ادراک خیالی

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the incremental fourth dimension. The basis of the incremental view of time is the non-existent future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not directly addressed this idea; however, it seems to be necessary for demonstrating some statements of Sadrian philosophers about the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perceptions and memory. When we perceive something using our senses or imagination, the perception remains in our mind exactly in the same way that it had appeared. This paper is intended to illustrate that this view is, in fact, unrelated to immateriality and, in the case of admissibility of its arguments, can only prove the incremental fourth dimension. In line with this approach, the author has critically examined the literature of this dimension in pre-Sadrian philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī’s claim as to attributing the idea of the incremental fourth dimension to some thinkers. Suhrawardī maintains that, as each of the motions has come into existence, all motions have come into existence, and they share the feature of being in existence with each other.

Ṣadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding. In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.

In this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.

For Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of therecognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identicalto the one Isaw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science:it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.

Pre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.

In the history of Islamic philosophy, from Farabi to the present day, the imagination and the world of imagination have been very important topics. Many intuitive, scientific, and philosophical discussions can only be explained by the imagination. In contemporary philosophy, the epistemic role of imagination as a mediator between emotion and reason has been neglected. The basic question of this paper is what does the word “imagination” mean?   From a religious point of view, what is the position of “imagination” in epistemology? What is the epistemological value of imaginary knowledge? Using a descriptive-analytical method, the findings show that, imagination is a fact that manifests every moment. It is a form that resembles reality. That is, it has the form and amount, but it has no substance and duration. Philologists have interpreted imagination with titles such as “form-like” and “shadow”.  Imagination, as part of human esoteric cognition, has a prominent place in the epistemology of philosophy, mysticism, and ethics. It plays an important role in human knowledge and his intuitions and perceptions through cleansing and purification. Imagination also play a significant role in human rational behavior.

Symbolism is the method that’s used in two fields of existence and knowledge. In existence one thing consider as a symbol of a truth or meaning; and one of the important usage of symbolism in knowledge is expression and recognition metaphysical truth and meanings. Therefore, it has always been used in various religions and mystical schools. This way has a history in Islamic culture and civilization. We can find it in Suhrawardi’s illuminationist philosophical tradition and Islamic mysticism widely. Considering the effective position of Transcendental wisdom in Islamic wisdom this essay try to answer this questions that how’s the process of symbolism in knowledge in Mulla sadra’s thought? Is it possible to find a method for decoding and hermeneutic in Mulla sadra’s epistemology framework? Analyzing thoughts like imaginary perception, intuition, interpretation (Taa’wil), and self-knowledge, can aid us to access our aim. Therefore, the epistemology of Transcendental wisdom provide a framework in which the symbolism will be strong and rational and also prepare a criteria for evaluating and identifying correct and rational symbolism.

Keywordimaginary perception- realm of archetypes -receptive dwelling place of soul - prove that the imaginary perceptions-Abstract analytical study about Reviews recent thinkers of the imaginary Perception in the perspective of Mulla Sadra the reality of the knowledge and perception and quality of his realization for intellective soul is beyond epistemology beyond and Step into the ontological issues In Sadraean Transcendent. Sadra in the realm of Imaginative perception and general apprehension and part of the general perceptions has some Innovations that has no history in the philosophy Before him. Some of the exponents Disagree with his vision about imaginary perceptions id est Emerging of intellective soul. In this paper we prove that the imagenary perceptions are manifestations of intellective soul. According to this view All people In understanding the material and tangible things in the universe,through the contemplation in td ideal world.Keywordimaginary perception- realm of archetypes -receptive dwelling place of soul - prove that the imaginary perceptions

Suhrawardi considers the imaginal perception as the illuminated adjoining of the lightning soul with the suspended forms in the imaginal world free from man's soul. in this process he does not consider any mediation even for the perceptual forms. Thus by eliminating the involvement of mental forms in the imaginal perception the discussion on mental forms is irrelevant with the external matters. A new thing that happens in imaginal perception as a new matter is the pure illumination adjoining that the perception was devoid of before. In illumination adjoining of the soul with imaginal world the immediate presence of the suspended forms in the soul’s conscience is the passive aspect of the soul and the attention of the soul to this presence is the active side of the soul. The imaginal perception is a combination of the soul’s interactions. Suhrawardi believes that human imagination has the bilateral relationship with the imaginal world. On the one hand the imaginal perception is realized in the relationship between soul and imaginal world. On the other hand the soul could create suspended forms in the imaginal world independent of himself. According to Suhrawardi though mental forms never interferes in the imaginal perception They could be used by soul as tool to create suspended forms and possess in the non – contiguous imaginal world with all souls are its subjects. The bilateral relationship between the soul and imaginal world can explain a great deal of mental problems ranging from the artistic creation to corporeal resurrection.

