اعتباریت

Existence is the basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy and his particular philosophical views. In the meantime, the question of the authenticity of existence is of great importance and is the basis of important debates in transcendent wisdom. Sadra has interpreted existence and essence in different interpretations, and each of the contemporary exponents of transcendent wisdom, on the basis of his own particular accepted principles, such as, acceptance of Sadra's personal unity of existence or form, and Sadra's various interpretations of existence and essence, somehow relate the essence to being. Mulla Sadra's commentary and commentary carry that interpretati. The present study is a descriptive-analytic one which seeks to determine the correct interpretation of the type of relationship of nature to existence. Therefore, in this paper, the interpretations of contemporary scholars on the question of the nature of the relation of nature to existence, are described and criticized. The author needs to distinguish between the ontological argument (the world of proof) and the epistemological one (the world of proof) in order to interpret the relation of nature to existenceIn this case, the apparent contradictions in Mulla Sadra's word will be resolved. Thus Amoli's Javidian theory that nature is the limit of existence, although true, seems to be true, but not true, since it only specifies the type of relation of nature to existence in the world of proof.

According to the primacy of existence and that quiddity is mentally constructed, the reality of what is there in the world is of existence, rather than of quiddity. Philosophers before Mulla Sadra were used to argue that quiddity was of objective reality, but after him it left its place to existence reducing itself to the mentally constructed concepts. Different interpretations of the concepts “Asalat”  (primacy) and “I’tibariyyat” (mentally constructed) have a decisive role in our approaches to the objective things. Shahid Mutahari’s interpretation has a real significance for the issue. He argues that it is existence that makes the outside world and comprises the objective things. Contrariwise, quiddity is a mentally constructed concept as an answer to the question “what is it in its essence?” whose location is merely in the mind having no concrete reality in the outside world. That is to say, existence comprises the real outside world but quiddity makes the mental world. It seems from among all those interpretations that Mutahari’s is correct. Here the author has come to examine this interpretation through description analysis and explanation.

Despite of the fact that Umre Khayyam is a peripatetic, he has defended the principality of quiddity. He deems that qualification of quiddity with existence is because quiddity is created. This idea raises the doubt of neglecting a part of history of philosophy by its authors. Semnani criticizing Mulla Sadra, Sabzevari and Aqa Ali Mudarres,deems Khayyam the initiator of debate of fundamental reality of quiddity or existence; reconsiders his vies from Sadra’s view point and confirms his proves. This paper arranging and explaining Khayyam’s view point (in accordance with Semnani’s expression),verifies Semnani’s judgement (according to Khayyam’s view point). This search is fundamental and its method is a mixture of description, analysis and comparison.The results are:1-Shekhe Ishraq was under the impact of Khayyam. 2-against to Semnani’s view point, the ground of Khayyam’s claim is refusing of external occurrence of existence to quiddity, not opposing with fundamental reality of existence. And this is the basicdistinction betweenpoint of view of Khayyamand that of Mirdamad and Mullasadra in this issue.

Sadr-al motalihin's philosophical thoughts as one of the philosopher schools in the field of ontology, has had several ups and downs during the time. So that more of his philosophical thoughts, gradually as a result of evolution, has been changed and he passing out and set aside his previous theories, with new theory replace them, entered his philosophy into new areas. This article tries to observe the course of Sadra’s thoughts, in one of the most important philosophical issues (quiddity and this means that it is something posited) to explain his last comments in this field by examining the Sadra’s different opinions.
The most serious challenge and a problem that Sadra has faced in this case, is that if quiddity something that fundamentally real? He in response to this problem, says quiddity is something posited and it explains by means of the following statement: »quiddity is by accident «,» quiddity is limit of existence «,» quiddity is virtual «,» quiddity is subdominant «.
What Sadra as your final wants, in the form of these propositions, to express, is that there is no quiddity and that Sadra said that it is something posited and with Expressions» by accident «,» limit of existence «,» virtual «and» subdominant«, is in trying to explain it, have been because of the narrowness words (No words), Otherwise, he Will not accept that there is quiddity.

