جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « برون گرایی محتوا » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In this article, I examine Fodor's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. Fodor's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, Fodor argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. Fodor examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. Fodor argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that Fodor’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or Fodor’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then Fodor's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

The problem of mental causation is the problem of mind-body interaction; how mind affects body, and how body affects mind. To acknowledge mental causation is to accept the causal effect the mind has on body. Externalism about mental content, on the other hand, says at least some of mental contents are dependent on things outside the mind in their individuation. Accepting the externalism about mental content gives rise to the question that if some of mental contents is dependent to the outside of mind, how can we accept the mental causation? The main claim in this paper is that the externalism about mental content arises no additional problem for mental content. We can solve the problem by distinguishing between two states of mind: its establishment, and its causation. In short, externalism about contents approves the dependence of mind on the outside in its establishment, not in its causation And so we can read externalism about content in such a way that does not deny mental causation. Keywords: Mental Causation, Mental Content