The creativity of human's soul is discussed in different fields such as psychology, education and upbringing – especially regarding the methods of increasing creativity in human being. This discussion is mentioned in Islamic mysticism and philosophy as well in the two fields of epistemology and miracles. Considering his special principles for egology and epistemology, Molla-Sadra has discussed the two aspects of epistemology and creativity for external objects. Regarding the epistemology of creativity, he believes, although soul's creativity is one of the Godlike aspects of human being, but God invents and originate from non-existence while human's soul uses material, intermediates and tools in all the levels of his sensory, imaginary and rational perceptions; and the meaning of soul's creativity used for God is not true with respect to human being. This research will try to study and analyze this epistemological aspect of creativity in sensory, imaginary and rational perceptions using Molla-Sadra's words in his outstanding writings and will briefly explain some of its important uses – such as proving the introductions of corporeal resurrection and fulfillment of human's real perfection and prosperity - when it reaches to the level of reason

The application of imagination in ontological and epistemological debates of mysticism is always the center of researchers’ attention in philosophical and intuitive knowledge. Among them, imagination has a great role in realization and explanation of many unveilings of mystic. In explaining this issue, Suhrawardī and Mulla Ṣadrā have divided the imagination into conjoined and separated. Conjoined imagination is one of the human’s intrinsic force and the sustainer of imaginative forms and separated imagination is an independent world which is between the world of intellect and the world of sense. In Mulla Ṣadrā’s view, the mystic’s soul by an inner conduct can be united with the separated imagination through conjoined imagination and unveil the ideal forms which have been descended to the conjoined imagination. The outcome of this unveiling is the unity of the soul with its object of witnessing and having an immediate knowledge of it. Suhrawardī considers imagination as a material force and doesn’t embrace the cognation of this with the Idea. But since he believes soul is the main perceiver of Ideal forms, therefore his explanation of the realization of formal unveiling is logical.

This essay explains the meaning of knowledge and perception as well as different kinds and levels of them, moreover, illuminates sense perception from Avicenna, Surawardi and Mulla sadra’s point of view. Avicenna and Surawardi define knowledge and perception differently. But Mulla sadra criticized their explanations innovating in the definition of knowledge and perception. He believed the origin of knowledge and perception is Existence but not Essence. In Avicenna’s eye, knowledge and perception are divided into four main categories: 1: Sensory, 2: Imaginary, 3: Illusory, 4: Intellectual although Mulla sadra and Surawardi divided them into three categories. Having a closer look, surawardi inserted illusory knowledge in imaginary one, but Mulla sadra inserted it in intellectual knowledge. Avicenna regards sense knowledge as material one while it is regarded as abstract knowledge in Mulla sadra's eye. In fact, Mulla Sadra regards the created form by soul similar to the form of appearance as sense knowledge.

To explain knowledge representativeness, at first, notions such as knowledge, representativeness and then levels and kinds of knowledge will be explained and then it will be determined that whether knowledge is material or immaterial. Thus, we have to find what Mulla Sadra means by knowledge. Our studies show that he considers concept, instead of quiddity, for knowledge. Also he regards knowledge as existence, and thinks that like existence it is self-evident; though to make some notice, he provides some arguments for knowledge. Mulla Sadra thinks that, like existence, knowledge is gradated, and considers for it kinds such as sense, imaginal, and rational knowledge. He believes that knowledge is an immaterial existence in its all grades and kinds. For him, relation between knowledge and knower is an emanative one; thus, he rejects immanent relation of the soul with all perceived things; and considers the relation between the soul and the known as the relation between agent and act. For Mulla Sadra, representativeness of various levels of knowledge is as follows: he thinks that the mere relation between rational perception and Active Intellect, which is the unity of the real (Active Intellect) and the lower (Rational Perception) suffices to make a distinction between the lower and the real. This representativeness is established between imaginal and sense perception and Active Intellect and soul as well. The important point concerns representativeness of sense perception of the accidental (sensory form in the world of nature). He believes that sensory form is a lower level of the Ideal form of the Active Intellect, since sense perception by the soul is lower than the Active Intellect and the soul. Representativeness between sense perception and the accidental is justified through the Active Intellect.

Esoteric senses are rarely discussed from an epistemological perspective, and hence the difficulty of discrimination between their ontological aspect from their epistemological one. However, one can find epistemological material amongst what is said in this regard. The author in this article begins with a definition and classification of the "esoteric senses", and has an overview on "common sense" and its repertory, and the domain and functions of "fantasy". Then he examines different aspects of "imagination" as a cognitive faculty, especially its errency and inerrancy. In the second part, the author discusses about memory, its domain, its functions, its quality, and the reliability of its outcome. He thinks that memory produces no certain knowledge, but it is a secondary way or instrument for preserving knowledge. It reproduces knowledge in the mind by recalling them. Whenever there is a slightest doubt about our conclusions in our mind, we can review and assess their arguments, and hence, reaffirm their accuracy. A mere reliance on memory is not immune from erring.

The question of knowledge is among the most important subjects heavily discussed in Islamic philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Mullā uadrā. This essay explains briefly Mullā uadrā’s theory on the nature and levels of knowledge.Having offered a short history of the subject in the Islamic philosophy as an introduction, the following issues are examined:a)Mullā uadrā’s innovations in the field of the philosophy of knowledge,b)The nature of knowledge in the philosophy of Mullā uadrā,c)The levels and stages of knowledge in the philosophy of Mullā uadrā.