ابن سینا

The theory of "graded terms" (alfāẓ-e mušakkik) has been a subject of considerable debate among Muslim philosophers. The roots of this theory can be traced back to Al-Farabi and Avicenna. This article investigates whether or not the theory of graded terms is a legacy of Aristotle and identifies the problem it seeks to address. Aristotle's perspective on terms, especially the term "being", is examined through his works and then compared with the views of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Additionally, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s claim that this theory was also articulated by Greek philosophers is critically analyzed. Aristotle categorizes terms exclusively as either homonymous or synonymous and makes no mention of graded terms (mušakkik). Al-Farabi categorizes graded terms under synonymous terms, while Avicenna, in his Logic of the Healing (Mantiq al-Shifāʼ), places them under homonymous terms. Nonetheless, Avicenna does not consider graded terms to be purely homonyms. This study demonstrates that Aristotle’s categorization of terms proves inadequate in addressing certain terms like “being.” The theory of graded terms emerges as a solution to this challenge

I argue that al-Farabi and Ibn Sina have a significant dispute regarding the analysis of the logical form of the subject matter of metaphysics: existence. al-Farabi asserts that "exist" has a disjunctive meaning, while Ibn Sina contends that it is a fundamental notion. I propose an explanation for this disagreement rooted in their differing views on the nature and structure of theoretical sciences. al-Farabi claims that theoretical sciences are mutually dependent, whereas Ibn Sina believes that higher-order sciences do not depend on lower-order ones, either in their subject matter or propositions. Based on these interpretations, I argue that the distinction between essence and existence poses a substantial problem within Ibn Sina’s framework, while it is considered trivial in al-Farabi’s metaphysics. This significant challenge in Ibn Sina’s thought elucidates the subsequent controversies in Islamic philosophy regarding this issue and the interpretation of Ibn Sina’s perspective. If my arguments hold, it suggests that Ibn Sina does not merely follow al-Farabi in metaphysics; rather, the evolution of Islamic philosophy marks a fundamental shift from al-Farabi to Ibn Sina.

The topic of the "afterlife" is one of the fundamental issues in philosophy and theology that has deeply intrigued Islamic and Western philosophers alike. This paper provides a comparative analysis of Avicenna's (Ibn Sina) and Descartes' perspectives on the afterlife based on their theories of the soul. It aims to identify the similarities and differences between these two prominent thinkers in understanding the fate of the soul after death. The central question of this study is how the differing philosophical foundations of Avicenna and Descartes have influenced their views on the afterlife. The research method is descriptive-analytical and comparative, utilizing primary sources and related studies to describe and analyze the theories of these two philosophers. The findings indicate that Avicenna, relying on the Islamic philosophical system and Peripatetic metaphysics, views the soul as an independent substance that reaches perfection through the active intellect, with its fate depending on its connection to the intellect. In contrast, Descartes, employing the dualism of mind and body and emphasizing divine will, sees the immortality of the soul as guaranteed. The fundamental differences in the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of these philosophers lead to differences in defining the soul, its quality of survival, and its interaction with the afterlife. The results of this study highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both perspectives and suggest that a comparative examination of these issues can foster interdisciplinary research in philosophy and theology, offering a deeper understanding of the concept of immortality and the meaning of the afterlife.

