جزئی

The discussion of "universal" and "particular" is a significant and pervasive topic across both mental and objective realms. This concept extends from essence to existence, making it an inseparable and decisive part of any philosophical school. A key question arises: How do the meanings and implications of "universal" and "particular" change with shifts in philosophical foundations? In the quiddity view, universals and particulars are confined to conceptual and quiddity domains. The individuation of each particular depends on a quiddity subsumed under a broader universal concept. Different types of universals are the results of various quiddity considerations. However, with a shift toward the doctrine of the primacy and gradational unity of existence, the roles of universals and particulars extend beyond quiddity correspondence. Existence, while inherently particular and individualized, universally encompasses all existential levels. Each higher level of existence embodies the truth of the lower, while each lower existence represents a refinement of the higher. Finally, in the third journey, the particular, in its specific meaning, signifies the encompassing nature of a personal existential reality over its manifestations. The universal, on the other hand, refers to the gradational and expansive manifestation of existence encompassing divine appearances. Thus, universality and particularity are conceptual considerations that vary depending on differing perspectives in ontology, whether they pertain to essence, existence, or their related dimensions.

Porphyry's work titled Isagoge is commonly seen as an analysis of Aristotle's Categories, focusing on universal concepts, with the five predicables considered as different types of universals. Often, the same view is ascribed to Aristotle, but in fact, it is an approach arising from a confusion between universal and whole, as well as a confusion between particular and part by Porphyry in the Isagoge. In Categories, Aristotle does not refer to "whole" and "part" as synonyms for "universal" and "particular. Porphyry, however, in some cases distorting this distinction, uses “whole” and “part” to mean “universal” and “particular”. Moreover, they disagree on the essence of the five predicables and their relation to the universal. Aristotle views genes and species as universals and their connection to individuals as universal to particular, but he distinguishes them from the concept of universal and does not believe every universal is a genes or species. Porphyry, on the other hand, reduces genes and species to mere universal conceptions and consider them as synonyms for universal. It appears that there are two approachs in the philosophical tradition that started with Porphyry. These approachs were perpetuated and broadened by later thinkers. Initially, he altered the understanding of whole and part to universal and particular. Furthermore, he reduced genes and species to mere universal.

The "substratum substance" theory is one of the theories proposed in the West regarding the structure of external objects. This theory posits that object is composed of a particular, bare, and featureless substance along with a set of properties. From their perspective, properties are all universal, and identifying them requires a bare particular. Moreover, the bare particular serves as the bearer of properties and the factor ensuring the persistence of an object through change. Similar to hyle (prime matter), the bare particular possesses no actuality of its own but merely carries actualities. Muslim philosophers have also presented their own perspectives on the structure of external objects. Using the method of comparison, explanation, and critique, this article argues that the arguments presented for proving the existence of bare particulars are insufficient. Furthermore, based on the principles of Sadrian philosophy, this theory can be critically examined and challenged.

Aristotle gives a definition of "universal" that Łukasiewicz considers non-comprehensive because it does not include null universals. In addition, Aristotle's definition of a particular can be understood in two ways: (1) a particular can only be predicated on one thing, (2) a particular cannot be predicated. This double conception, which is repeated with great frequency in the words of Aristotle's commentators, on the one hand, calls into question the opinion of Koons and Pickavance - who believe that a particular in Aristotle's view is unpredicable; And on the other hand, it is a conflict that must be resolved. In this essay, it will be shown that, firstly, Łukasiewicz's objection is not relevent and Aristotle's definition also includes null universals; And secondly, the conflict that seems to arise from the definition of particular can be resolved by distinguishing two types of predication, "in the manner of one name" and "not in the manner of one name".

