kant, but his philosophy in a clear, distinct and independent manner, involves not such an issue. Thirdly, on the problem of the meaningfulness and meaninglessness of metaphysics, it could be accepted that Kant's philosophy seems to have the backgrounds, indications, and implications
For the second question, it could be distinguished two levels of meaningfulness or meaningless in Kant's philosophy: linguistic and nonlinguistic levels. The linguistic level are considered from two directions, i.e., the parts or components (words and metaphysical propositions) and the whole (as the science of metaphysics).
In the linguistic level, in one hand, I argue that the metaphysical words or propositions are not meaningless, but on the other hand, the proposition that “Metaphysics is a science” is a meaningless proposition. In the nonlinguistic level, metaphysics due to not reaching to the ends and goals seems meaninglessness as well.

Al-Ghazali and Averroe's controversy deals with whether or not religion is compatible with reason. Having illustrated the intellectual differences and similarities of al-Ghazali and Averroes, the author has examined the efforts of the two thinkers in welcoming or rejecting philosophy in the field of religion. He has also dealt with the grounds and reasons for that controversy between them. One of those reasons is the fact that the Mutazelite movement of modernism flourished in Avicenna's peripatetic philosophy. Avicenna mingled peripatetic philosophy with Platonic approach which as some structural ground paved the way for Averroes to oppose al-Ghazali. It can also be said that the socio-political circumstances of Averroe's time opposing philosophy occasioned that conflict. Accordingly, Averroes was being disturbed by the people of his time; therefore, by the criticism of al-Ghazali he tried to defend himself against the raised allegations. As a matter of fact, al-Ghazali and Averroe's controversy was occasioned both by a socio-political cause and religious doctrines in originated from the two structures of fideism and rationalism as two long-lasting opposing schools in the world of Islam.

Evaluating and considering of immateriality and immortality by three philosophers naming Aristotle's (322-384 H.Q), Avicenna (370-428 H.Q), and Aviross (520-595 H.Q) constituted the core of this article. Contradiction and ambiguities seen in some of Aristotle's ideas is considered as the origin of the differences of his exponents about this matter. Philosophers such as Alexander Aphrodisias and (2 and 3 BC), Aviross attributed materiality and mortality of individuals’ souls and also Avicenna attributed immateriality and immortality to Aristotle. Some definitions of Aristotle on soul based on immateriality and immortality as well as his emphasis on soul simplicity is an expression of accurate viewpoint of Avicenna, not related to Aviross. Avicenna relying on the lack of dividing the location of intelligible forms and also according to personal science of self-esteem proves personal souls immateriality and survival of them. But, Aviross was not able to prove the personal souls immateriality based on the unity of intellect course and the relation of potential intellect and active intellect and eventually, Then did not consider them as immaterial and one.

An important subject of resurrection is the issue of individual survival and it is emphasized on by teachings of divine religions; however, followers of Ibn Rushd attribute the denial of human individual resurrection to him who is a great Islamic philosopher. Some of the Ibn Rush􀀇s statements confirm this attribution because for him, human soul is abstract, he does not believe in physical resurrection and for him, numerical plurality is exclusive to materials. The result of these three introductions leads to the fact that human abstract soul cannot be united after death of the body. Therefore, we should believe in unity of human soul after death. Since Ibn Rush is a Muslim, he should believe in numerical plurality of human souls in resurrection. To deny this attribution to him, some solutions could be proposed. Firstly, we can accept this rule with its apparent meaning in that numerical plurality is existed within materials. Secondly, some of Ibn Rushd􀀇s statements suggest that either he does not always undertake this rule or he takes the concept of material as general and construes it as absolute capability, not physical material. For instance, he recognizes numerical plurality among the superior reasons based on rating integrity.

In the thirteenth century, along with the return of the European thinkers and philosophers to Aristotelian philosophy and the emergence of the contradiction between Aristotle's philosophy and Christian teachings and religious beliefs, the church put forward a theory known as dual reality. According to this theory everything that is true in theology, its opposite can also be true in philosophy. With this theory, the church accused the philosophers of heresy, while the followers of Averroes considered themselves free of this charge. In his book Faṣl al-maqāl, Averroes appeared to be in favor of the above mentioned theory in a different form. By a precise analysis of the theory through reviewing the now available sources and considering the events followed by attributing this view to the philosophers, one can infer different implications from the theory from the perspective of each of the three sides involved (i.e. Averroes, followers of Averroes and church) and the following division can be sketched: 1- ontological implications: that is to believe in the existence of two types of realities in the universe which can be described in two ways: A) two contradictory scopes in the universe B) two distinct scopes in the universe. 2- Epistemological implications of the dual reality: A) Two ways to reach one reality. B) Two dictions to narrate one reality. C) Duality of the reality in practice. D) Two levels of one single reality. By analyzing each of these implications of the dual reality, one can be led to some consequences according to which based on different works of Averroes; he cannot be accused of believing in a kind of duality which makes him deserve heresy.