احکام پسینی

Metaphysics has a long-standing history in philosophy. Although it does not date back as far as philosophy itself, it has always been a fundamental part of philosophical systems and is regarded as "first philosophy", the highest domain of rational knowledge. At times, metaphysics has been considered synonymous with philosophy, addressing fundamental questions about the essence and reality of things, or pure being. However, as intellectual developments have progressed, metaphysics has faced serious criticism and even outright rejection. Immanuel Kant and Rudolf Carnap, two prominent philosophers from distinct philosophical traditions, adopted critical stances toward metaphysics, resulting in profound transformations within this field. Kant, through his Copernican Revolution and his distinction between analytic/synthetic propositions and a priori/a posteriori concepts, examined the conditions under which metaphysics could be considered possible. In contrast, Carnap, a leading figure of the Vienna Circle, developed theories on analytic/synthetic judgments and their relationship to experience, establishing an epistemological framework that dismissed metaphysical propositions as meaningless. This article seeks to address the following questions: Which aspects of Kant’s philosophy revitalized philosophical thought and influenced Carnap and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle? How did Kant critique and redefine metaphysics? How did Kant’s rationalist philosophy shape the empiricism of the logical positivists? A comparison of these two philosophers’ perspectives reveals that Carnap drew significant inspiration from Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists between them: Kant sought to liberate metaphysics from its traditional framework and redefine it in a scientific and rigorous manner. In contrast, Carnap, emphasizing empiricism and dismissing metaphysics as futile, aimed to abolish it entirely and pave the way for the scientific advancement of human knowledge.