Everything has two aspects; existential and essential or existence and essence. Now the important question is: is it the existential or essential aspect of a thing that makes it real and objective? Which one is primary causing something to be objective and which one is secondary simply qualifying or modifying it? Though there are different opinions concerning Suhrawardi’s thoery, Suhrawardi’s words show that he believes in the primacy of essence in all existents including Allah. According to him, existence is an unreal and a purely mentally-considered aspect of existents. Following an analytical method, this article aims at finding a commonality among illuminationist philosophy, peripatetic philosophy and transcendental philosophy. According to this article, illuminitionist philosophical principles are too weak to pave the way for establishing a strong philosophical system

Principality of Existence and the mentally positedness of quiddity is the issue constituting the foundation of many philosophical problems. This principle, as existing today in philosophical fields, has not been nourished in illumination school. Nevertheless, with respect to the principle of “non-addition of existence over quiddity in external world” in his works, and the arguments he has provided to prove this principle under the rubric of proofs on mentally positedness of existence, Suhrawardi is accused of accepting the notion of principality of essence. However, the discourse of the principality of existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works is clearly stated with respect to the proofs he has provided to prove this principle, and also due to his criticizing the arguments of those believing in mentally positedness of existence. In this article, it is tried to examine Suhrawardi’s proofs on mentally positedness of existence and Mullā Ṣadrā’s critiques on it.

Sohrawardi has a significant contribution in the theory of reality, as some of the basic principles of this theory have been droved from his viewpoint or have been the reflection of his thoughts. Different contrasting interpretations of Sohrawardi’s reality and reliability and not paying attention to his explicate have aroused extensive debates such as ,if Sohravardi cognizes existence as something credential and reliable , how would he consider human sensuality and its transcendent possessing a simple and nonidentity existence so that Mulla Sadra inevitably had to interprets his expressions to refute the contradictions. The main purpose of this paper is to review and analyze Mulla Sadra’s attributed contradictions to Sohrawardi in the matter of reliability of existence. This article is going to show: 1-The key to solve some of the ambiguities regarding the antecedents’ words is related to the terminology of expressions. 2-The authenticity and reliability matters are the progression of the matter of abundance of existence over substantiality. 3-Due to Sohrawardi`s explicit words, there is no contradiction in his speech, so it needs no interpretation.

Since Molla Sadra’s era، various exegeses have been made of the principality of existence (isalat al-wujoud) and non-principality of quiddity which can be placed in three distinct groups: 1) common-sense exegeses، 2) philosophical exegeses، and 3) mystical exegeses. Common-sense exegesis is the one derived from a common sense viewpoint of the universe، which presupposes the quiddities external. Philosophical exegesis is due to a rational and exact viewpoint of the quiddity. In this view، quiddity is considered something that is derived from the limitation of the existence of the entities. Finally، mystical exegesis is one derived from the direct knowledge of the entities and in which quiddity is simply some mental appearance. The article shows that philosophical and mystical exegeses are correct exegeses of principality، whereas common-sense exegesis is an incorrect one that is the result of an inexact view of the quiddity.

The Mulla Sadra’s ontological system and all his innovations in this field is based on the theory of the “primacy of existence” and “non-primacy of quiddity”. The accuracy and validity of this theory depends on the soundness of his arguments for primacy of existence and his responses to the criticism and related doubts. Through an analytic approach، this article addresses Sadra’s responses to the Shaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism on this issue. The article shows that Mulla Sadra’s responses to Shaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism are not successful.