The Book of Salvation (al-Najāt) is one of Avicenna's most significant works, encompassing essays on logic, natural science, theology, and mathematics. The latter section was added by al-Jawjazānī, drawing from Avicenna's mathematical writings. The theology part presents Avicenna's metaphysical principles and his final views on metaphysics. The section on resurrection is a central topic within the theology part. Avicenna states in the introduction that one of his objectives in writing the Book of Salvation was to provide a philosophical explanation of resurrection. In this theology, Avicenna bases his account of resurrection on various principles from his theoretical and practical philosophy, making it, in fact, a culmination of both. Since all currently published versions of the theology section of the Book of Salvation fail to meet the standards of a critical edition and have overlooked the valuable early manuscript of Murad Molla 1410, they cannot be regarded as critically edited texts. This highlights the necessity of producing a proper critical edition. The Murad Molla 1410 manuscript was transcribed by Riḍwān b. al-Sāʿātī, a sixth-century AH scholar, and underwent a thorough comparison with other manuscripts and works by Avicenna for fifteen years after its transcription. At the end of this manuscript, there are five "balāgh" notes (collation statements certifying that the manuscript was collated with a more original copy held by the teacher and confirmed to match it). Additionally, numerous other collation statements appear throughout the manuscript. The scribe also inserted valuable marginal notes, comparing the Book of Salvation with Avicenna's other works, including the Book of Healing (al-Shifāʾ) and Origin and Destination (al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-Maʿād). Given the importance of resurrection in Avicenna's intellectual system and the theology of the Book of Salvation, this article prioritizes and presents a critical edition of the resurrection section of the book. The edition is based on three early and valuable manuscripts from the sixth century AH, housed in the following libraries: Āstān-i Quds Razavi, Haraççi Oġlu, and Murad Molla. These manuscripts surpass all other extant copies in terms of both temporal precedence and accuracy. The article offers an analysis of the resurrection section in the theology of the Book of Salvation and provides a detailed codicology of these three manuscripts.

The principle of causality is one of the most fundamental principles in philosophical systems, although there are differences of opinion regarding its formulation and obviousness. The statement “every possible being needs a cause” is Ibn Sina’s formulation of it. From the perspective of most commentators of Ibn Sina, he believes in the self evidence of this principle. In his works, there are both interpretable evidences in favour of the self evidence of this principle and interpretable evidences against it, which may lead to illusion of contradiction among his statements. Some commentators have considered the existence of this conflict to be insoluble, while others have tried to resolve this conflict in favor of the self-evidence of the principle of causality. This research, which is organized by citing printed and manuscript sources and has introduced the views of some of these commentators for the first time, seeks to describe and analyze their views and evaluate them. The results of the evaluation show that, contrary to their views, the aforementioned conflict can be resolved in favor of the non-self-evidence of the principle of causality.

The theory of the accidentality of unity is seen in many works of Ibn Sina. It has attracted the attention of his commentators and critics. The statement that unity is an accident does not mean that, in his view, unity is included in the nine accidental categories; instead, he intended the additionality of unity to its subject and such additionality, as long as it does not extend to external occasion, can also be interpreted based on analytic accident. Leaving aside his explicit statements regarding the external accidentality of unity, an examination of Ibn Sina's works, based on the question of the possibility of interpreting the accidentality of unity as an analytic accident, yields three types of statements:  (1) Statements that, at first glance, could indicate that "unity is an analytic accident." (2) Statements according to which, in the case of some entities, the identity of unity with existence is raised. (3) A statement that states the identity of existence and unity in an absolute way. A rational analysis of all these statements leads us to conclude that Ibn Sina's statement about the external accidentality of unity contrasts with some of his other statements. This conflict seems to be due to a change in Ibn Sina's thought or an inconsistency in his intellectual structure due to a lack of a clear understanding of philosophical concepts and their relationship to reality. In any case, his view on the accidentality of unity cannot be interpreted as the external accidentality of unity.

