بساطت

One of the debates that has been discussed among sages for a long time is how to attribute God's nature to His attributes. The theologians, philosophers and mystics have come to different views by reflecting on this issue and paying attention to the verses and traditions. Among the philosophers, there are three main trends in this issue: firstly, the negation of the attributes of God's essence and its interpretation as the negation of its opposite from the sacred domain of God, that is, when God is described as the attribute of the universe, in fact, ignorance is removed from God. Second, the conceptual unity of divine attributes and their synonyms in the sense that when a perfection like knowledge is proven to God, in fact, other perfections are also proven to God, based on this in beings like humans; The meaning of knowledge is different from power, but in God Almighty, knowledge implies the same meaning as power implies. Third, the conceptual difference between divine attributes and its exemplary objectivity with Wajib Ta'ala.Believing in the third theory, the contemporary philosopher late Hakim Mohammad Taghi Amoli has expressed many proofs in his valuable book Derr al-Fawad. In this article, his proofs have been discussed and analyzed with a rational analytical method, and it has been concluded that the said proofs are sufficient to prove the theory of objectivity. is not.

In their theological works, Muslim philosophers tend to elaborate on the unity and other attributes of the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) after establishing its existence. In such discussions, they examine the essence (dhāt) alongside its attributes but remain silent regarding the essence independent of the attributes. In some of their works, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī address the reasoning behind this silence. Drawing upon the principle of simplicity (bisāṭa) and the transcendence (tanazzuh) of the essence from any form of composition or multiplicity, Avicenna arrives at the theory of the conceptual unity of attributes. He considers essential attributes such as knowledge and power to be inextricable concomitants (lawāzim) of, and posterior to, the essence. From Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn’s perspective, all determinations dissolve in the Unique Essence (al-dhāt al-aḥadiyya), while attributes, names, and their manifestations are collectively present at the level of Oneness (wāḥidiyya). ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī holds that each of God's perfectional attributes (al-ṣifāt al-kamāliyya) encompasses other perfections. Emphasizing the absoluteness of the essence and distinguishing between the two ranks of Uniqueness (aḥadiyya) and Oneness (wāḥidiyya), Ṭabāṭabāʾī regards names and attributes as posterior to the rank of essence. Given the indescribability of the essence, any discourse on the Unique Essence is deemed impossible. The present study employs a descriptive-analytical method, seeking to examine the philosophical silence in confronting the Unique Essence by analyzing the views of Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.