The doctrine of asalat al-wujud (Principiality of Existence) is perhaps the most important basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Mulla Sadra is mostly considered as the first founder of this doctrine. The doctrine of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity" has been interpreted in three ways" 1- quiddity is "existential limit" of existence; 2- quiddity is "mental limit" of existence"; and 3- quiddity is "the same as existence". The two first interpretations are caused by confusion between subject and object and confusion between epistemology and ontology. The best interpretation of the doctrine of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity" is the third interpretation according to which quiddity is "the same as existence". The author of the present article seeks to show that concerning "existence" and "quiddity" Aristotle is of an opinion which is the same as the third interpretation- "principiality of existence and mentallypositedness of quiddity". Having distinguished "existence" from "quiddity" in the mind, Aristotle claims for "sameness of existence and quiddity" in the external; world; and this is the same as Mulla Sadra's idea of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity".

The principlility of existence is one of the most fundamental innovations of Mulla Sadra, which in turn influenced lots of philosophical subjects. Although it is clear and articulated for the metaphysicians of Hikmat al-Mutaalia, sometimes there are some obscure interpretations of the principally of existence according to which the quiddity varies from "pure mirage" to "real thing". According to the obscure interpretation of the principality of existence, quiddity is as real as existence, but quddity is not "existence" by itself, but by existence and they both exist as a single instance of being. Those who believe in this interpretation, ascribe it to Mulla Sadra. In this paper by articulating the discussion I am going to explain and clarify the exact intention of Mulla Sadra and criticize the arguments and proofs of the dominant interpretation.

The general purpose of this paper is to explore the outcomes and consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. However, in practice, by explaining the role of this theory in solving one of the basic problems of Islamic theology (kalam), it rejects the idea that the opposition between the principiality of existence and the principiality of quiddity is verbal in nature. This paper examines the effect of the theory of the principiality of quiddity on the basis of some contradictory theories in the domain of the semantics of the Divine Attributes and the role of the principiality of existence in removing the related contradictions. In doing so, after determining the source of contradiction, the writer studies the origin of the theory of the principiality of existence and its principles in the history of Islamic philosophy and concludes that the dead-ends resulting from advocating the principiality of quiddity when dealing with philosophical and theological (kalami) problems led Mulla Sadra to scrutinize more deeply and try to find a convincing solution. Finally, he developed the theory of the principiality of existence as a basis for a philosophical school. At the end, the writer has analyzed the semantics of the Divine Attributes on the basis of the two theories of the principiality of existence and the principiality of quiddity and explained the quality of removing the contradictions from the views of Muslim thinkers on the basis of the principiality of existence.

It is attributed to Shiekh al-Ishraq that he holds the principality of quiddity. But this has been doubted by great philosophers such as Mulla Sadra and Allamah Tabatabai. The present paper is going to trace the proofs of principality of existence to the Sheikh al-Ishraq's writings. So, presenting the meanings of existence and quiddity, the paper propounds ten proofs of those holding the principality of existence; it attempts to show roots of the ten proofs of the principality of existence in the works of Sheikh al-Ishraq and claims that Sheikh al-Ishraq means the concept of existence, rather than the reality ofexistence, when he says that existence is mentallyposited.As a result, one can consider Sheikh al-Ishraq as those maintaining the principality of existence.

This article considers all the M?ll?? adr?’s proofs of primacy of existence (a??lat al-wuj?d) found in all his works‚ and concludes that? adr? has two approaches in his arguments: (1) to prove the primacy of existence through negation of original attributes from quiddity (mahiyyah), (2) to refute the primacy of quiddity through indirect proof. At the end‚ we conclude that the first approach and the arguments based upon it are stronger than the other.

The existence of the Absolutely Perfect, or the Infinite Being, is one of the fundamental convictions of all monotheists, especially Muslims. Such terms as Subˆān-Allah, al-ˆamd-u li-llāh, yā Subbūˆ, and yā Quddūs refer to the reality of God as the absolutely perfect. In order to establish such a fundamental conviction, religious (including Muslim) philosophers, have introduced rational arguments and philosophical reasons, which are critically reviewed in this paper. The author also introduces other arguments that have not been sufficiently articulated in the existing philosophical works.