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This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

Krauss believes in the spontaneous creation of the world from nothing, and considers the beginning of the world from a Big Bang that is constantly expanding; means infinity of time and space. Therefore, the succession is possible in his opinion. Therefore, he objects to the claim of theologians who prove the first cause by the rule of "succession" and says that if we consider a supernatural being that is outside the system of nature, it leads to the fact that we must put one prior and the other latter, because the series of causes must end somewhere. Therefore, he believes in the succession within nature. The present study criticizes Krauss's thought based on Allameh's thought with descriptive method. Allameh believes that this whole world is a personal unit like the human body with all its parts and composed of series of causes and effects that require a cause on top of each other. By combining the two proofs of occurrence, necessity and possibility, he has presented a distinctive proof and claims that the universe is constantly occurrence due to the intrinsic movement, and because it is a total external existence, as a unit of occurrence, it needs a cause, and if someone denies the intrinsic movement of the universe, its inherent possibility is undeniable, because the universe has quiddity, and the necessity of quiddity is the inherent possibility; therefore, every possibility needs a cause. Consequently, this universe requires a first cause, which is proved through the rule of succession.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western thinkers, such as the infinite regress in the representation, are still unknown to Muslim philosophers: if the mental existence view is accepted, then a mental image will have a “representation”. But, the very “representation” must have another “representation” and so on ad infinitum. In addition to this infinite regress, Husserl has also proposed the infinite regress in the mental images – that is the very objection of the infinite regress in the mental existence and acquired knowledge (al–‘ilm al–ḥuṣūlī) well-known in Muslim philosophy. Muslim philosophers have here suggested the true response that we have knowledge to our mental images by means of knowledge by presence (al–‘ilm al–ḥuḍūrī) and immediately not of acquired knowledge and another mental images. So, there will be no infinite regress. Some have thought that the infinite regress in the representation objection too can be resolved by the very response. But it is not the case. We will try to find a resolution to the objection based on some of the principles of Muslim Philosophy; in particular of Ibn Sīnā’s Philosophy. Nonetheless, we will see that Few Muslim thinkers can be truly objected to bear some sort of the infinite regress in the representation and mental images.

The finitude of the natural body has implications and consequences in some of Avicenna’s philosophical issues. The proof of some problems in Avicennian philosophy is subject to proving the limitation of natural body. It should be made clear that the proof of which issues in this philosophy is the result of finitude of the body and what implications it has. In terms of background, only the finitude of the body and its dimensions has been examined in the existing research literature, and the connection between the finiteness of the natural body and other philosophical topics discussed by Avicenna is absent. To answer the question “What are the implications of the finitude of the body in Avicennian philosophy?” we have referred to the works of Avicenna and some of his prominent commentators, and have inferred and explained its physical and metaphysical implications. These considerable and important implications are as follows: non-separation of form from matter, proof of shape for body, rejection of void, proof of muḥaddid al-jihāt (the celestial sphere which determines the directions), rejection of infinite regress and proof of the Necessary

As a philosophical question covering issues such as whether dimensions of the world are finite or infinite, the possibility of indivisible part, the possibility of an infinite thing, whether time and temporal past incidents are finite or infinite, and regressio ad infinitum in the chain of causes and effects, "Ad infinitum in actu" has since long caught the attention and disputes of scholars. Some of them have argued for the possibility and some for the impossibility of it. There are others who considered the arguments of both sides inadequate and thus remained silent about the issue. Following Kantor's efforts, it was embraced that "Ad infinitum in actu" is neither provable nor refutable logically. Having embraced that mathematics of infinitum in actu cannot be proved nor can it be decided about and that it is far from mathematics of finitude, at last ad infinitum in actu was accepted as one postulate in the theory of postulates of sets.    In their essay showing that ad infinitum in actu is far from mathematical infinitum, the authors have suggested an argument to demonstrate that infinitum in actu is mathematically unprovable. It will become evident that mathematical arguments for the refutation of ad infinitum in actu (such as those of comparison, of the side and the middle, of ladder, and so on) are not real arguments, rather they are mere hints to more illuminate the consequences of the concept of ad infinitum in actu in the light of which one can decide about the possibility or impossibility of ad infinitum in actu.