The soul is an abstract concept that requires the use of metaphor for its comprehension. The human mind is inherently incapable of understanding intellectual concepts without the aid of concrete domains. Cognitive metaphor theory (conceptual metaphor theory) demonstrates how humans utilize metaphors to grasp intangible phenomena, wherein the target conceptual domain becomes understandable through mappings from a source domain. This study adopts a cognitive approach to explore the conceptualization of the soul in Ibn Sinā’s works through anthropomorphic metaphors, framed under the overarching metaphor "The Soul is a Human" and its subsidiary metaphors. The findings reveal that the soul is made comprehensible through metaphors drawn from domains such as human life dimensions, including birth, management, ownership, worship, physical activity, social interaction, legal frameworks, and negative human traits. These metaphors illustrate the relationship between the soul and the body as well as its connection to higher principles, including the Active Intellect.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important philosophical discussions among the majority of philosophers is the problem of the existence of the soul, its essence, the quality of its appearance, its immateriality, and its subsistence. This problem is also one of the most fundamental and crucial issues for Muslim philosophers, and its kālāmī and philosophical outcomes cannot be ignored. This is because several religious beliefs can be explained depending on accepting this main element in Man’s existence. Without the soul, Man is not responsible for any obligation issued on the part of the holy legislator and, naturally, resurrection and the related problems become pointless. The importance of the soul for philosophers who are not committed to kālāmī and religious views indicates that this problem, irrespective of its religious nature, holds an important place in philosophy. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, as two philosophers who are also concerned about religious beliefs, have paid particular attention to the problem of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the existence of the soul, demonstrated its essential nature and subsistence, and explained the quality of its appearance in the form of corporeal origination, in fact, his new views in this regard are quite famous. However, this paper is intended to reveal that many of his discussions regarding the problem of the soul have been exactly borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. Referring to Avicennan views in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy can greatly contribute to a correct understanding and justifiable interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas, particularly concerning the perception of the concept of the corporeality of the soul, which some wrongly equate with the corporeality of the soul at the beginning of its creation. Here, the author demonstrates that neither is this interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s words correct, nor is this principle solely attributed to him. Rather, he has borrowed Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical views in this regard, as is the case in his other discussions in relation to the soul.

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رساله البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رساله الالهیات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

The principle of the priority of existence (asalat al-wujud), a fundamental tenet of Islamic philosophy, particularly in the transcendental theosophy (ḥikmat mutaʿāliya) of Mulla Sadra, posits the precedence of existence over essence. This theory considers existence as an independent and primary reality from which the essence of beings is derived. In Islamic philosophy, "asalat" signifies the source of effect, and the external realization of an object is through this primordial principle. This article, employing an analytical-descriptive approach and examining the works of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), traces the roots of Sadra's theory of the priority of existence in the pre-transcendental theosophical thought of this philosopher, demonstrating that Avicenna's statements can illuminate this theory. Evidence such as the equivalence of existence and goodness, the indifference of essence to existence and non-existence, the supervention of existence upon essence, and the inherent contingency of existence, indicates the roots of Mulla Sadra's theory of the priority of existence in Avicennan thought. However, differences and distinctions exist between the priority of existence in transcendental theosophy and Avicenna's concept, which are discussed in detail in the article. The theological implications of this theory can have profound effects on our understanding of being, God, the human relationship with God, prophethood, imamate, the embodiment of actions, and so on. These implications demonstrate the depth and breadth of this theory's influence on various areas of Islamic theology.

The question of the relationship between the rational soul and the body, and the mediating role of the vaporous soul, has led to the formation of many philosophical discussions in this area. One of these cases is the causes and symptoms of mental illnesses, such as melancholic depression, which, from Avicenna's perspective, the most important reason for its occurrence and the most effective method of treatment should be sought in the relationship between the rational soul and the body. Melancholic depression means the deviation of human thoughts and mental images from the correct path, in which case the correspondence of cognitive concepts with the external world is disrupted, and therefore the person is immersed in their own incorrect thoughts and beliefs. This mental illness has different levels, and in its most severe form, mania, the patient's perceptions are greatly deviated from the real world, they constantly think about the dead, and may consider themselves dead. From Avicenna's point of view, the main cause of this disease should be sought in the weakness of the vaporous soul, which weakens the connection between the soul and the body. The root of this weakness is also the predominance of the melancholic temperament in the brain, which disrupts the function of the vaporous soul as the link between the soul and the body. Overall, Avicenna's approach to melancholic depression shows his comprehensive approach to mental disorders, an approach that is rooted both in his philosophical foundations and in empirical evidence and studies.