“The Rule of the One (Qāʻîdâh Al-Wāḥîd)” regarded as one of the fundamental philosophical rules, which is not only directly or indirectly connected with several philosophical issues about God, cosmos, knowledge and so on, but also some thinkers have used it in other sciences such as Physics (Ṭâbīʻîyyāt) and Jurisprudence (Ûṣūl al-Fîqh). Although historically rooted in ancient Greek philosophy, the Rule of the One, like other philosophical rules, after the introduction of the Science of Philosophy into the Islamic world, was dealt with by Muslim philosophers. The Rule of the One indicates that from a one simple cause only one effect is produced. The Muslim philosophers have often used this rule to explain how creatures are produced from a one supreme cause. However, this rule in that is related to God and His agency, can be considered as a Kâlāmī (theological) problem. Hence, most of Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) have discussed on it in their writings.In spite of the significance of this rule and its several usages in real and conventional sciences, the Muslim thinkers don’t agree on it. So, in discussing on the Rule of the One, some Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, Sûrâwârdī and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, using the foundations of their philosophical systems, not only have accepted and proved this rule, but also have employed it in their philosophical views. But many Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) and mystics and even some philosophers have not accepted this rule, and consequently, have criticized it. Apparently, no book has been written about this rule by the early Muslim thinkers, but in the writings of the later Muslim thinkers, there are many works related to this rule. Of course, as far as I have searched, in most of these works, their authors have tried to criticize the Rule of the One, and in a few works, this rule has been defended. Since the acceptance or rejection of the Rule of the One has very important implications for the philosophical epistemological and cosmological issues, and many philosophers’ belief in this rule has been one of the main causes of the criticisms of the opponents of philosophy against the Muslim philosophers, it is necessary to classify, analyze and evaluate the criticisms arisen against this rule in order to respond to them, based on the foundations of Transcendent Philosophy. After classifying and examining the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, it was found out that, in general, these criticisms either have arisen from denying or rejecting one of the philosophical foundations of this rule (Kâlāmī (theological) criticisms) or from considering this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules (philosophical criticisms). In this paper, I have tried to classify, analyze and evaluate, by a descriptive-analytical method, the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One. The findings of this paper show that these criticisms can generally be classified in two main kinds of criticism: the first kind is related to the criticisms which have been arisen against the reasons for the Rule of the One, and in which those reasons have been considered as insufficient for proving this rule; and the second kind is related to the criticisms which, apart from the reasons for proving the Rule of the One, have considered this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules.According to what has been discussed in this paper, it can be said that   For some contemporary scholars of philosophy, the Rule of the One is incompatible with some philosophical doctrines, such as “The Simple Reality’s being All theThings”, “The particular and immediate knowledge of God to things”, “The soul’s being, in its unity, all its faculties”, “The simplicity of the essence of Necessary Being”, “The immediate relation of the existents with the Necessary Being”, and “God’s being the Willing”. 2. Some other scholars of philosophy, taking a historical approach to the Rule of the One and its origin in Greek philosophy, believe that this rule is confined to the natural causes. They argue that Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, should not applied this rule to the Divine agent, especially to the Necessary Being.3. Some others, emphasizing on some philosophical doctrines such as “the absence of necessary concomitance between the conceptual multiplicity and the extensional multiplicity” and “the possibility of analyzing a simple essence into various concepts”, consider the production of many effects from a one simple cause as possible, and thereby, criticize the Rule of the one.4.Finally, Some other scholars, based on some philosophical foundations, regard the essence of Necessary Being as the Comprehensive of all the Attributes of Perfection, which implies the possibility of inclusion of the multiplicity of existential perfections in a simple essence. At the end, I have concluded that in most of the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, we can see two kinds of error: “the confusion between the Concept and the Extension”; and presenting an incorrect and inaccurate image of the philosophical premises of the Rule of the One, such as “the principle of congruence”, “the impossibility of production of the simultaneous effects from a simple agent”, and “the necessity of differentiation between cognitive and objective multiplicity”.

Mulla Sadra has categorized incorporeality into two types: imaginal incorporeality and intellectual incorporeality. Accordingly, he has differentiated the arguments for the incorporeality of the soul into two categories. In the context of proving intellectual incorporeality, Mulla Sadra relies on arguments grounded in the perception of universals. While these arguments are valid and acceptable, they do not apply universally to all human souls according to him.Another group of arguments for the intellectual incorporeality of the soul is presented by the previous philosophers. In these arguments, an attempt is made to prove the incorporeality of the faculty of reason through the independence of the intellect from the body and bodily faculties. This conclusion is made through different means such as: by negating the occurrence of cognitive disabilities concurrent with the aging process of the body, by relying on the unequal effects of thought on the soul and body, and by the independence of certain cognitive functions of the intellect from bodily faculties.The truth is that these arguments, apart from being inadequate in establishing the intellectual incorporeality of the soul, are rooted in the common understanding or experimental knowledge of previous centuries. Therefore, a final judgment regarding them depends on their reinterpretation based on the findings of cognitive sciences. However, some of these arguments can at least be applied in proving the imaginal incorporeality of the soul.

Among the researches in the philosophy is the study of the effect and impression of philosophers on each other. With the translation of the sixth book of the physics of Healing into Latin, Avicenna's psychology attracted the attention of scholastic philosophers. William of Auvergne is one of the philosophers who was influenced by Ibn Sina's psychology, but this influence has been neglected. Under the influence of Ibn Sina, William proposes the hypothesis of the suspended man to justify self-awareness and prove the existence of the soul and its distinction from the body, but attributes it to himself. He also mentions Ibn Sina's statement on the immateriality of the soul, but this discussion is now known as the Augustinian theory. In the discussion of the immortality of the soul, William of Auvergne has distorted Ibn Sina's theory, which believes in the individual immortality of the soul, and attributed the theory of the unity of the soul to Ibn Sina, a theory that is incompatible with the Christian concept of the afterlife, and as a result, this distortion leads to the church has opposed Ibn Sina's thought. Examining Auvergne's theory about the soul and its attributes and comparing it with Ibn Sina's opinions based on analytical-comparative method forms the structure of this research.