In peripatetic philosophy Existence is the subject matter and it is the basis of the Peripatetic’s philosophical system, including theology, cosmology and ontology. Suhrawardi analyzes the view of Peripatetic philosophers about existence in the light of its relation to essence. In his view, existence as a general concept is only in the mind But peripatetic philosophers consider it an objective matter and have confused the rules of mental concepts with objective matters. Hence, Suhrawardi believes that the Peripatetic philosophers in the discussion of existence have been confronted with the fallacy of mind and object, which leads to internal incompatibility in the Peripatetic philosophical system. By expressing this confusion, he concludes that existence is a consideration of mind and therefore, changes the problems of philosophy from ontology to theory of light. In this article, by analytical and critical method, first discuss Suhrawardi's understanding of existence and its relation to essence, and then, relying on the views of Peripatetic philosophers, we express Suhrawardi's misunderstanding from his point of view, and in the last stage, Suhrawardi's opinion is criticized in detail. Among Suhrawardi's fallacies in understanding the views of peripatetic philosophers about existence, we can state the Epistemological fallacies in understanding of existence, confusion of accident with accidental, confusion of nonconditioned essence with the conditioned with something essence, confusion of reason with mind, confusion of kinds of distinctions between existence and essence, and confusion of secondary philosophical ineligibles with logical.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western thinkers are unknown to Muslim philosophers. For example, Husserl says that if we accept the mental existence, then there will be an infinite regress in object:object  “idea of object”  “object of “idea of object””  “idea of “object of “idea of object”””  “object of “idea of “object of “idea of object”””” ⁞We will try to find a resolution to the objection – that refutes the mental existence – by means of a rational method and based on some of the principles of Muslim Philosophy. Although Muslim philosophers have not been engaged in the very infinite regress objection, they have been done in similar ones and said that: such infinite regresses are found due to the consideration of our minds and therefore they would cease to exist following the cessation of the consideration of mind. Thus, based on the very principles, here too, outline of the resolution is as follows: except for the first object, the rest are found when the infinite regress is found in our minds by means of the consideration of our minds. So, whenever we stop our consideration, they would stop as well and therefore there will be no infinite regress. Finally, we will have a glance at the infinite regress in object objection of some Muslim philosophers that refutes the active intellect to be the truth-maker. We will show that this infinite regress in object objection too is an unsatisfactory criticism.

The “argument of the sincere” (burhān al-ṣiddīqīn) was first introduced by Avicenna as andirect proof for a creator. He tried to provide a nearly ideal and direct version of the proof for God’s existence. The argument from possibility and necessity found its way to the Western philosophy through translations, and then Thomas Aquinas made tremendous efforts to refine and supplement it as a proof for the source of the world.This paper seeks to provide a more clear account of Avicenna’s argument of the sincere in the Islamic world and Aquinas’s argument from possibility and necessity in the Western world as proofs for the creator. It will then be argued that, first of all, these are two different arguments, and despite their shared foundations, they have different structures. It seems that Aquinas’s argument is like the argument from possibility and necessity in Islamic philosophy and theology. Secondly, regardless of how persuasive it might be to the public, Thomas’s argument rests upon controversial philosophical assumptions and involves lengthy premises, whereas Avicenna’s argument has solid rational foundations and structure, achieving its goal through fewer mediating premises.

The mover (muhrek) is one of the basic elements of motion (hrakah). Mulla Sadra considers the distinction of the origin of motion, its end, its distance, the moving (muteharek), and time as a conceptual one, and believes that all of them have only a single instance; however, some philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, believe in the distinction of the mover instances. Unlike the motion and the moving that are distinguished only in accidental motions, the motion and the mover is necessarily different in all forms of motion. In substantial motion, the motion and the moving unite, but in accidental qualities, the motion is distinguished from the moving and is considered as a property.In substantial motion, motion in the moving is essential and there is no difference between the motion and the moving, and the moving substance is the source of motion in the accidental qualities. Although motion inherently exists in motion substance, it does not suggest that the motion needs no causes, but on the contrary, in this case, the need of motion for the cause is more. In the present paper, first, the difference between motion and the moving substance is showed. Then, the seven arguments of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the necessity of the existence of a mover distinct from the moving are proposed and the differences between the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi are discussed, and by using the substantial motion theory, for the existence of unmoved mover will be argued.

The structure of justification is one of the important subjects of epistemology. There are various views, on this problem, in which infinitism is one of them. This view was known since Aristotle's time and was declined by philosophers constantly. Avicenna, too, opposes the view, although different from Aristotle. In this inquiry, we, with an analytical-critical approach, explain and criticize Avicenna's objections to infinitism and indicate that his arguments do not reach an end. Avicenna poses three main objections: first, infinitism implicates that no knowledge is obtained; second, its requisite is that the restricted some stands equal to restricting whole, which is impossible; third, its requisite is that some principles of demonstration be unknown. But Avicenna's arguments are based on three presuppositions which are at stake: first, justification is of concepts that have not degrees, rather it is univocal; second, arguments are transferor of justification and not a generator of it; third, if the regress of our arguments is to come about knowledge, its components must be disciplined one after another and be gathered in existence and be actual. In addition, his second argument apart from these presuppositions is still corrupted.