The question of human perfection and the perfect human is a subject of attention for all religions and philosophical, ethical, and educational schools of thought. The ultimate perfection is a level of human existence in which all innate, spiritual, and human potentials are actualized through spiritual practice. The main goal of this research is to examine human perfection from the perspectives of Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi. A comparative method has been used to achieve this goal. In Ibn Sina's epistemological approach, only rational intuition is applicable, and it is not possible to speak of mystical knowledge and heart intuition. Ibn Sina considered the ultimate goal of knowledge and happiness to be rational and cognitive understanding, and connection to the Active Intellect, which is based on theoretical reason and rational intuition. However, in Ibn Arabi's intellectual system, every being is ontologically a manifestation of the name or names of God, and epistemologically, their understanding of God depends on their ability to receive divine manifestations. In Ibn Arabi's epistemological and intellectual system, the higher truths are received with the help of discovery and intuition and are of the nature of presentational knowledge. In Ibn Arabi's epistemological and intellectual system, human perfection is depicted based on love and discovery and intuition. Therefore, the perfect human of Ibn Sina, in his rational-intuitive perfection, is consistent with the mystical perfect human of Ibn Arabi. Therefore, the perfection of theoretical reason within the Peripatetic framework is a connection to practical reason and is incomplete without it. In both viewpoints, it is stated that humans have different levels of perfection. Acquiring these levels is gradual, and after going through this process of gradual perfection and ascending the levels of perfection, a human finally reaches the lofty position of his ultimate perfection. A review of Ibn Arabi's religious and mystical texts shows that he was by no means separate from society but was rather within it and considered the isolation of mystics and shunning society to be wrong. The perfect human of Ibn Sina, in a philosophical-mystical view, is the same as the mystical perfect human of Ibn Arabi and has no superiority over the perfect human of mystics. Therefore, it is not only the perfect human of Ibn Sina who is closer to the human of Islam and the Quran, but also the mystical perfect human of divine mystics, due to his complete manifestation of God, is the same as the Quranic and Islamic perfect human.

Since Avicenna considers the main function of the estimative faculty to be the apprehension of intentions (maʿānī), other functions of this faculty must be understood in light of this form of apprehension. His primary and well-known meaning of intention is something inherently non-sensible that nonetheless exists within the particular sensibles. These intentions can generally be categorized under the duality of agreeableness (muwāfaqa) and disagreeableness (muẖālafa). Thus, a connection can be established between this class of intentions and particular accidents of existent qua existent. However, intentions never lose their relational aspect to the sensibles neither in the actualization nor in conceptualization. Avicenna also considers another kind of intention apprehended by estimation. This type of intention is nothing but the relation among the sensible forms, which is perceived from the external sensible objects and entities. Although this intention is non-sensible, unlike the first type, it is derived from and reducible to sensibles. Based on this second kind of intention, one can explain how, in estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt), judgments about sensibles are generalized to non-sensible objects. Furthermore, this generalization, if applied to the sensibles and their attributes, leads to the formation of induction. Given that Avicenna considers methodic experience (tajriba) to be the result of the conjunction between sensory induction and syllogism, it can be concluded that the estimative faculty and its apprehended intentions play a central role in the formation of empirical method and knowledge.