The realization of multiple significances in a unified reality is a significant principle that may seriously disrupt our epistemology and ontology if an adequate interpretation is not presented or accepted. Based on this principle, in the external world, no consequence is basically realized, and at the same time, reality can be considered as an instance of significance and various consequences. Reality is absolutely non-complex and through its non-complexity, it is an instance of various consequences. The mind does not self-foundedly take significance from the external world, rather it is the non-complex reality that allows the mind to abstract its significance. Thus, the significances are indeed realized in the external world, and at the same time, the reality is an absolute non-complex and no consequence and plurality can make it pluralistic. This is obviously manifested in Existentialism. according to the correct interpretation of Existentialism, reality is not merely of existence or essence; neither existence is the source of abstraction of essence nor conversely, rather the non-complex reality is the source of abstraction of both and the plurality of both. Thus, reality is actually derived from both, but with its non-complexity. The difference between the significance of existence and other significance is that it can be realized through its essence, but other significances are the true realization of the consequence.

This paper has been written with the aim of answering the following two questions: "Is it possible to know the God’s Essence in view of Alvin Plantinga? What are its strengths and weaknesses in this regard?" The findings of this paper are: In the Plantinga’s vocabulary network, essence and nature are used in the same sense; in view of Plantinga, God has absolute sovereignty over the universe. Plantinga has the following effects on this sovereignty: The simplicity of the Essence, the objectivity of the Essence and the Essence’s necessaries (which, of course, is accompanied by doubts from Plantinga's point of view) and the infinity of the Essence; After this, Plantinga proves the necessity of Essence or Nature for God and considers God’s Essence as the same as God’s Being. The lack of clarity in expressing the relationship between Essence and the necessity of Essence, as well as the lack of clarity in positions on his statements, is criticized. Finally, Plantinga rejects the belief that it is impossible to know Essence and accepts that man has the possibility of knowing God’s Essence; of course, there are other criticisms of his arguments, such as reducing theology to conceptual issues and presupposing the authenticity of the scriptures. This article collect data and analyze and critique them with descriptive-analytical method and uses library tools too.

Two theories of the union of divine attributes with God by Sadr al-Din and the negation of attributes of God by Ibn-Arabi are two rival theories that still have many proponents. Imam Khomeini considered both theories to be valid and explained in his works.Leading research was based on a comparison of the ratio of the two theories and the search for the root of the difference between the two approaches with terminological and anthological considerations.

This research was qualitative and was done by analytical-descriptive method.

These two theories are in a correct proportion and in harmony with the rules and assumptions of her own intellectual system and due to the use of gradational unity of existence in the language of argument andpersonal unity of existence in expressing mystical experiences, both approaches are acceptable to Imam Khomeini.

  In the intellectual system of gradational existence, simple truth is the Necessary Being that is united with all possible levels and possesses the qualities of perfection inherently and absolutely, while On Personal Unity of Existence, Simple truth is the First issued that has all the possible attributes. Almighty Lord's attributes are substances of divine attributes which bears no resemblance to the possible attributes and like the unseen essence, are unknown and beyond the reach of human knowledge.

The burhāni ṣiddīqīn, the proof of ṣiddīqīn, is one of the most important proofs of the existence of God. Various interpretations of this argument have been made from the time of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā to the present day. Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī is one of the commentators of Ṣadrā's thought and sometimes among its critics who tries to open a new way in ilāhiyyāt bi`l ma`n al-akhaṣṣ, theology in its narrowest sense, by proposing four manners of expression for the proof. The purpose of this article is to re-read these manners of explanation to measure them. On the other hand, contemporary philosophers, such as Abdullāh Javādī Āmulī and Muḥammad Taqī Misbāh Yazdī, have also criticized these arguments while quoting them. In this article, we try to explain and analyze these critiques with a descriptive analytical method. As explained in the article, only in two explanations Sabziwārī has taken a step toward the proof on the basis of originality and simplicity of existence, and the step is also a case of objection. That is, both aforementioned bases are theoretical issues and need to be proven, and using such doubtful bases reduces the strength of the proof.