From the viewpoint of those who believe in the confusion of “human will regressive chain”, the criterion to consider an act as volitional is the belonging of free will to that act. This criterion is tabled about the “will” itself. That is, if the will is willed by another will, it would be a regressive chain (tasalsul); and if the cause of the will is out of the human nature, it would lead to determinism. Sadr al-Mutallehin and Imam Khomeini have tried to answer this problem. From the viewpoint of Sadr al-Mutallehin the criterion for an act as being volitional is the belonging of free will to it, not the free will itself as being volitional; but by referring the human will to the divine will, he failed to solve the confusion. Imam Khomeini at first defends the viewpoint of Sadra, but finally tries to answer it with an innovative resolution. By dividing the acts of soul into two kinds of “heart” and “organs” and considering will as the heart act and attributing it to the free nature of the soul, he tries to solve the confusion. This research shows that the answers of Sadra and the philosophers before him are not acceptable, but the Imam Khomeini resolution could be defended.

The first part of this paper takes a cursory glance at the various arguments for the existence of God that can be found in the works of the scholars of the East and the West from times immemorial. In the Islamic world, three approaches [to prove God] were generally accepted. These were the approach of the philosophers, the approach of the theologians and that of the physicists. The philosophers tried their utmost to keep the premises of their arguments for the existence of God to a minimum. Also, from the time of Ibn Sina, they called the manner of their argument, ‘the Argument of the Veracious. ’ The late Ashtiyani mentions nineteen versions of this type of argument If we add to these the version of Allamah Tabatabai, then the number of versions of the argument of the Veracious’ would extend to twenty. One of the scholars who actively pursued this problem was Allamah Khafri. After mentioning the argument of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi in the Tajrid al-Itiqad, he mentions four versions of the same in his footnotes to this book. Following this, he also presents two new arguments in which there is no reference to the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes. Then, he states the second argument in two other ways. What is more, he considers this a version of the Argument of the Veracious. Mulla Sadra, who sometimes remembers Khafri as ‘one of the Persian sages’ and at other times as an ‘Allamah’ (a very learned man), objected to the two arguments of Khafri as well as the two innovative explanations of this sage. In this paper, we hope to defend Khafri from these objections.      

One of the reliable arguments, among the majority of Muslim philosophers for proving the existence of God, is the cosmological argument. Avicenna, in his book “al_Ishārāt”, has a particular reading of this argument, which claims to be independent from the creation to proving the creator. So only by considering existence per se, he has proved the existence of God and has called this argument “The righteous” argument. Apparently later philosophers have initially accepted this term and have criticized him using his own criterion. They have questioned if the term is adequate. Two fundamental critiques have been raised. One is that this argument is based on impossibility of infinite and circular regress and the second is that in the argument, the quiddity has been applied as a premise. In this study it will be shown that the argument is not in need for impossibility of infinite regress, but it will be also explained that against Avicenna’s claims, in this argument the necessary being is not derived from the existence per se and the concept of quiddity plays a role in this argument. We cannot call this argument “The righteous” argument as regarded in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. Nevertheless, in peripatetic school, it’s the most direct argument for proving the existence of God.

Sadra believes that all types of causes are finite. one type of this causes is the material cause. If we believe that the material causes of one thing is finite, then we must accept that the time is also finite. but there are good reasons that proves the infinity of time. so we must resolve the conflict between these two reasons. the solution is based on the base of division of time. the time divided to its parts, because of the division of distance of the movement that the time is the value of it. so replacing the straight path to the circular path will help us resolving the problem. In fact, the idea that we have infinite time, is based on the notion of an infinite straight distance while the distance is different than the time, and also the distance that produces the infinite time could be on a circular path, in which case the problem of contradiction between the reasons of infinity of time will be solved.

The representation of subjective perceptions of the outside world and its quality is one of the basic issues in Islamic Philosophy. One of the theories intended to explain this issue is the Image (Shabah) Theory according to which the mind receives only an image of the external object. This theory was not followed by the leading Muslim philosophers and has been criticized by contemporary ones. The present paper argues that, irrespective of the position that one may take with regard to this theory as being reasonable or unreasonable, the critics’ attempts to reject this theory do not seem to have provided convincing arguments.