A miracle is one of the most important signs of proving the truthfulness of a prophet in his claim of prophethood. Therefore, discussing what a miracle is and explaining how it differs from magic and other supernatural events, is one of the basic issues in this field. In the present study, we first compared the philosophical explanations of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on this issue; then, by referring to the content of the Qur'an and using clear historical semantics, we have evaluated the extent of matching the philosophical findings with the Qur'anic content. As a result of these investigations, it became clear that Ibn Sina, by emphasizing the specific characteristics of the prophets, and Mullah Sadra, by considering miracles as gifted, explained the philosophical differences between miracles and magic. They have considered the prophet's soul to be the proximate agent for the miracle. Ibn Sina also implicitly accepted the proof of the signification of a miracle on the truth of the claim of prophecy, while Mulla Sadra considers this signification to be unique to nonsensuous miracles. Qur'anic studies showed that the interpretations regarding miracles in the Qur'an show the inherent signification of miracles and proof of the truth of the claim of prophecy, and in this way, the distinction between magic and miracles is also clarified. On the other hand, by categorizing the types of miracles in the Qur'an, it became clear that a prophet is considered the proximate agent only in certain types of miracles. In the end, it is concluded that the philosophical efforts of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra were in many cases consistent with the Qur'anic intentions, and in cases where this concordance does not exist, newer philosophical explanations should be followed.

The explanation of the possibility of the reality of the primary intelligibles in the realm of habitual intelligence is an important epistemological issue. Two perspectives on explaining this matter are noteworthy: first, the speculative intellect at the level of habitual intelligence possesses the primary (non-acquired) intelligibles, and these intelligibles themselves (independent of anything external to the intellect) are valid. Second, verifying the reality of the primary intelligibles is not possible without relying on presential sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, this dependence has been emphasized more in the discussion of the "levels of speculative intellect." However, in the reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemology, attention has generally been paid to expressions that demonstrate the independence of the intellect from the senses or any matter external to the intellect. In the forthcoming paper, after expounding and criticizing the first perspective, we will show that Avicenna's views support the second perspective. Any kind of reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemological perspective in this regard, without considering his views on the "levels of speculative intellect" and the intellect's dependence on presential sensory perception, is not in line with his perspective. In general, according to the selected perspective, "sense intuition" is the first psychical reality to which the self is connected. The prior connection of the self to the psychical reality is the origin of actualization and the basis of the validity of the primary intelligibles; therefore, the speculative intellect relies on presential sensory perception while being independent in other respects.

Thought is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic of humans, setting them apart from other beings. For this reason, one of the influential factors in education is the cultivation and strengthening of the rational faculty. In Islamic philosphy, rational education has also been given serious attention. The main purpose of this research is to explain the methods of rational education in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. The research population includes the works of Ibn Sina, from which materials related to philosophical and educational foundations and methods of rational education have been purposefully selected. The findings indicate that the methods of rational education should be in line with the goals and principles and in accordance with them, and should guide the learners to choose the correct rational path and enrich the levels of reason until they reach the ultimate goal of rational education -which is divine proximity. These methods include cultivating creativity (creating a creative space), cultivating reason (through play and argumentative dialogue), question-based dialogue, participation, controlling the excesses of the soul, intellectual intuition, and the method of asceticism, which have been identified and explained. The application of the aforementioned methods can be effective in creating a foundation and smoothing the path for rational education in the educational system.

An existential analysis of dispositions is a significant matter. Based on this perspective, the place of dispositions within the soul and its impact on the theoretical and practical aspects of human life is explained philosophically. This paper intends to examine this issue from Avicenna's perspective. According to him, the essence of dispositions is formed in the relationship between the soul and the body through faculties. If the practical intellect has a superior position relative to the animal faculties, the soul acquires a mediating disposition; and if the superior position belongs to the animal faculties, a disposition of excess or deficiency befalls the soul. This occurrence takes place through the Active Intellect and with three preparatory causes: addiction, temperament, and society, and it has an impact on both the theoretical and practical aspects of the soul. In the theoretical realm, if the soul is purified, it becomes more prepared to receive the intelligible. In the practical realm, the formation of dispositions leads to the continuity of action and the formation of habits, which can determine subsequent dispositions. Despite Avicenna's more precise explanation of this issue compared to previous philosophers, since he considers the soul to be purely immaterial and the changes in the soul to be of the type of accidental changes, he cannot provide a suitable explanation of how human beings can be perfected through dispositions.