In Islamic philosophy, two phrases about concept/ meaning of essence are famous: concept of essence: 1) is the most general concept; 2) is vast, upper clear and undefinable. But the independent theory about the affair itself draws us to conclusion that essence (special essence or opposed the inexistence) is in the following of two general concepts: 1) reality meaning general (general essence), 2) real essence (against credit essence). In other words, special essence firstly is subgroup of general essence; secondly is subgroup of real essence. We can define the two mixture as follows: (general essence+ reality= real essence) + property of opposing inexistence= special essence. Therefore, special essence is compound of three affairs (general essence, reality and property of opposing inexistence. Hence, 1. Essence is not the most general concept; 2. Is not vast, upper clear but is secondary clear so is definable. But general essence which is not opposed to inexistence: 1. is the most general concept; 2. is vast, upper clear and undefinable.

Explanation of reality of ‘body’ is something that has occupied the minds of the divine philosophers since long ago, causing disagreements and plurality of views among them. In the early division, a group regarded the external reality of the body to be composed of the components having position and actualized, and another group regarded it connected and simple, free from such components; and of course, both groups had some offshoots and divergences.
Here, Democritus' view in the first group and Peripatetic view in the second group seem to be important views. Democritus regarded body as composed of minor solid and actualized components, and the Peripatetics regard it as composed of connected and simple, free from such components, considering for it two elements: the hyle and the form. Of course, Peripatetics acknowledge that they do not find the hyle directly in the outside world and that accept it because of the necessity of the argument. Illuminationists also agree to some extent with the first view, and – unlike the Peripatetics – deny the hyle as a component of the substance of body.
However, the Peripatetic view is the most well-known among all, for it has been used as the foundation of action for philosophers. Today, the scholars of the empirical sciences such as physics and chemistry have no doubt that the body is composed of actual components. It is, then, as if today the Peripatetic view, used as the foundation of action by philosophers, is challenged.
Some contemporary philosophers see the Peripatetic view unacceptable, and consider the body composed of components. Among them, Allama Hassan-zada Amoli has initiated a new view that has resolved the drawbacks of the previous views, while gathering all views together.

In some disciplines such as logic, usul al-fiqh, and philosophy, there are two main theories regarding the derivative and the truth of its component parts: conceptual superimposition of the derivative and its simplicity. Each of these two theories provides a different interpretation of philosophical problems. Hence, similar to other thinkers in the field of religious sciences, philosophers have exercised extreme care in choosing one of these stances. Among the related approaches, Sayyid Sanad has provided a different view and believes in the limitedness of the derivative. He maintains that this concept potentially (not actually) consists of three components. A study of Mulla Sadra’s views indicates that the theory which has been rejected in the name of Sayyid Sanad in Mulla Sadra’s works is not compatible with what we find in the words of Sayyid Sanad himself. Mulla Sadra is mainly interested in the view of Sayyid Sanad’s rival, that is, Muhaqqiq Dawani.

One of the important rules that has long been considered by philosophers is that of " wajib ul-wujud wajibun min jami`i l-jihat"; transcendent philosophy pays special attention to this principle and treats it differently from predecessors. This paper with a descriptive-analytical approach, examines the meaning, proofs and philosophical implications of this rule as may be found in the transcendent philosophy. And following this study, it has been proven that Mulla Sadra, in addition to the theological consequences of this rule which had been neglected before him, has substantiated the contents of the rule with a new and different reasoning from the predecessors, and in addition to the fruits counted by predecessor scholars, has based the sameness of the Divne essence and attributes on it.  have It has been mentioned in the past that it has used this principle of the essence of perfection. This article also focuses on the new arguments put forward by the commentators of transcendent philosophy in the field and their responses to the drawbacks of the rule arguments.

Ibn Sina holds two radically different views towards the possibility of knowing the essence of things; in some of his writings, he argues in a way that he believes the knowledge of the essence of the things is possible, though it contains difficulties. In some other, on the contrary, he states human knowledge is limited to the accidents and attributes of things. So there is no possibility of knowledge of the essence. In order to shed light on this controversial issue, one should focus on the ontological and epistemological basis of Ibn Sina philosophy. Thus, the findings of the research reveal, on one hand and based on Ibn Sina philosophy, the subjects are classified according to their achievement of the epistemological degree of the realms of sense, imagination, and intellect. And on the other, the ability of simplicity or composition of the subjects shows the number of people who succeed in knowing the essence of things or fail in it. In other words, the access to the higher degree of intellectual knowledge and the ability of composition lead to make the knowledge of essence possible, while remaining in the degree of the sense or imagination and simplicity of subject cause fail in knowing the essence.