Evidently the greek terms καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον appeared first in Aristotle’s works as meaning respectively universal and particular. In Plato’s works καθόλου is rarely used as synonum to ὅλον, meaning “whole”, and nowhere indicates “universal” in the logical sense. To be “whole” is a characteristic of ideas, implying a very high degree in the hierarchy of unity, ordered between the One and maltitudes. Aristotle uses καθόλου in several and even inexact meanings. Sometimes it means “universal” in an exactly logical sense, but often and specicaly in criticizing Plato’s theory of ideas, it indicates “genus” and doesn’t include any universal unconditionally. He criticizes Plato for conceiving universals as separate beings, however, contrary to the common view, καθόλου in such contexts means inclusively “genus”and doesn’t refer to species or any other logical universal. In the like manner καθ’ ἕκαστον occasionally in his works implies “particular”, but criticizing Plato’s ideas, it appears often as a synonym of species. Universal and particular, at the same time have some relation to “whole” and “part” and in that regard genus and species are considered as part and whole respectively. In this article we are going to explain the logical, as well as the lexical relation between “whol” and “universal”, on the one hand, and “part” and “particular”, on the other hand, but lastly there seems to bo no relation at all.

Muslim philosophers have been influenced by the views of ancient Greek philosophers in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality, so that the essence of the views presented in the Islamic era can be seen in the opinions of Plato and Aristotle. Avicenna, like Aristotle, has denied the theory of Forms (theory of Ideas) and rejected Plato’s view about the general and partial issue. Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī has accepted the Platonic theory of Forms, but he has denied the Platonic generality in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality and has had a common opinion in explaining of “generic” (Arabic: کلی) with Aristotle and Avicenna, which means that he, like Avicenna, considers generality to be the same of mental concept as independently subsistent. Of course, Shaikh al-ʿIshraq (Master of Illumination) has opposed Avicenna in some minor aspects of this issue and has presented innovations. This article has explained Suhrawardī’s point of view on the issue of generality (generic) and partiality by an analytical-descriptive method and studied the reason of his tendency to Peripatetic explanation of the “generic”. Suhrawardī’s critiques of Sinavi’s approach have also been explained in this analytical study, and their impact on Mullā Ṣadrā’s critique on Peripatetic’s theory has been shown. Also, Mullā Ṣadrā’s encounter with Suhrawardī’s view on the issue of generality (generic) has been analyzed.

Since early times, Plato’s ideas have been assumed as universal entities as opposed to the particulars. More exact analysis of Plato’s terminology, however, shows the contrary. There is no term for “universal” and “particular” in his terminology at all, and he rather uses the words “whole” [کل] and “part” [جزء], which, considering their similitude to “universal” [کلی] and “particular” [جزئی], have been extremely mistaken for the two latter. These terms are developed in the middle Dialogues being closely related with the controversial issue of ideas. Plato regards each idea as one and simple; however, Parmenides’ criticisms urge him to reconstruct his views. To resolve this problem, he makes use of the term “whole” which implicates a middle state between the One and the multitude in the hierarchy of unity. There is nothing absolutely simple and with the exception of the One, all things include parts. In a sense, however, the idea can be considered as one, for although it includes parts, it cannot be reduced to them and so it is somehow independent of them. Such a kind of unity, lying inferior to the absolute One and higher than the multitudes, is called the whole and belongs to the ideas. Every idea is a whole and possesses the highest possible unity after the One. So “wholeness” is almost a synonym for unity or a second unity. It is not the case that the wholeness appertains to ideas, but the particulars also participate in it.

Knowledge by presence has been a matter of dispute in theology. In this paper we attempt to answer the question how and in what way the knowledge by presence of the One will be achieved based on Plotinus and Rumi’s Views. It has been assumed that: there is a possibility of knowledge by presence for understanding the One through Nous; however, it will be achieved in the final step of Knowledge by presence, even by going beyond the Nous. The method of this article in understanding and analyzing Rumi and Plotinus’s discourses is comparative accompanied by the interpretive approach. The importance of the article, especially in the field of intercultural studies, is that although, contrary to Rumi, Plotinus mysticism is not bound to revelation and this mystic did not have much to do with the religion of his time (Christianity), the relative similarities are found as to the possibility of Knowledge by Presence to the One and its quality, apart from the difference in logic and expression.