There are many arguments formulated for the existence of the necessary Being. In a general categorization, one can divide them to three groups: conditioned to the infinite regression, indifferent to the condition of infinite regression, conditioned to the invalidity of infinite regression. In this way, the majority of the arguments for the existence of God belong to the second and third groups. The subject of this study is an argument presented in an article in the 21th issue of this journal titled “Proof for the Necessary Being Using the Infinite Regression Principle: Looking at Avicenna's Argument and the Formation of a Novel Argument.” Presupposing the infinite regression and using some other philosophical principles, the authors of that article tried to present a novel argument categorized in the first group. In the present article, that argument is examined by a logical analysis. The findings of this article firstly show that the argument, regardless of the truth value of its premises, has some formal deficiencies, and secondly has a premise that generally is not true and needs revision. Formal deficiencies of the argument could be resolved by modifying some of the premises and fine-tuning the formal structure of the argument; but unless the false premise of the argument being replaced by another premise, or being modified in a way, the argument will remain incomplete.

The existence of God is such an important topic that has long preoccupied the human mind. In philosophy of religion, philosophers have tried in different ways to prove the existence of God. The proof of necessity and possibility is one of the cosmological demonstrations which involves proving the existence of God using a posterior approach. In Western philosophy, Thomas Aquinas, influenced by Islamic philosophy, has presented a particular version of this proof. In Islamic philosophy, the proof has been referred to as 'burhan al-siddiqin' (proof of the veracious). One of the scholars who has especially discussed about it is Allamah Tabatabai. His version of this proof can be illustrated through the following points. 1- The objective reality of existence is its true being which lies against fallacy. 2- This reality is what every sentient being must inevitably accept and cannot take in any form of nullity. 3- When a reality cannot be null, it means it is necessary and because reality cannot be mixed with inexistence, it has eternal necessity and everything requires reality if they are to exists. Thus, the necessary existence of God is clear and evident for human beings and the proofs of God's existence function as reminding element. The version of the proof of necessity and possibility presented by Aquinas can be explained as follows: 1- There exist the possible beings (the being which can be existent or non-existent) 2- The possible existents are eternal which means if the entire universe is possible existent, it did not exist at a particular time. 3- If the entire universe were possible existent, it wouldnt exist even now, while it exists now. 4- Thus the whole universe cannot be just possible existent, and it must include a necessary existent as well. 5- Every necessary existent receives its existence either from its own or from others. 6- The necessary existents that receive their existence from others cannot rely on others in an endless manner (infinite regress is invalid) 7- There is a being who is necessary self-existent. In this essay after the analysis and criticism of both versions, the similar and different aspects will be stated, some of which are as follow: 1- In Aquinas's version, God is looked upon as only the creative cause, while in Allamah's version, besides being creative cause, God is considered as continuing cause as well. 2- Aquinas's argument is based upon the philosophical principle of invalidity of infinite regress, also he claims a regress of material causes which is not in fact invalid, while in Allamah's version no philosophical principle is presupposed. It is worth mentioning that in philosophy, the invalidity of regress in causes depends on three requirements: actualization, sequence and unity of existence of all causes, therefore the infinite regress of material causes which lacks the mentioned requirements is not invalid. Also Thomas's version of the proof, although does not concern any divine act or attribute, when it comes to proving the existence of necessary existent, cannot prove His absoluteness. As his argument consists of the concepts such as gradation or multiplicity of existence and… fails to prove the absoluteness of Creator, on the other hand, Allamah Tabatabai's version of the proof, first focuses on proving the absoluteness of God's essence and then considers the necessity as its initial determining quality. Thomas's version presupposes and applies the concepts of necessity and possibility, while in Allamah's version such concepts are not explicitly mentioned and although in his argument, the existents are divided into necessary and possible, the intended meaning is different from that inferred by Aquinas's version

Infinite chain means endless sequence or dependence of one thing on another thing. Numerous proofs have been offered for the impossibility of endless chain, the most important of which are four proofs of Side and Amid, the Firmest and Most Concise, Applied and Existence, Copulative existence and Independent. Mirdamad believes that proofs for infinite chain go only through ascending hierarchy and that succession and co-existence are conditions for impossible endless chain. Allamah Mohammad Hussein Tabatabaii, however, believes that proofs for endless chain go through both ascending and descending hierarchies and that three conditions of actuality, sequence, and co-existence are conditions for impossible infinite chain. The present paper proves that proofs for the impossibility of infinite chain go only through ascending hierarchy and have nothing to say about descending hierarchy. Impossible infinite chain has two conditions of sequence and co-existence and infinite chain is impossible only in complete causes.

In this essay I try to analyze briefly the claim and proofs of Mu‘tazilite’s nonbeing objects (thubūt)، Russell''s earlier view in Principles of Mathematics، and Russell''s later view on negative facts. I، then، indicate that since these claims have been defended and reconstructed even in the recent years، it is necessary to reevaluate such views. Since we should not regard their counter–intuitiveness as sufficient in criticizing them، I attempt to show some of their logical unacceptable consequences: if they are true، they ontologically will result in an infinite regress.