In order to comprehensively describe and explain the intellectual system of Sheikh Al-Raees Abu Ali Sina, especially to recognize the amount and quality of his philosophical innovations, it is necessary to refer and cite his lesser-known works, including the book Al-Insāf. This necessity goes back not only to the need to complete the geometry of his "Eastern wisdom", but also to the correct presentation of the principles and foundations of the philosophical thought of the Islamic world and the degree of independence and identity of the phenomenon called "Islamic philosophy". Another aspect of the importance of this reference and research is that Ibn Sina, in the mentioned book, examines and evaluates the opinions of the old and new commentators of Aristotle, among the conventional philosophical traditions up to his time. Something that can be seen in few works of this kind. Despite the certainty of attributing the authorship of the work to Ibn Sina, there are many questions about the themes and subjects of this book. In addition, discussions have been raised about the time of creation and authorship of the work, the quantity and quality of the content, and the issue of its rewriting. In this article, an attempt has been made to answer some of the aforementioned questions by using historical and philosophical sources and parts of the text of the Al-Mubahasat as an important witness and proof. In general, it should be said that Al-Insāf has an original version and a rewritten version, and in each of them, Ibn Sina had a different treatment compared to the descriptions of Aristotle's books. His effort has been to resolve the ambiguities in Aristotle's books based on rational and definite criteria, while making a fair judgment between different opinions, by determining the principles that he obtained from the main books of wisdom. In the meantime, the process of Avicenna's and his students' scientific relations with the thinkers of that time, especially the people of Baghdad, has been clarified to some extent. In order to refer to Ibn Sina's own works and literature in this context, the translation of a part of the text and the appendices of Al-Mubahasat have been attached to this article.

The central issue of this paper is to explain the place of pleasure and happiness and their relationship in the thought of Ibn Sina and Epicurus, and to conduct a comparative study of these concepts. For this purpose, using a descriptive-analytical method and library sources, we will examine the Epicurean approach to pleasure and happiness, with a focus on superior pleasure, the four-part cure, and the various dimensions of their hedonism and sensualism. In fact, Epicureans consider the primary goals of moral theory to be describing the nature of happiness and outlining the methods to achieve it. In the case of Ibn Sina, we will explore superior pleasure and types of happiness in his philosophy, drawing on his teleology and focusing on the concept of perception. Ibn Sina connects happiness to specific types of pleasure. Finally, since Epicurus and Ibn Sina present unique concepts of pleasure and happiness based on different worldviews, we will conduct a comparative analysis focusing on virtue-oriented approaches and perception, because both philosophers emphasize the central role of ethics and virtue in the pursuit of happiness. Based on the aforementioned points, this paper compares the views of Epicureans and Ibn Sina on pleasure and happiness.

Undoubtedly, Ibn Sina is the most important philosopher in the Islamic world. Understanding his thought requires new readings that can enable us to comprehend and explain philosophy in the Islamic world more accurately. To this end, in the first step of this research, the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's view has been analyzed. This analysis is refined in the reading of the idea of philosophy as a way of life, whose architect is the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot's work on ancient philosophy challenged the understanding of that period by contemporary philosophers. It seems that such a reading can also be applied on the philosophy in the Islamic world. This can be better understood in light of the Muslim philosophers' view of happiness. To this end, by presenting a holistic view of Ibn Sina's thought, we will show that Ibn Sina's existential view is consistent with his philosophical system. It seems that such an explanation offers a more useful reading of Ibn Sina in Hadot's idea. Therefore, to achieve this goal, this research has attempted to briefly explain the importance of the question of what philosophy is among contemporary thinkers and then present a theory of philosophy as a way of life. In the following, an attempt has been made to examine the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's thought with the aforementioned idea and an analysis of the necessity of accepting Ibn Sina's holistic system.