One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical propositions is inconsistent with his discussion at conditionals; and his analogy between the two realms is more confusing than explaining! Despite this, in this paper, I’ll show that by using some branches in Modern Logic, such as second-order logic, modal logic and temporal logic, many of the ambiguities and the objections can be replied. Also, I’ll glance at the reflection of the discussion in some of Ibn-Sina’s great followers: Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Afdal Al-Din Al-Khunaji, Athir Al-Din Al-Abhari, Khaje Nasir Al-Tusi, Shams Al-Din Al-Samaqandi and Qutb Al-Din Al-Razi. I shall show haw far they are from Ibn-Sina. Besides, it will be clear that their distinctions between contingent conditional and particular cogent conditional are very weak and, indeed, cannot help any way to understand the distinction.

This writing is to explain the scope of the Impact of Ibn Sina's ideas on one of the most controversial philosophical issues in the Christian Middle Age and in particular scholastic thought, i.e. "universals" and consequently the "principle of individuation" with an eye to the ideas of the Scottish philosopher and theologian, Johannes Duns Scotus (1266- 1308) and the way that such impact appears. Discussion about universals and its threefold divisions, in particular "natural universal" and its existence or nonexistence in the external world and consequently the principle of individuation, i.e. the origin of the particular external objects, is among very important and decisive issues which begins in the western scholastic thought entirely under Ibn Sina's impact and leads to long debates between Christian philosophers and theologians. From among Ibn Sina's works, Scotus had studied his al-Shifa which was translated into Latin in 12th Century. Like other scholastic thinkers before him, he has discussed universals in details. His view is, however, entirely influenced by Ibn Sina and adopted from the latter's ideas. In the way he has introduced universals, three kinds of universals, and in particular in the way he discusses "natural universal", its external existence and the mode of this existence, he refers directly to Ibn Sina's ideas; though about the way of unity of natural universal in the external world, his ideas differ slightly from those of Ibn Sina. Also, in negating Platonic Ideals, he is completely influenced by Ibn Sina. Though in discussing principle of individuation he is like other scholastic thinkers influenced by Ibn Sina, his explanation is completely innovative and entirely independent from Ibn Sina's view. Introducing thisness (haecceitas) as the principle of individuation, he goes far from Ibn Sina who considers "personal properties and accident" as the agent of individuation.

Reason”, hikmat, philosophy, knowledge, and psychic faculty, are divided, in Greek philosophy, into theoretical and practical ones. Muslim philosophers diverge on the nature and function of these two types of reason. Some of them consider them of the same nature, i.e. comprehension and reasoning. According to them, the difference lies in the fact that the object of first one is knowledge, and that of the second one is action. Still some others put the burden of both on theoretical reason. Some philosophers consider theoretical reason an instance of cognition and practical reason an instance of action, and they deem their cooperation as leading to a mixture of knowledge and action.According to the common view, practical reason gets to particular knowledge by deliberating on theoretical understandings, so that it can guide psychic powers to action. Theoretical reason enables one to understand facts, while practical reason guides one to manage one’s personal, as well as social, affairs. The author thinks that it is “heart”, and not practical reason, that motivates one toward a set of actions.

Logicians have, since Aristotle, agreed upon dividing “concept” into universal (kulli) and particular (Juz’i). The criterion of such a classification is based on whether or not a concept is applicable to the plenty: on the one hand, this criterion calls for a close examination of such concepts like god (ilāh), necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd), and assumed universals like nothing (lā-shi’) and not possible (lā-mumkin). This is important in order to determine whether these concepts fall into the realm of the universals. Logicians sought to verify the universality of these concepts, and despite the futility of their attempts, their claim seems plausible. On the other hand, the particularity of such concepts as "Zayd" (or John Done) is deemed uncertain. Accordingly, some logicians have considered the universal-particular dichotomy as groundless, arguing that every concept is universal. This essay deals with how Mullā uadrā and Allāmah _abāabā’i have treated this issue. uadr al- Muta’allihīn, viewing concepts from a certain angle and Allāmah _abāabā’i, observing the relationship of imagery and sensory concepts to the objective (‘aini) world, were able to justify the particularity of particular concepts, and thus confirming the idea that “concept” is in fact of two types: universal and particular.