The doctrine of "monotheism" is among the principles emphasized by all divine religions, among which only Judaism and Islam have pure monotheism. Since Ibn Meimoon, in Judaism, and Allamah Tabatabai, in Imamiyah, played a significant role in the advancement of religious teachings, after presenting the views of these two great scholars about the arguments for monotheism, the present paper uses a comparative -analytical method to express, study and analyze their agreements and disagreements. The only argument of Ibn Meimoon for monotheism is the simplicity of divine essence, whereas the most important argument of Allamah Tabataba'i is the purification of divine existence, which he has proposed besides the argument of simplicity and other proofs for monotheism. Regarding the criticisms that Ibn Meimoon has made about the arguments for monotheism, this paper indicates that none of them can be directed at the statements of Allamah Tabatabai about the arguments of hindrance and contradiction.

The emanation of the First Intellect as the first thing which was created without an intermediary by Almighty Truth is one of the important problems in Islamic philosophy. The First Intellect or the First Emanated in the Transcendent Philosophy is the essence and transcendent spirit of the Holy Prophet (s) or the same “Mohammedan truth”, which is confirmed based on transmitted proofs and rational principles. Following a descriptive-analytic method, this paper explains the ontological bases of this theory in the Transcendent Philosophy while clarifying its meaning and referents in Islamic philosophy and gnosis. Some of the philosophical fundamental principles upon which the understanding and explanation of Mohammedan truth depends include the principiality of existence, the principle of the One, the principle of the noblest possibility, simplicity of existence or the principle of simple truth, and the principle of the simplicity and diffusion of existence. In the final section of this paper, based on Mulla Sadra’s works, the writers have dealt with the genetic place of Mohammedan truth in the system of being and elaborated on some of the most important effects and ontological blessings of this transcendent truth, such as mediation in divine blessing and mercy, maintaining the basis and order of the world, providing guidance towards the right path and attainment of happiness, and gaining proximity to God and benefitting from His intercession.

In Mulla Sadra’s view the rational soul has been created in such a way that, immediately after having the knowledge and the will, it can actualize its intention as one of its own modes. However, this ability is of different stronger and weaker grades at different ontological configurations and levels of the souls. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the domain of the soul’s creativity is divided into two inner and outer fields. The inner field refers to the hidden worlds of the soul and the outer field contains nature and metaphysics. A clear example of inner creativity is the making of mental forms, and one example of external creativity is the miracles done by prophets and favorites of God. Some of the anthropological principles of creativity in the Transcendent Philosophy which are examined extensively in this paper include the immateriality of the soul, the immateriality of the imaginal faculty, being a knowing agent, simplicity of the soul, and the soul’s being a supreme paradigm. Accordingly, the human soul, as a divine existent who is the vicegerent and perfect manifestation of God Almighty, in addition to its internal creativity can be everything which is rationally manifested to its mind under its control and grant external existence to mental existents provided that it becomes identical with perfect immaterial things in terms of knowledge and act.

In this paper, through examining the meanings of the “simple intellect” in Mulla Sadra’s view, the writers have tried to clarify its specific meaning in relation to the human soul. He maintains that unity and simplicity are among the characteristics of the simple human intellect, and that the general acquisition of intelligible forms by the simple intellect is a particular attribute which distinguishes it from other levels of perception. The simple human intellect is a name coined for the level of acquired intellect in order to, firstly, explain the specific features of this level, that is, simplicity and unity, and secondly, to emphasize the ontological harmony of the acquired intellect with the “Active Intellect”, which is the origin of the emanation of intelligible forms and is in unity with the acquired reason. Mulla Sadra also uses the term “the simple intellect” to clarify the process of the descent of revelation and considers the descent of the Qu’ran to be the product of the union of the simple intellect of the human soul with the Active Intellect or the “Holy Spirit”. It is through this union that the “Divine Pen” or the same Active Intellect portrays intelligible forms on the tablet of the prophet’s rational soul.